Marine payments for environmental services in an artisanal fisheries context by Barr, Rhona
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marine Payments for Environmental Services  
in an artisanal fisheries context 
 
 
 
Rhona Ferrer Barr 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Geography and the Environment of 
the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 
London, September 2012  
 2 
Declaration  
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than 
where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of 
any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).  
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. The thesis may not be reproduced 
without the prior written consent of the author.  
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe on the 
rights of any third party.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 3 
Abstract 
The past decade has seen a growing interest in the application of the Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES) instrument, in part for its apparent ability to alleviate 
poverty and inspire sustainable environmental practices. More recently, PES 
programmes have been advocated for use within marine environments. However, 
concerns have been raised relating to their applicability in this context, e.g. ill-defined 
property rights and more fluid environmental services. Yet these issues have received 
little critical scrutiny.  
This thesis presents one of the first empirical analyses of the applicability of PES to 
the marine and coastal context, more specifically its suitability to small-scale artisanal 
fisheries.  
The first part of the thesis analyses expert opinions in order to identify what 
opportunities and, indeed, what obstacles remain for PES more broadly in the marine 
environment. The second part delves a little deeper in order to identify those 
determinants which can encourage adoption of marine PES within artisanal fishing 
communities are reported on, paying particular attention to those characteristics 
important for low-income and vulnerable groups. In addition, the thesis investigates 
how PES adoption can be influenced by several key design parameters. Analyses are 
based on primary data collected from six artisanal fishing villages in Mtwara, 
southern Tanzania. 
The thesis presents a number of key findings. Firstly, evidence from expert elicitation 
suggests that the on-going concerns based on the nature of marine environmental 
services pertaining to marine PES could be unjustified and solutions for their effective 
implementation are presented. At the supply-level, fishers’ gender and informal risk 
mitigation strategies are shown to have significant associations with participation 
within marine PES and may influence the adoption of marine PES programmes 
within fishing communities. Moreover, whilst PES design can influence adoption, the 
initial transition away from current management practices can signify a larger utility 
cost and be met with resistance.  
The results have interesting implications for the successful application of marine PES 
schemes, particularly those hoping to target poor households. The findings are 
widely applicable due to a global dependence on coastal and marine resources and 
their continuing degradation.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
1.1 Payments for Environmental Services and the marine environment 
1.1.1 Coastal ecosystems, small scale fisheries and externalities  
In a world where almost half of its seven billion population live by the coast, marine 
ecosystems provide direct and indirect benefits, locally and to a wider global 
population (Halpern et al., 2012). Mangrove forests, sea grasses and coral reefs 
provide protection against storms; provide refugia for many juvenile species which 
later migrate to deeper waters; and are important in sedimentation stabilisation and 
nutrient recycling. At a global scale, these ecosystems sequester carbon and provide 
important cultural and tourism areas (Barbier, 2010; Barbier et al., 2008; Nellemann et 
al., 2009). Together these marine and coastal ecosystems are symbiotic, non-
autonomous units in a larger seascape linked by ecological and hydrodynamic 
processes (Moberg and Rönnbäck, 2003).  
Yet, burgeoning coastal populations, intense poverty as well as persistent and 
destructive fishing practices continue to weaken the health of coastal systems. 
Fisheries now threaten not only the very resources upon which fishers’ livelihoods 
depend, but also the coastal ecosystem and its capacity to provide beneficial 
environmental services to these fishers and others, both now and in the future (Berkes 
et al., 2001; Defeo and Castilla, 2005; Halpern et al., 2012).  
Coastal and marine ecosystems1 are among the most productive ecosystems found on 
earth. Coastal zones comprise as little as four and eleven percent of the earth’s total 
land and ocean area respectively. Yet, these critical areas represent 90% of all marine 
fisheries catch and are the source of as much as 61% of total gross world product 
(Barbier, 2010; MA, 2005; Nobre, 2011; UNEP, 2006). In the mid nineties, offshore gas 
and oil were estimated have an annual worth of US$ 132 billion, trade and shipping 
US$ 155 billion, and marine tourism as much as US $161 billion (MA, 2005).  More 
recently, in 2010, capture fisheries and aquaculture were worth some US$ 98.5 billion 
and US$ 119 billion respectively (FAO, 2012).  
                                                      
1 Coastal systems are designated as the area which include waters less than 50m deep through to that 
area inland to a maximum of 100km or 50-meter elevation from the coastline. Marine systems include all 
those waters extending from the low water mark (50m depth) to the high seas (UNEP, 2006). 
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Fisheries alone provide a vital source of food, employment, trade and economic well-
being for mankind worldwide, in particular to those in low-income countries. Recent 
estimates place as many as 54.8 million people engaged in capture and aquaculture 
fisheries, of which over 23 million earn their living from marine capture fisheries 
(FAO, 2012, 2009, 2005; Lunn and Dearden, 2006). Moreover, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that a further 200 
million people rely on the sector either directly or indirectly for their livelihoods – 
through ancillary employment in processing, marketing, distribution and equipment 
processing to name but a few. Together with dependents, primary production and 
associated employment in the fisheries sector assures the livelihoods of some 660-820 
million people or, to put this number into context, 10 to 12% of the world’s total 
population (FAO, 2012).  
Small-scale artisanal fisheries are identified as amongst the world’s most vulnerable 
and display a high occurrence of poverty; many still live on the margins of human 
dignity and 20% are thought to earn less than $1 a day (Béné et al., 2010). As such, 
these fisheries play a critical role in poverty reduction and food security (Béné et al., 
2010; Staples et al., 2004). Not to be underestimated, these artisanal fisheries 
contribute more than half of marine and inland catch worldwide and comprise 
approximately 40% of global marine catch destined for final human consumption; 
moreover, they employ as many as 90% of the world’s capture fishers, 95% of which 
are found within low income countries (FAO, 2010; Lunn and Dearden, 2006).  
However, small-scale fisheries are one of the major factors affecting coastal and coral 
reef health (Defeo and Castilla, 2005; Hawkins and Roberts, 2004). Persistent 
overfishing and a rising use of destructive fishing gear – in an effort to catch 
whatever fish remain – results in the untiring and increasing degradation of these 
areas. In fact, these marine and coastal ecosystems are some of the most heavily 
exploited; are now considered overfished or collapsed; and continue to deteriorate 
faster than other ecosystems (Barbier, 2010; Defeo and Castilla, 2005; Halpern et al., 
2008; UNEP, 2006; Worm et al., 2009). Globally, 35% of mangrove habitats, a third of 
coral reefs and approximately 30% of sea grasses are considered either lost or 
degraded (Barbier, 2010; Hargreaves-Allen et al., 2011).  
1.2 PES within the marine environment 
1.2.1 Payments for Environmental Services 
In areas of prevalent poverty, justifying interventions which serve to reduce fishers 
effort, catch and ultimately income will prove difficult. Indeed, in the past, many 
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marine conservation efforts met with high resistance and low compliance for failing 
to deal with the socioeconomic aspects of many of these fishing communities 
(Christie, 2004). But compliance and enforcement will not be the only issue, nor 
should it be: interventions which serve to further marginalise and compound poverty 
can not be, and should not be, promoted.  
The problem here is that those who benefit from the resources are not those paying 
for its supply. Healthy coastal and ocean ecosystems are important globally, yet these 
costs are borne locally by coastal communities including those subsistence and low-
income fishers.  
In the terrestrial context, recent conservation initiatives have shown a growing 
interest in the use of market-based instruments, in particular Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES) (Muradian et al., 2013). With a lack of tangible markets 
preventing resource users from recognising or indeed capturing the benefits of 
nature’s real value, PES schemes are considered a promising new approach for 
bridging widespread conservation deficits (Engel et al., 2008; Goldman-Benner et al., 
2012; Mandel et al., 2009; Tacconi, 2012; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010; Wunder 
et al., 2008) as well as addressing many of the inequities associated with the 
distribution of local conservation costs and more dispersed benefits (Balmford and 
Whitten, 2003; Engel et al., 2008).  
PES create direct markets between service users and service providers. In effect, PES 
schemes put Coase’s theorem into practice, which states that under certain conditions 
the problems of external effects can, in theory, be overcome via private negotiations 
between the affected parties (Coase, 1960; Engel et al., 2008). PES move away from the 
‘Polluter Pays Principle’ to a ‘Victim Pays Principle’, whereby resource owners are no 
longer seen as the polluters (or the injuring party) but as service providers who can 
now add one or more environmental services to their production portfolio (Van 
Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010). Direct incentive instruments such as PES, it is 
reasoned, will lead to the more efficient allocation of scarce conservation funds, as 
well as cover the potentially high opportunity costs associated with protection, 
particularly in low-income countries (Ferraro & Kiss 2002). As a result, although 
primarily designed as a conservation tool, many believe PES will contribute to 
poverty reduction and regional development through the payments made to poor 
resource users (Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2008).  
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1.2.2 PES and artisanal fishers 
Artisanal fisheries are often seen as an activity of ‘last resort’ and can represent an 
entry level for policies which target the poor. In the past, marine management tools 
have largely failed to extinguish unsustainable practices, in part due to an inability to 
change behaviour, inspire compliance or compensate for loss of earnings; sustainable 
consumption is the exception rather than the rule (Mohammed, 2012). In the past, 
marine conservation initiatives have focused on legislative tools such as marine 
protected areas (MPAs) and individual transferable quotas (ITQs) as well as less 
direct approaches like integrated conservation and development programmes 
(ICDPs) (Agardy et al., 2003; Bess and Rallapudi, 2007; Cho, 2005). However, these 
have seen limited success due to a failing to adequately address the immediate needs 
of local users; in the worst-case scenarios this has led to the further marginalisation of 
vulnerable fishers.  (Berkes, 2003; Berkes et al., 2001; Davis and Gartside, 2001; Defeo 
and Castilla, 2005; Pauly, 2006). Perhaps here marine PES can represent a win-win.  
In the first instance, can PES contribute to coastal development? To what degree will 
fishers wish to participate? Who will be those fishers willing to participate? Will 
marine PES serve to improve the livelihoods of the rural coastal poor or will it in fact 
serve to exacerbate inequality of these already fragile communities? Given the 
troublingly low compliance rates within MPA design, will the additional inclusion of 
an incentive package inspire compliance and behaviour change? How best can 
schemes be designed in order to promote participation?  
Worryingly, in the terrestrial literature, some claim that PES can in fact increase 
relative poverty in places; under a PES scheme landless poor may become relatively 
worse off, as profits may be restricted to only those with tenure rights over resources. 
Barriers to PES may exist based on gender, kinship or other divisions (Landell-Mills 
and Porras, 2002; Wunder, 2005). Impoverishment is multidimensional and 
heterogeneous; and as such, interventions can have implications far beyond those 
initially imagined and factored for. Within artisanal fishing communities, it is clear 
that these entities are far from homogeneous; fishing communities comprise many 
strata of ‘poor’ as well as some who are most definitely not poor by local standards. 
Marginalisation and exclusion are commonplace (Béné, 2003). On the other hand, 
well-designed and locally appropriate PES can improve livelihoods and even 
strengthen local tenure (Evans et al., 2012; Sommerville et al., 2010b) and their 
voluntary nature may be more socially accepted (Kaczan et al., 2013). If PES schemes 
are to have a place within small-scale fishery management it is important that their 
impacts on the welfare of these already impoverished communities are understood, 
and that they do not further contribute towards the exacerbation of poverty. Enabling 
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access through instrument design will be fundamental determinants of PES’s welfare 
impacts (Mahanty et al., 2013).  
In the second instance, can demand successfully fund such schemes? What are the 
issues surrounding the realisation of this demand? As yet, few buyers are confident 
about PES and its potential to deliver the environmental services promised (Wunder, 
2005). This problem may be more profound in a marine setting where environmental 
services are more diffuse, fragmented and to a large extent ‘invisible’ (Pagiola, 2008). 
Indeed, how does this underlying difference in environment and human dimensions 
affect the potential suitability of PES as a marine instrument?   
PES is quickly becoming the dominant intervention for biodiversity conservation 
(Muradian et al., 2013). This recent and rapid interest in PES has unfortunately come 
with little critical discussion or analysis of the suitability of this approach in the 
coastal and marine context, or how it can work alongside existing instruments. 
Coastal and marine ecosystems comprise environmental systems which are both 
unique and diffuse (Carr et al., 2003; Pagiola, 2008), have ill-defined property rights 
and are home to some of the most vulnerable socioeconomic groups (Béné 2009). A 
greater understanding of how these tools can and should transfer to a coastal and 
marine context and its stakeholders is overdue.  
Marine PES may indeed represent a win-win opportunity; however their window for 
success is tight. Understanding how best to implement these instruments in a 
complex environment and promoting participation will be key. With many 
unsuccessful interventions and unfulfilled development promises under their belts, 
artisanal fishers will require PES to deliver equitably and effectively to permit long-
term success.  
1.3 Aims and objectives 
The growing interest in the application of PES to the marine environment, in part for 
its apparent ability to alleviate poverty as well as inspire sustainable environmental 
behaviour, has come with little empirical analysis of these assumptions. As can be 
seen, questions remain. Who is likely to participate in artisanal marine PES schemes? 
Are poor and vulnerable fishing communities likely to participate? If not, what 
restrictions stand in their way? What design schemes are likely to inspire 
participation? And what challenges remain for marine PES overall, as well as how 
these can be overcome in order to translate best PES to a marine and coastal 
environment? 
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1.3.1 Research aim 
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore the feasibility of implementing PES in the 
marine and coastal context. More specifically, we look at the possibility of using 
marine PES for coastal protection within artisanal fishing communities.  
In the first part of this thesis, we aim to identify what opportunities and, indeed, what 
obstacles remain for PES in the coastal environment and how best they can be framed 
within the marine policy portfolio. Taking these findings, possible solutions for 
implementation are presented.  
The second part of this thesis aims to identify determinants which inspire or indeed 
deter the uptake of marine PES schemes within poor and vulnerable coastal 
communities. In particular, the role of gender, risk mitigation and informal insurance 
mechanisms such as social capital and income diversification are investigated. In 
doing so, the hope is to shed light on barriers which may prevent vulnerable fishers 
from participating and show that programme design can induce participation. In 
addition, choice experiments, a stated preference methodology, can provide a good 
means to test acceptability and adoption rates of PES design. Ultimately, this thesis 
hopes to improve the design and long-term participation in marine PES.  
1.3.2 Research Objectives 
The key objectives of this thesis are as follows: 
1. Elicit and qualitatively analyse expert opinions on the opportunities and 
challenges in bringing PES to the marine and coastal environment.  
2. Empirically investigate the association of individual characteristics, with 
particular focus on gender, income diversification and social capital, with the 
adoption of marine PES schemes by artisanal fishers. 
3. Empirically examine fishers’ preferences for the design of marine PES schemes 
and implications for adoption rates. 
In order to achieve these key objectives the thesis will also:  
4. Produce and analyse primary quantitative and qualitative data which will aid in 
the successful implementation of PES in the marine and coastal environment.  
5. Assess the suitability of the stated preference methodology, Choice Experiments 
(CE), in determining appropriate PES design characteristics. 
6. Produce recommendations for dealing with the challenges in bringing PES to the 
marine and coastal environment highlighted within this thesis.  
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1.4 Overview of thesis and methods 
The thesis is centred on two distinct but related empirical pieces of research. Both are 
based on primary data collection.  
1.4.1 Expert elicitation 
The first part of this thesis relies on primary data collected from experts in the fields 
of PES and/or marine management. Research data was collated via an online 
structured survey. Over the period between February and June 2012, 42 expert 
opinions were elicited and subsequently analysed.   
Questions concentrated on the benefits and limitations of implementing PES in a 
marine setting, the possible use of PES schemes within a wider portfolio of marine 
conservation instruments and the possible role of PES in coastal development and 
poverty alleviation. Open-ended responses were coded using a grounded approach.  
More details on this methodology are presented in Section 3.4. 
1.4.2  Participation choice: Mtwara field research 
The second part of this thesis looks at the supply side of marine environmental 
services through a PES scheme. The first of three chapters synthesises the current 
thinking on determinants to participation and adoption of new conservation 
technologies and initiative. It further draws on the fisheries literature to make 
hypotheses about determinants of participation in a marine PES. The subsequent two 
research chapters use primary data collected from a field study to determine the 
possible influence of individual characteristics and programme design on the 
adoption of a currently hypothetical marine PES scheme. The data for these chapters 
relies on a case study of six artisanal fishing villages along the coast of the Mtwara 
Region in Tanzania. The hypothetical marine PES is designed given the most likely 
restrictions requiring behavioural change given current local circumstances; these are 
however likely to be common marine PES scheme interventions within the artisanal 
context.  
The region of Mtwara is located in the south of Tanzania and borders Mozambique. 
The region is considered one of Tanzania’s less developed (Malleret, 2004). Research 
was conducted within Mtwara Region’s two coastal districts: Mtwara urban and 
Mtwara rural. Together these two districts comprise around 26% of the Region’s total 
population: 92,602 and 204,770 respectively (Barr 2010; Guerreiro et al. 2010). Coastal 
dwellers in these districts exhibit a wide array of livelihoods but show high 
dependence on fisheries specifically (Malleret, 2004).  
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Mtwara’s coastal waters contain some of Tanzania’s most significant biodiversity. Its 
reef system is of critical importance as a source of larvae and spores to neighbouring 
regions and is an important area for many mega fauna. In order to manage this 
important marine and coastal area, Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park 
(MBREMP) was gazetted in 2000. However, the area continues to allow fishing within 
its borders and exhibits no restrictions additional to those enforced outside of the 
park.  
Between April and June 2010 fisher surveys were conducted with 662 fishers, 35 were 
incomplete and dropped. A final useable sample size of 627 was obtained. Both men 
and women conduct fishing activities in this region. Surveys were conducted with 
354 male and 307 female fishers. Survey design followed those guidelines as set out 
by Bateman et al. (2002), and were shaped from focus groups and key informant 
interviews. The surveys collected data on individual and household demographics; 
household assets; attitudes relating to fishing, the environment and conservation; 
fishing practices and income; diversification strategies of the individual and 
household and social capital characteristics. A hypothetical scenario was also 
presented relating to the possible implementation of a marine PES scheme within 
local waters. Surveys with male fishers also included a CE; the single style of female 
fishing was not conducive with a CE. Fishers were presented with choice cards which 
showed two new scenarios alongside the status quo. Options varied over 3 attributes: 
restrictions on closure area, restrictions relating to allowable net size and size of 
compensation payment. Surveys were conducted by a team of trained field 
researchers throughout the months of March and June 2010 inclusive.  
More information pertaining to methods, questionnaires and valuation scenarios are 
provided in relevant chapters. A more detailed review of the case study can be found 
in Chapter 3.  
1.5 Contribution to knowledge 
This research makes a number of novel contributions to the research literature on 
marine PES. To date, little 2  empirical analysis exists which addresses the 
transferability of PES to the marine and coastal context. Discourse on marine and 
coastal PES is restricted to policy and discussion pieces. We further provide some of 
the first quantitative and qualitative data relating to this field, thus adding substantial 
knowledge to a previously scarce research area.  
                                                      
2 The author is aware of only one previous empirical paper relating to marine PES: (Barr & Mourato 
2009)  
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A recent interest in marine PES has seen the publication of a number of discussion 
and policy pieces on the subject. However, the overarching challenges of 
implementation have received little critical analysis. The first research chapter of this 
thesis, Chapter 3, is the first to attempt this. The chapter collects and collates primary 
data in order to analyse what experts in the fields of PES or marine management 
believe to be the more pertinent issues for successful marine PES implementation. 
The chapter highlights some of the major elements, giving a sense of magnitude to 
these issues which have been previously discussed within a wider list of limitations.   
Access to PES programmes will fundamentally affect who participates and who does 
not and ultimately determine what the livelihood implications the scheme will have 
(Mahanty et al., 2013). Within the PES literature, assumptions about the instrument’s 
ability to target poor members of society continue to be based on assumptions 
relating to the apparent voluntary nature of the instrument, however other barriers 
exist. Ex-post studies have examined household factors which enabled participation. 
To the author’s knowledge no ex-ante studies exist which investigate those 
determinants which may reduce desire to enrol within PES schemes, and to a great 
extent within overarching development-conservation initiatives overall (Sesabo & Tol 
2005). The role of risk mitigation strategies such as social capital and income 
diversification has received little to no attention, less so within a coastal and marine 
context where these coping mechanisms have been shown to be important livelihood 
strategies.  
Chapter 6 marks one of the first empirical contributions to the marine PES literature. 
These results provide an understanding of how gender, income diversification and 
social capital variables can promote but at the same time dissuade participation in 
novel marine PES initiatives. To date the author knows of no gender analysis within 
the PES literature, much less within a marine and coastal PES context. This thesis is 
one of the first research studies to empirically examine participation and adoption 
choice of environmental service suppliers within marine and coastal PES schemes. In 
particular, those determinants of low-income and potentially highly vulnerable 
individuals are investigated.  
PES can further influence adoption rates through its design. While the previous two 
chapters relate to endogenous individual characteristics, willingness to participate 
may also be affected by programme design, in particular those restrictions put in 
place. Previous work has shown that scheme design can influence adoption and re-
enrolment rates in agri-environmental schemes (AES). Fishers have also been shown 
to value management restrictions differently (McClanahan & Mangi 2004).  
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Chapter 7 is one of the first to demonstrate that CE analysis can be used in the design 
of marine, and indeed terrestrial, PES instruments. To date, PES design in developing 
countries has placed little value on this technique (Whittington and Pagiola, 2012). CE 
is shown to assist in defining how local stakeholders value various restrictions and 
can highlight preferred options. Economic values are placed upon management 
restrictions and trade-offs are revealed. In addition, it is shown to be relevant in a 
low-income small-scale context. Previous work has focused on larger-scale operations 
and/or public values relating to implementation of marine management options, and 
overall there has been little application of CE within fisheries management (Wattage 
et al., 2011). No evidence of the previous use of CE within small-scale artisanal 
communities was uncovered.  
1.6 Thesis structure 
The thesis takes the following format:  
1.6.1 Chapter 2: Literature review 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the PES literature to date with a particular focus 
on participation decisions amongst poor communities. This literature is further linked 
to the current marine and coastal context and more specifically, to small-scale 
artisanal fisheries.  
1.6.2 Chapter 3: Examining the issues in marine PES schemes through expert 
elicitation 
In this first research chapter, determinants of marine PES success are examined. In the 
first instance the benefits and challenges in bringing PES to a marine environment are 
explored. This is followed with an investigation into the feasibility of marine PES as a 
stand-alone tool in the coastal and marine environment and indeed its capacity as a 
pro-poor mechanism.  
In order to answer these questions, Chapter 3 uses a primary data set generated from 
web-based expert questionnaires. Results from open-ended questions are coded and 
analysed using a qualitative approach.  
We present evidence that the on-going wariness surrounding marine PES could be 
unjustified and present solutions for their effective implementation. These results are 
widely applicable due to a global dependence on coastal and marine resources and 
their continuing degradation.  
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1.6.3 Chapter 4: Determinants for participation: a review 
In this chapter we review the literature surrounding adoption decisions in a number 
of related and representative fields including conservation agriculture, agroforestry, 
microfinance and Community-based Management. Household and individual 
determinants influencing participation decisions are discussed. Where relevant we 
also look to fishery exit and compliance decisions within the fisheries literature in 
order to better interpret fisher decision-making processes. The chapter concludes 
with hypotheses as to how determinants will affect fishers’ response to the proposed 
hypothetical marine PES.  
1.6.4 Chapter 5: Site description 
Chapter 5 offers a summary of the local context and a description of the case-study 
site from which the data used in chapters 6 and 7 is collected.  
1.6.5 Chapter 6: Determinants of fishers’ willingness to adopt a marine Payments 
for Environmental Service scheme 
In the first of the two data chapters, based upon primary data collected from the 
Mtwara research site, we examine the hypothesis that attributes important in low-
income households affect a fisher’s decision to join a proposed marine PES scheme. 
More specifically, we focus on the role that income diversification and social capital 
can play in this choice. We also investigate the role that gender can play in adoption 
of marine PES. We do this for two reasons: past adoption studies have been shown to 
display a gender bias; and fishing communities display strong gender roles. Data on 
fisher attributes is collected and results are analysed using a logit model. 
Evidence is provided showing that participation is significantly associated with a 
number of social capital variables and income diversification, associations vary 
between the sexes and show both positive and negative associations. Furthermore 
female fishers, often the most vulnerable members of society within artisanal fishing 
communities, are more likely to express a positive decision to participate but are 
influenced by different facets of social capital to those of their male counterparts.  
Results provide an understanding of how gender, income diversification and social 
capital variables can promote and at the same time dissuade participation in novel 
marine PES programmes. The chapter goes on to offer some explanations as to 
possible underlying reasoning behind these results. Results show valuable policy 
implications for those marine PES schemes hoping to target low-income fishers as 
well as inferences for improved female participation.  
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1.6.6 Chapter 7: Investigating fishers’ preferences for the design of marine PES 
schemes.  
In addition to individual endogenous determinants, participation in marine PES is 
anticipated to be influenced by PES design, such as choice and level of PES 
restrictions.  
In Chapter 7 we investigate whether project design influences a fisher’s uptake of 
marine PES programmes. Fishers’ preferences for various PES management 
restrictions were elicited using a choice experiment (CE). Analysis was conducted 
using conditional and nested logit models. Results indicate fishers’ preferences for 
restriction types and the utility costs associated with each.  
The chapter provides an understanding of how various restrictions can influence 
adoption, and provides insight to other factors which may play equally important 
roles. The findings present some useful lessons for policy, both in PES design and for 
the preceding programme foundations.  
1.6.7 Chapter 8: Synthesis and conclusions 
In this final chapter, the main conclusions of the thesis are presented. Results are 
discussed with respect to policy implications and recommendations made for the 
successful application of PES in the marine and coastal environments.  
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Chapter 2 
Payments for environmental services 
2.1 Overview of chapter  
This chapter provides a summary of the current literature on PES. In particular we 
cover how the literature relates to a number of key topics. We first provide an 
overview of PES as a conservation instrument and discuss current levels of demand 
for environmental service delivery. This is followed by a review of supply dynamics, 
focusing on the extent to which PES can deliver the concurrent benefit of poverty 
alleviation it seems to promise. We finish by discussing the current marine 
management of small-scale artisanal fisheries and the role PES can play in improving 
conservation results, as well as what implications for poverty may follow.  
Further relevant literature is reviewed within each of the chapters. 
2.2 Payments for environmental services framework 
Underlying the premise of PES, is the failing of markets to ascribe a true value to 
environmental services and to the free-riding induced by the public-good nature of 
these services (Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010). More often than not, local 
monetary benefits of conservation earn less than from alternative uses such as 
conversion to cropland or non-selective fishing methods. Ecosystem managers, such 
as farmers and fishers, may be poorly motivated to protect the nature under their 
guardianship. Payments from downstream beneficiaries can make sustainable 
resource-use the more attractive option and incentivise the adoption of improved 
ecosystem management (Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2008, 2005).  
Although not formally defined in the literature, the most widely accepted 
interpretation defines PES by the following five criteria: (1) a voluntary transaction; (2) 
PES involve a well-defined environmental service (or land use likely to secure that 
service); (3) the service is ‘purchased’ by at least one service buyer; (4) the service is 
‘provided’ by at least one service provider; and (5) the payment is conditional on service 
provision (Engel et al. 2008; Wendland et al. 2010; Wunder 2006).  
In reality, PES seldom correspond to this strict definition (Mahanty et al. 2013; Shelley 
2011). More recently, the literature has seen a relaxing of the definition with Tacconi 
(2012) defining PES as “a transparent system for the additional provision of 
environmental services through conditional payments to voluntary providers”. 
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Sommerville et al. (2009) redefine PES as instruments which aim to (1) transfer 
positive incentives to environmental service providers that are (2) conditional on the 
provision of the service, where successful implementation is based on a consideration 
of (3) additionality and (4) varying institutional contexts. Removed from this 
definition is the notion that PES must be voluntary. Sommerville et al. (2009) argue 
that although PES are voluntary at the transaction level – a service provider can 
decide if to accept payment – they do not necessarily have a choice in the provision of 
the service (e.g. in such cases where land-use change is illegal).  
Although definitions may have relaxed somewhat, conditionality and positive 
incentives remain at the forefront of PES criterion, and are considered herein as 
critical facets in their design.  
2.3 PES markets: innovative finance 
One of their key selling points, PES are touted with the ability to generate additional 
funding opportunities outside of increasingly constrained government and non-
government organisation (NGO) budgets (Balmford and Whitten, 2003; Balmford et 
al., 2003; Hein et al., 2013; Wunder et al., 2008).  
2.3.1 Current market status 
Emerging markets are now placing a value on ecosystem services such as carbon 
sequestration, flood protection and clean water – previously under-valued and over-
exploited public goods. And, unlike Overseas Development Assistance and non-for-
profit sources, this funding group has grown rapidly in the last two decades.  
By their very nature PES are more direct, cost-effective and less institutionally 
complex than many previous efforts such as ICDPs and regulatory mechanisms; 
hence are considered more likely to produce the desired outcomes (Frost and Bond, 
2008).  
Over the last decade, hundreds of PES initiatives have been implemented across the 
globe (Yang et al., 2013a). For watershed conservation alone, Bennett et al. (2013) 
catalogued 205 active projects in 2011, with a further 76 in development. Market 
observers estimated global trade of carbon allowances at US$ 176 billion in the same 
year; this continues to grow by 11% year on year despite economic volatility (Kossoy 
and Guigon, 2012). Globally government-mediated payments for watershed 
protection now exceed US$ 5 billion annually; US markets for wetland and stream 
mitigation account for transactions worth between US$ 2.4-4 billion each year in 
transactions, and endangered species mitigation totals US$ 370 million (Madsen et al., 
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2011). Global markets for environmental goods and services now reach an estimated 
US$ 600 billion annually, with projections reaching US$ 800 billion over the next 10 
years (Standish, 2006).  
In practice, four PES types currently dominate the market (Table 2.1), however to 
date, most examples of working PES schemes are for the provision of either carbon or 
water services (Turpie et al., 2008). 
Table 2.1 Current PES markets 
 Market Example of 
potential PES 
Buyers Commodity 
1 Carbon 
sequestration 
and storage 
A northern 
electricity company 
pays farmers in the 
tropics to plant and 
maintain trees 
Local, regional and 
national goverments; 
international 
organisations; 
national carbon 
funds; conservation 
groups; land trusts; 
corporations; hedge 
funds and 
investment groups 
Assigned-amount units, certified 
emission reductions, emission-
reduction units, carbon 
offsets/credits, tradable 
development rights, conservation 
easements 
2 Watershed 
protection 
Downstream water 
users pay upstream 
farmers to adopt 
land uses that limit 
deforestation, soil 
erosion, flooding 
risks, etc 
Municipalities; 
private water 
suppliers; public 
water suppliers; 
bottled water 
companies; farming 
organisations; 
hydroelectric energy 
providers 
Watershed management contracts, 
water quality credits, water rights, 
land acquisition/lease, salinity 
credits, transpiration credits, 
conservation easements, certified 
watershed-friendly products, 
stream-flow-reduction licenses, 
reforestation contracts, protected 
areas 
3 Biodiversity 
protection 
Conservation donors 
pay local people to 
set aside or naturally 
restore areas to 
create a biological 
corridor 
International  and 
national NGOs; 
private businesses 
(offsets) 
Protected areas, bioprospecting 
rights, biodiversity-friendly 
products, biodiversity company 
shares, debt-for-nature swaps, 
biodiversity credits, conservation 
concession, land acquisition, 
biodiversity-management 
contracts, logging rights 
acquisition, tradable development 
rights, conservation easements 
4 Landscape 
beauty 
A tourism operator 
pays a local 
community not to 
hunt in a forest in 
which tourists view 
wildlife 
International and 
national NGOs; 
private tourism 
operators;  
Entrance rights, long-term-access 
permits, package-tourism services, 
natural-resource management 
agreements, ecotourism 
concessions, photographic 
permits, land acquisition, land 
lease 
Adapted from (FAO, 2007; Landell-Mills, 2002; Wunder, 2006) 
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2.3.2 To what extent will PES instruments prove cost-effective and efficient?  
PES are touted as more cost-effective and efficient than other less direct policy 
interventions; this is perhaps their key selling point (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Groom 
and Palmer, 2010). This thinking is based on a number of assumptions within the PES 
model, most of which are rarely met (Delacote et al., 2013; Engel et al., 2008; Wunder 
et al., 2008). Effectiveness requires that PES schemes lead to an increase in 
environmental services compared to the “business as usual” alternatives. Efficiency 
pertains to a maximisation of the environmental services obtained from a given 
budget (Engel and Palmer, 2008). PES have a lot to live up to, and in reality have a 
long way to go in order to match these claims. The extent to which PES schemes can 
meet the promise of both of these criteria is hotly debated within the academic field 
and continues to drive research and contract redesign.  
The effectiveness of a PES instrument is determined by targeting, additionality, 
permanence, leakage and fairness (Engel et al., 2008; Narloch et al., 2013; Pattanayak 
et al., 2010). But getting these right requires a more in-depth understanding of the 
local context and ultimately higher transaction costs. The transaction costs will, for a 
large part, determine the efficiency of a PES programme. Ultimately PES schemes are 
a trade-off between the two, and the increased transactions costs may outweigh the 
benefits from improved targeting and pricing (Engel et al., 2008; Ferraro, 2008; 
Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Vatn, 2010). Indeed, when transaction costs are high, Coase’s 
theorem calls for a switch to regulatory instruments (Coase, 1960).  
In general, transaction costs are highest when projects involve many smallholders 
and multiple PES actors, where institutions and property rights are weak, and when 
costs of gaining baseline data, monitoring and enforcement are high (Jack et al., 2008; 
Wunder, 2007): characteristics which are common in a developing country context. A 
review of carbon-sequestration schemes within various developing countries 
reported transaction costs as high as 45% of total costs (Cacho et al., 2005).  
2.3.2.1 Targeting  
PES programmes start with the decision of who to target for payment. Who should be 
paid for service provision often depends on the scheme’s objectives (Alpízar et al., 
2013). This choice however will affect effectiveness as well as efficiency. A more 
effective PES will target those who can provide the environmental service at the 
lowest cost. However doing so requires identification of these individuals, not always 
an easy task given issues of changing baselines and information asymmetry, to name 
a few (Ferraro, 2008).  
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Recent publications in the field have suggested a number of methods to better target 
and implement PES (Wendland et al., 2009). Location is a key consideration; the 
geographical targeting of high threat/low opportunity cost lands is a win-win for 
PES and is already implemented to maximise the cost-effectiveness in many protected 
area and reserve designs (Gauvin et al., 2010; Naidoo et al., 2006; Newburn et al., 
2005; Wendland et al., 2009). Practices which protect biodiversity in proximity to 
protected areas, for example, can buffer impacts on these areas and therefore have 
benefits beyond those associated with the land change itself. Payments that disregard 
the degree of risk to the environmental service will also lead to inefficiencies. Failure 
to take these differences into consideration will result in over-payment for less 
desirable or low risk areas, as well as under-payment for, or exclusion of desirable 
land (Alix-Garcia et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2004).  
Efficient payments will also tend to favour larger resource users with economies of 
scale and generally not those with smaller or marginal holdings. However, incentive 
schemes which ignore and/or further marginalise poor resource owners are hard to 
get behind; indeed the long-term sustainability of PES programmes has been linked 
to perceptions of equity and legitimacy (Narloch et al., 2013). Many PES now focus on 
co-benefits such as poverty alleviation, livelihood protection and regional 
development (Bulte et al., 2008). Moreover, failure to pay resource owners who have 
been providing environmental services in the past, while paying others to adopt 
provision has been shown to lead to inefficiencies and moral hazard (Alpízar et al., 
2013).  
The simplest of payments, is a ‘one price fits all’ where resource owners are paid for 
the quantity of land or a change in practice, irrespective of the quality and/or 
marginal benefit of said land. However, where costs and benefits of biodiversity 
conservation differ spatially the cost-effectiveness of these uniform payments is 
found to be low (Wätzold and Drechsler, 2005). More complex PES schemes look 
towards price differentiation to improve PES efficiency but in the process face 
increased transaction costs (Engel et al., 2008; Ferraro, 2008). Cost targeting enables 
prices to more readily reflect the true opportunity cost of service provision and would 
enable inclusion of a greater area overall for a given budget (Ferraro, 2008; Wunder et 
al., 2008). Cost targeting can further be designed to include other factors such as 
potential gains and future risks in addition to cost (Wünscher et al., 2008).  
Calculating appropriate payments requires an accurate calculation of suppliers’ 
opportunity costs. The challenge is to identify contract prices in the absence of any 
market where service providers have little incentive to reveal their true costs (Ferraro, 
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2008). Transferring price estimates between projects is difficult since implementing 
new environmentally sound practices can be highly location- and activity-specific 
(Jindal et al., 2013).  
To reduce informational rents to resource owners, conservation agents can take one of 
three approaches: 1) acquire information on observable landowner attributes that are 
correlated with compliance costs; 2) offer landowners a menu of screening contracts; 
and 3) allocate contracts through procurement auctions (Ferraro, 2008). Perhaps the 
most effective of these is procurement auctions. Unlike screening contracts, auctions 
do not require that conservation agents specify landowner types and/or quantity of 
environmental service provision. Auctions invite landowners to competitively bid for 
contracts against other service providers, and in doing so reduce the incentive for 
sellers to inflate their costs (Ferraro, 2008).  Auctions have a number of advantages 
over other methods: differentiated payments have been associated with improved 
additionality (Newton et al., 2012); auctions are also adaptable over time – as 
conditions change so too will opportunity costs and repeat auctions can keep up with 
these dynamic scenarios; and more recently, auctions have seen successful 
implementation in a developing country context (Jindal et al., 2013). However, 
auction mechanisms require a large pool of bidders in order to induce 
competitiveness and prevent collusion and can induce self-selection related to 
economies of scale (Jack et al., 2008a).  
To further overcome high transaction and implementation costs, some PES 
programmes look towards ‘bundling’ (Wendland et al., 2009). ‘Bundling’ refers to the 
selling of environmental services as joint products. This can be beneficial for those 
currently interested in protecting services which generally do not receive as much 
attention as those such as carbon. Furthermore, services for which it is often harder to 
mobilise funding and which at a lower volume may be subjected to higher 
transaction costs (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Robertson and Wunder, 2005; 
Wendland et al., 2009).  
2.3.2.2 Monitoring and enforcement 
The success of a PES market will depend on its ability to monitor and enforce service 
delivery, and do so at a reasonable cost (Landell-Mills, 2002).  
Within PES, payments are expected to be contingent upon the continuous production 
of environmental services and as such should be linked to clear environmental service 
monitoring. In reality, PES projects rarely include explicit frameworks for monitoring 
and evaluating their success and, as such, calculating additionality remains difficult 
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(Wunder, 2007). In fact, for many PES initiatives worldwide: results are either loosely 
monitored or not monitored at all; payments are made upfront and in good faith; and 
are not continuously or truly contingent upon service provisions (Robertson and 
Wunder, 2005; Wunder, 2007). Monitoring has been identified as one of the hardest 
criterion to meet. The lack of low-cost monitoring options represents a large barrier 
for PES effectiveness (Kroeger and Casey, 2007); however, a focus on monitoring 
within the field and advances in technology are likely to ease this difficulty in the 
future (Alston et al., 2013; Sommerville et al., 2011). 
This said, greater emphasis on monitoring might not adequately solve the problem of 
assessing additionality. The complexities within systems mean that, in practice, PES 
schemes will often rely on observable proxies such as actions or outcomes as a 
measure of success, because direct monitoring is either near impossible and/or too 
costly (Jack et al., 2008). Performance-based payments are bound to the outcome of a 
desired environmental good or service. Action-based payments, on the other hand, 
pay for a pre-defined action or measure (Derissen and Quaas, 2013). The most typical 
solution is not to pay for the environmental service itself but the land uses which are 
hospitable to biodiversity (Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2004). However, what is 
often thought to provide a service, such as hydrological services, is often not based 
upon sound scientific evidence but built upon perceived rather than factual linkages 
(Wunder, 2007). The future efficiency of PES schemes may therefore rely upon the 
correlation between these proxies and the provision of the environmental good. 
Output-based monitoring , can be based on threats, changes to species or presence of 
rare indicators, to name but a few, and no one criteria will transfer to all PES 
(Sommerville et al., 2011). However, even for those services that are becoming more 
easily measurable due to scientific and technological advances, establishing a credible 
counterfactual remains difficult (Alston et al., 2013).  
What monitoring does provide, at its very least, is the promotion of compliance and 
this is paramount to the success of any PES intervention. PES has been championed as 
a means to move away from previous, and often ineffective, regulatory mechanisms; 
the market will facilitate compliance, for example. This assumption, however, relies 
on the existence and effectiveness of strong institutions (Miteva et al., 2012).  In 
reality, it is unlikely that PES will work without adequate levels of monitoring, 
enforcement and the appropriate sanctions (Barbier and Tesfaw, 2012; Chhatre and 
Agrawal, 2008; Engel et al., 2008; Gibson et al., 2005). Enforcement lowers the 
marginal value of non-compliance and as a result increases the level of compliance as 
individuals find it more economical to reallocate their time to alternative activities 
(Muller and Albers, 2004; Robinson et al., 2012). The flipside is that the provision of 
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enforcement officers can incentivise PES participation through curtailing expected 
returns from previously unsustainable practices (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2008; Yang et 
al., 2013a). In some instances, the fear of being caught has proved a greater deterrent 
to non-compliance than the PES payment itself (Sommerville et al., 2010b; Travers et 
al., 2011). However, as with previous command and control policy tools, enforcement 
can prove expensive, particularly when contracting with many stakeholders (Grieg-
Gran et al., 2005). Moreover, where labour and resource markets are missing, as they 
are in low-income and rural settings, enforcement will induce less conservation per 
dollar as alternatives activities may not offer high enough rewards (Muller and 
Albers, 2004).  
This said, evidence shows that the cost of enforcement and levels of non-compliance 
can be reduced with good design. Performance-based payments can reduce the need 
for enforcement but will still require high-levels of monitoring (Derissen and Quaas, 
2013; Engel et al., 2008; Ferraro, 2001; Kroeger and Casey, 2007). More recently, 
inclusion of certain criteria in contract design, such as revealed bidding, has been 
shown to promote high rates of self-enforcement (Jindal et al., 2013). Where PES 
requires provision by many, community contacts which promote social norms can 
further improve compliance (Chen et al., 2009; Clements et al., 2010). Involving 
environmental service suppliers within monitoring and enforcement decisions 
empowers PES participants and can enhance long-term protection (Barbier and 
Tesfaw, 2012). A recent study by Travers et al. (2011) indicates the importance of self-
organisation including the ability to devise, monitor and enforce a set of rules. Under 
a common pool resource game played in four Cambodian villages, those treatments 
where self-organisation was promoted showed the greatest effects on reducing 
individual extraction. Community monitoring has been shown to be a cost-effective 
monitoring and enforcement tool in ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation’ (REDD+) programmes (Danielsen et al., 2011; Larrazábal et al., 
2012). However, the effectiveness of community monitoring and enforcement may be 
limited by group size, with the enforcement of larger groups proving more difficult 
(Poteete and Ostrom, 2004; Yang et al., 2013b)  
More generally, PES can increase local incentives to self-enforce thereby reducing 
required programme or state-level enforcement (Engel and Palmer, 2008).   
2.3.2.3 Additionality 
Initial results suggest that the potential of PES schemes to increase the conservation of 
environmental services has been mixed, both between projects and between analyses 
of the same programmes.  
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In Costa Rica’s national PES programme Pago por Servicios Ambientals’ (PSA) – 
whereby farmers were paid to maintain land under forest cover – evidence suggests 
low additionality. An estimated 76.8% of forest area under the PSA would have been 
conserved or managed with limited extraction without the PES intervention. In 
addition, 70% of PSA forest protection contracts were on land that had production 
capacities limited to forest management/protection (51%) or severely limited 
agriculture (20%) (Wünscher et al., 2008). Pfaff et al. (2008) further indicate that 
annually as little as 0.08% of those forests under PSA contracts would have been 
cleared if payments had not been received. For Mexico’s similar national PES 
programme calculated average clearage rates without the programme were also low: 
0.8% per year (Alix-Garcia et al., 2012). These results are even more profound when 
one considers the baseline. In the example of Costa Rica, a static baseline was 
employed to define payments; in reality, the true baseline was one where national 
forest cover was increasing. As such this PES has paid above and beyond what was 
required and in addition has paid for forest establishment which would have 
occurred irrespective of payments (Wunder, 2007). Conversely, current CDM criteria 
employs a rigid adherence to the static baseline ignoring the argument for one which 
is declining, as posed by many who see natural resource use as an integral part of any 
resource rich countries’ development progress (Wunder, 2007). 
The practical reality is that measuring PES success is difficult and requires 
comparison with a ‘business as usual’ counterfactual. However, in most instances, 
PES projects do not construct realistic counterfactual scenarios which consider what 
could hypothetically occur to the environmental service in the absence of the scheme, 
nor are payments targeted based on this information (Wunder et al., 2008). 
For those PES schemes, which can claim additionality, further possible concern 
relating to permanence and leakage can affect true levels of additionality.  
2.3.2.4 Leakage and Permanence  
Leakage is associated with the inadvertent relocation of activities which become 
restricted under a PES programme (Engel et al., 2008). Leakage can occur for two 
reasons (Alston et al., 2013). First, PES can lead to the displacement of 
environmentally damaging activities to an area outside the target zone. Secondly, 
leakage can occur due to raising commodity prices for goods restricted under the 
scheme, whereby non-participants locally, or not, are motivated to carry out the 
activity thereby generating the environmental externalities anyhow (Alston et al., 
2013; Murray and Sohngen, 2004; Wunder et al., 2008).   
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Leakage is only a relevant concern where the spatial scope of the intervention is lower 
than that of the desired service. And as such leakage will always be a consideration 
for global services such as carbon and biodiversity markets (Wunder et al., 2008). 
However, programmes can be more successful in reducing leakage when they are 
larger in scale (Alston et al., 2013). As such, the contracting of community property 
rights can offer economies of scale and reduce possible issues of leakage, although 
may ultimately increase transaction costs and so success will depend on the level of 
community institutions in place, the strength of collective action and/or effective 
enforcement.  
In practice little is known about leakage, mainly due to the difficulty in accurate 
calculation. Of 14 PES-like programmes analysed by Wunder et al (2008) only one 
quantitatively attempted to estimate project leakage, finding potential estimates 
varying from small to an upper bound 21%.  
Permanence, on the other hand, refers to the ability of PES schemes to achieve long-
term improvements in environmental service provision, including the time-period 
after which payments are stopped (Engel et al., 2008). A successful PES programme 
generating environmental services is not guaranteed to do so indefinitely. As 
payments are intended to be contingent on service production there is no reason to 
believe that, if the underlying externality is itself permanent, this service will continue 
to be provided once payments end (Wunder et al., 2008). Many farmers participating 
in the world’s largest PES the Chinese Sloping Lands Conversion Programme, said 
they planned to reconvert land back to former uses once the programme was over 
(Groom and Palmer, 2012a). Given the basic premise of PES as a conditional incentive 
tool, there can be little expectation of permanence in the absence of payments. On the 
other hand, the very nature of voluntary participation in PES can assure permanence; 
it gives each party the ability to renegotiate in changing climates and markets (Engel 
et al., 2008; Pagiola and Platais, 2007). Given the limited operating time frame of most 
PES schemes, insufficient information is available whether indeed payments will be 
able to promote long-term land use changes, or indeed if payments must be 
continuous (Wunder et al., 2008).  
2.3.2.5 Liability 
Liability has been identified as a key precondition for permanence within PES 
schemes (Palmer, 2011; Sedjo and Marland, 2003). Put simply, liability can be 
described as having a high probability of being held accountable for – and penalised 
for – the failure to deliver those environmental services under PES contract (Palmer, 
2011).  
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Who is liable if a PES does not deliver is an important question, and one that is still 
hotly debated. It has perhaps received the most attention within the carbon market 
and REDD+ (Angelsen, 2008; Dutschke and Angelsen, 2008; MacKenzie et al., 2012; 
Palmer, 2011; Phelps et al., 2011). One of the main issues in securing funds for the 
carbon market is this: under the Kyoto principles, liability for the loss of climate 
change benefits, e.g. reduced carbon emissions, is transferred from project developer 
to those purchasing the carbon credits (UNFCCC, 2005). In other words, once credits 
are sold, the sellers are no longer liable for any losses (or failure to provide 
environmental services), although they continue to maintain control over the 
resources via ownership and use rights (MacKenzie et al., 2012; Phelps et al., 2011) 
The problem of liability is most acute at the project level, where cause and effect are 
harder to prove and/or prove difficult to measure (Kroeger and Casey, 2007; Palmer, 
2011). These risks are higher where individuals, particularly the poor, cannot be 
directly sanctioned and when penalisation is merely the termination of future 
payments (Palmer, 2011), as is currently the norm. “Voluntary” agreements, such as 
these, require allocation of liability in such as way as to reduce the incentive to ‘opt 
out’ at a future date, and in particular before contract completion. Mechanisms such 
as co-management and nested liability frameworks have been suggested (Carlsson 
and Berkes, 2005; Palmer, 2011; Pedroni et al., 2009) which transfer a degree of 
liability to the resource owner. One concept of liability, which could transfer well to 
low-income user rights, is sanctions based on the removal of some of their use rights 
in addition to the termination of PES payments, which would be institutionalised 
under a co-management platform. In the event of non-permanence, enforced 
reductions in resource extraction ensures environmental service delivery above the 
reference level (Palmer, 2011).  
2.3.2.6 Legitimacy and fairness 
Legitimacy and fairness are now recognised as important attributes in the long-term 
success of PES, although more often than not, their consideration in project design 
requires a decrease in short-term efficiency (Corbera and Pascual, 2012; Muradian et 
al., 2010; Narloch et al., 2013). The legitimacy of any PES scheme will rely on 
stakeholder’s preferences and perceptions of how the scheme conforms to local 
formal and informal rules and social norms (Gross-Camp et al., 2012). 
Yet, for PES to be effective and efficient they need to contract with those who 
constitute a credible threat to environmental service provision, and to do so in a cost-
effective manner (Wunder, 2005; Yang et al., 2013a). The question of who should get 
paid is, however, never this simple. In only paying those individuals generating 
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negative externalities, PES schemes can generate perverse incentives and moral 
hazard (Alpízar et al., 2013).  
In essence, a PES project can be viewed as payments to polluters, the value of the 
payment depending upon the degree to which they pollute. As such, land stewards 
who already engage in effective environmental practices should not – from an 
efficiency point of view – be entitled to compensation (Salzman, 2005). However, 
exclusion of such players can be seen as unfair, and, evidence suggests, can even 
result in ‘behavioural spillover’. Behavioural spillover means that those excluded 
from a new PES scheme choose to reduce their contributions to service supply even 
though they face no change in price or income, or even induce degrading practices in 
order to receive payments (Alpízar et al., 2013; Muradian et al., 2013; Wunder et al., 
2008). This in turn can significantly influence long-term contributions to public good 
supplies (Alpízar et al., 2013).  
From an efficiency point of view, PES should also be targeting larger resource users 
with economies of scale: generally those with larger holdings. However, as 
previously mentioned, excluding small holders can further exacerbate poverty and 
marginalisation and PES design should mitigate such effects (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; 
Miranda et al., 2003). Schemes which enable PES benefits to be distributed across a 
wider range of stakeholders, including those non-participants, can go a way towards 
mitigating exclusion and perverse incentives (Mahanty et al., 2013).  
Perhaps one of the most important determinants of legitimacy is the inclusion of key 
stakeholders in PES design, as has been suggested by many scholars (Corbera et al., 
2007; Gross-Camp et al., 2012; Narloch et al., 2013; Sommerville et al., 2010a).  
Views on equity and fairness are ultimately cultural and context specific and 
designing ‘fair’ and legitimate PES will prove challenging: there is no “one size fits 
all” (Narloch et al., 2013; Pascual et al., 2010). Context-specific views on equity must 
be addressed and taken seriously within PES design. If not, PES risk eroding intrinsic 
motivations and pre-existing institutions which can ultimately reduce the 
effectiveness of PES, if not undermine them completely (Muradian et al., 2013; Vatn, 
2010).  
2.3.2.7 PES suitability 
PES schemes hailed as instruments which can solve environmental and development 
issues at the same time. Yet, there are numerous reasons why PES may not be the 
most appropriate tool. Under perfect market and institutional settings, a budget 
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constrained donor will always prefer PES to more indirect approaches, these being 
more cost-effective and efficient (Ferraro and Simpson, 2002). However, in reality 
constraints as well as market and institutional failures are the norm, particularly in 
low-income countries (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006; De Janvry et al., 1991). As such, 
the provision of credit, expertise or technology may in fact be the more cost-effective 
intervention (Groom and Palmer, 2012b). Severity of constraints, relative prices and 
the type of technologies have been shown to affect the cost-effectiveness of PES 
(Groom and Palmer, 2012b). How individuals respond to PES will be influenced by 
their ability to interact with other markets such as labour and resource markets 
(Muller and Albers, 2004). Combined policies which reduce constraints alongside 
PES, thus enabling PES to be more efficient, should not be overlooked in 
conservation’s current market-centric approach (Groom et al., 2010). Subsidies can 
work alongside PES to reduce access barriers and constraints; but in addition can be a 
source of environmental degradation (Groom et al., 2010; Palmer, 2011). Elimination 
of such subsidies, i.e. those for inputs, should also be removed prior to investments 
into PES. 
Where PES must contract with multiple sellers, transactions costs will inevitably rise. 
Contracting with groups or communities can theoretically reduce costs (Jack et al., 
2008); this can include contracting with communities for the protection of common 
pool resources (CPR). CPR are those which are rival and non-excludable (or where 
exclusion is extremely expensive) (Fisher et al., 2010; Kemkes et al., 2010). While PES 
can learn much about contracting in these areas from previous CPR literature 
(Clements et al., 2010; Fisher et al., 2010; Muradian et al., 2010) – a description of 
which can be seen in Table 2.2 – contracting with  groups will be inherently more 
difficult and subject to issues of leakage, free-riding and distributional constraints 
(Alix-Garcia et al., 2012; Sommerville et al., 2010a) as well as possibly capture by elites 
(Bennett, 2008; Sommerville et al., 2010a). In dealing with these issues – through 
design, screening and ensuring equity to name a few – transaction costs will 
inevitably increase, and may end up costing more than other less direct instruments.  
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Table 2.2 CPR management lessons for PES design and implementation  
 CPR considerations PES analogs 
Resource size The size of the resource and knowledge 
of its boundary are both characteristics 
that can enable better management. 
Although scale is relative, typically the 
smaller the resource the easier it is to 
carry out management principles. 
Ecosystem services are delivered from 
nested processes. Microscale nutrient 
exchange affects macro-scale biomass 
production. As scale increases in a 
system so does the ecological complexity. 
This invokes the importance of 
subsidiarity. 
Group 
characteristics 
The size of the stakeholder group, the 
level to which they have shared norms, 
and interdependencies across groups are 
all characteristics that have been shown 
to affect CPR management. Smaller 
group size, more common histories and 
norms and more interdependent  
Both the level to which ES buyers ‘trust ’ 
the providers to deliver a service, and the 
level to which the providers ‘trust ’ the 
PES scheme and its initiators have been 
shown to affect performance, 
implementation and legitimacy of PES. 
The number of participants (size) is also 
likely to affect cost of PES 
implementation and may therefore limit 
total ES delivery. 
Resource–group 
relationship 
 
When the resource is in close proximity 
to most of the stakeholder groups, better 
management is enabled. The level of 
dependence on the resource can affect its 
management — the higher the level of 
dependence the more incentive to 
manage it properly. 
Where the resource providing the 
ecosystem service is far removed from 
the beneficiaries (e.g. carbon offsets), the 
verification of the effectiveness of 
intervention has been deemed critical for 
buyers. 
Institutional 
arrangements 
 
Governance rules must be clear in nature 
and seen as appropriate by the majority 
of stakeholders. Ideal rules are derived 
from inclusive processes and not be seen 
as ‘top- down.’ 
Broad stakeholder inclusion, buyers and 
sellers of ES, should be involved in 
design and monitoring. PES contract 
allocation should be transparent, and the 
contracts themselves should have some 
flexibility to acknowledge changing 
opportunity costs. 
Resource–
institution 
relationship 
Both an institutional knowledge of how 
the biophysical system works and spatial 
overlap between the processes that 
deliver the resource and the governing 
institution are enabling factors for 
successful management. 
PES schemes should show that the 
intervention can deliver the service it 
promises. The scheme should be able to 
monitor system function over time, as 
well as monitor use, costs and benefits 
over time. 
External 
environment 
Exogenous factors such as demographic 
and technological changes can greatly 
affect the success of management. For 
example, improved low-cost technology 
for monitoring a resource may greatly 
enable management, where rapid 
population growth could hinder it. 
Technological changes and population 
pressures (including changing 
preferences) affect how PES schemes are 
monitored, negotiated and implemented. 
Technology advances can make 
monitoring, compliance or defection 
easier; or for example, changes in global 
price of hardwood could affect local 
contract compliance. 
Source: Adapted from Agarwal (2002) in Fisher et al. (2010) 
2.3.3 A problem of demand 
Such uncertainties in contract design and effective supply lead to a very different 
global picture of demand than that painted in Section 2.3.1. As yet too few buyers are 
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confident about the PES mechanism and its potential to deliver the stated services to 
be willing to commit to these emerging markets (Wunder, 2005).  
Taking the example of the carbon markets, with a estimated total value of US$ 176 
billion in 2011 (Kossoy and Guigon, 2012): it is only really the forestry subsector 
(under which umbrella mangrove forests can in theory be included) which has the 
potential to provide sustainable conservation finance alongside other environmental 
and social benefits. Yet, forestry is largely limited to the voluntary carbon market 
(VCM), where demand is driven largely by corporate social responsibility. In 2011, 
the value of the VCM was an estimated at US$ 424 million, substantially less than 
compliance carbon markets. While within the VCM the volumes of credits from the 
forestry sector have been increasing, REDD for example generated 29% of all VCM 
credits in 2011 (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011), the value of forestry credits is highly 
variable. REDD credit prices ranged between US$ 1 and US$ 25 in 2010 (Hamilton et 
al., 2010). The uncertain prices for forestry credits, uncertainty in liability and the 
overall small share of the total carbon market that this sector holds illustrate the 
limited finance for sustainable conservation that forest carbon markets provide 
(Grimsditch et al. 2012). In these times of climate change and growing environmental 
awareness, the fact that revenues for such carbon-related PES schemes are so limited 
can hold little promise for those other environmental services which achieve much 
less media attention. 
Moreover, biodiversity is often harder to monetise than many other services: 
interconnections are complex and generally poorly understood. The services 
provided by biodiversity are numerous, generally intangible and rarely consumed by 
one clearly identifiable beneficiary (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). As such it is even 
more difficult to get local and, more specifically, global beneficiaries to pay directly. 
Despite significant advances in recent years, most payments from biodiversity 
services remain limited to NGO and government budgets and experimental at best 
(Turpie et al., 2008).  
Within the marine environment the picture is even more confused. Although the 
marine environment provides numerous environmental goods and services, poorly 
understood flows and interactions as well as ill-defined property rights make marine 
PES highly complex and dynamic systems. Moreover, the generally common pool 
nature and large number of stakeholders will make contracting, monitoring and 
enforcement difficult and costly. As recently as 2008, no PES schemes for coastal or 
marine environments had thus far been implemented (Pagiola, 2008).  
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This said, private sector funding for biodiversity has grown significantly, much of 
which is currently funnelled through three of the largest global conservation 
organisations: the World Wide Fund; The Nature Conservancy; and Conservation 
International. With the private sector generally favouring quid pro quo approaches, 
conservation funding is experiencing a shift to more contingent, more accountable 
business-type approaches (Wunder, 2006), of which PES are a prime example.  
Advances in PES understanding and design prove hopeful for marine PES. In the 
past, the lack of property rights has been cited as a barrier to marine PES. More 
recently, however, there has been a shift in gear around the discussion of property 
rights, mostly due to the growing interest in REDD+ and equity. Some scholars 
submit that instead of actual land ownership (or private property rights), participants 
need only have rights over the service flow or, indeed, de-facto use rights (Alston et 
al., 2013; Lyster, 2011). Community contracts can offer economies of scale which 
reduce transaction costs (Jack et al., 2008) and may also be a more effective method in 
dealing with the complex external relationships between neighbouring resource 
users, moreover identifying community structures and frameworks will also be key 
to ensure a fair, transparent and long-term programme. Moreover, previous lessons 
with CPR management do not preclude large marine areas from successful 
management but do highlight the critical need to better understand the resources and 
resource users (Fisher et al., 2010). Advances in technology will help reduce problems 
of costly monitoring (Alston et al., 2013; Game et al., 2009). With such dynamic 
systems, preventing leakage will require new and innovative responses. The 
development of appropriate controls, risk buffers and insurance mechanisms will 
reduce investor risk and concerns. Reducing these associated costs and risks of 
marine PES will undoubtedly improve the ability of marine PES to access a wider 
market.  
In reality, much work is still needed to identify what demand does currently exist 
and how this will likely grow in the coming years, and in particular what efforts are 
needed to promote demand; such will be key to PES and indeed marine PES success.  
2.4 PES as an instrument for poverty alleviation 
Irrespective of issues in design and demand, the question remains: can rural 
communities, both inland and coastal, provide the desired environmental services? 
Under what conditions can they do so?  
One of the most obvious supply constraints to a successful marine PES is an apparent 
lack of defined property rights over the seascape. In reality, de facto tenure does often 
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exist, be it through community access rights or governmental permit schemes. And 
the ability to access this apparent ‘common property’ is often dependent on informal 
conditions of socio-cultural origin, such as inheritance of rights of access, membership 
of a user group, gender, kinships, allegiances and ethnicity, as well as a fisher’s 
original asset base (Béné, 2003; Geheb and Crean, 2003). 
Successful marine PES will rely on adequate identification of all actors – winners and 
losers, as well as an accurate analysis of associated opportunity costs and 
compensation packages. Yet to date, too little is known about the supply-side 
dynamics, for example: what resource-use incentives are preferential; what 
institutional preconditions are required; as well as how these benefit transfers will 
affect local livelihoods in often remote, cash-poor communities (Wunder, 2007).  
The degree to which lessons learnt within a terrestrial context can be transferred is 
unclear; in particular that information relating to tenure, benefits transfer and relative 
distributional implications. In the past, the assumption that rural coastal fishing 
communities are homogenous and function in a way similar to terrestrial 
counterparts has led to management practices which have generally proved 
unsuccessful. Perhaps to a greater degree, fishing communities are characterised by 
complex livelihood strategies and rich socio-economic and institutional networks 
than their terrestrial counterparts (Allison & Horemans 2006; Béné et al. 2000). 
PES can offer new income sources in cash-poor areas and, when well administered, 
can provide a more stable cash flow than alternative sources such as cash crops.  This 
should, in theory, enable a more flexible use of natural assets, diversification and 
greater livelihood security (Tschakert, 2007; Wunder, 2008). Indeed, a number of 
studies point to the success of PES projects as poverty alleviation tools.  
In the Pimampiro watershed of Ecuador, Echavarría et al. (2003) found that 
participants received average payments of US$ 21.1 per month, representing an 
average increase of 15% in household disposable income; the larger Costa Rican PSA 
programme found that PES payments accounted for more than 10% of household 
income in over one quarter of participants (Ortiz Malavasi et al., 2003). Contributions 
can be even more profound in poverty struck areas. Again, in Pimampiro Ecuador 
payments for watershed protection to poor upland settlers comprised 30% of 
household spending on food, medicine and schooling (Echavarría et al., 2003). In 
Costa Rica’s Osa Peninsula, a small survey found that 50% of participants below the 
poverty line were lifted above it due to the scheme and PES revenue became a 
primary source of cash income for 44% of these households (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; 
Wunder, 2008). However, these studies provide only gross figures for PES income 
 45 
and ignore landowner opportunity costs. Under such conditions it is anticipated that 
the gains would be much more modest. Indeed, more recently a review of seven PES 
schemes by Mahanty et al. (2013) indicated that although schemes did show small 
additional income to participating households, payments were often insufficient to 
cover the opportunity costs to participants over the lifecycle of the programme.  
Recently, work on the Chinese Sloping Lands Conversion Programme (SLCP), the 
largest PES scheme in the developing world, has raised some interesting insights into 
PES as a poverty tool. The SLCP was first implemented in 1999 in response to human, 
agricultural and fishery losses associated in part with the deforestation of upland 
river basins. As a set-aside cropland programme, its main aim was to prevent soil-
erosion though the afforestation and/or reforestation of highly sloped cultivated 
lands in the upper areas of the Yellow and Yangtze river basins (Groom and Palmer, 
2012a; Uchida et al., 2007). By 2005 over 9 million hectares of cropland had been 
retired by over 15 million farmers and included lands in 25 provinces and 
municipalities in China (Bennett, 2008; Groom and Palmer, 2012a; Uchida et al., 2007); 
environmentally the SLCP has been considered a success (Groom and Palmer, 2012a). 
A secondary objective of the SLCP was poverty reduction, the long-term successes of 
which remain less obvious. In the first instance, Uchida et al. (2007) found that 
participating households had lower initial levels of income, lower house values and 
asset holdings more generally than non-participating households. Using three 
methodological approaches – propensity score matching, differences-in-differences 
and differences-in-differences matching – the authors present evidence for a positive 
welfare effects from the programme on rural households; income from livestock and 
certain asset holdings increased significantly more so for participating households 
than for non-participating households. However, Uchida et al. also warn that the 
programme does not systematically favour the poor and only minimal statistical 
differences between the poor and better-off participating households are seen, hence 
there are few positive distributional impacts. In fact, Uchida and co-author’s research 
hints that, in the future, richer households will be better placed to achieve structural 
change, promoting long-term income streams from on-farm to off-farm income 
sooner due to less current constraints and a less urgent need for immediate profits.  
However, more recently, Groom (2012, In: Groom and Palmer, 2012b) and Li et al. 
(2011) show significant income effects for participants from the SLCPs and that this 
result is in fact more profound at the lower quartiles of income distribution.  
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Many scholars warn against assuming the pro-poor advertisements of PES (Corbera 
and Brown, 2010; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Kerr, 2002; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; 
Landell-Mills, 2002; McAfee and Shapiro, 2010; Pagiola et al., 2005).  
In the first instance, PES schemes can only assist in poverty reduction in those areas 
where service production exists, is at risk and overlaps with incidences of high 
poverty (Tschakert, 2007). However, where high environmental benefit, low 
opportunity costs and high poverty overlap PES programmes can theoretically 
achieve dual goals cost effectively (Gauvin et al., 2010).  Yet, while impoverishment 
and vulnerability are have long been recognised within coastal communities, poverty 
reduction is by no means guaranteed. 
Many assume that PES schemes will contribute to the alleviation of poverty through 
the payments made to poor land/resource owners; indeed the premise that 
participation is voluntary creates a presumption that potential actors will simply 
refuse to participate or withdraw if benefits are not realised (Pagiola et al., 2005). 
However, in reality, PES may not be voluntary at the individual level (Bennett, 2008; 
Sommerville et al., 2009; Uchida et al., 2007). PES programmes, in an aim to obtain 
efficient outcomes through community contracts, can reinforce existing power 
structures and inequalities, particularly with respect to resource access rights (Pascual 
et al., 2010; Sommerville et al., 2010a). At a global level, there are concerns that 
REDD+ can reverse recent trends of decentralised natural resource management, 
placing power – and carbon rights – back into the hands of more disconnected 
governments (Phelps et al., 2010). Moreover, participation can be blocked for many 
poorer households by significant up-front financial and labour costs (Mahanty et al., 
2013).   
More generally, no results pertain to the wider community of poor. In fact, the PES 
literature remains virtually silent on issues of distribution within these schemes 
(Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Pascual et al., 2010). Of notable exception is work by 
Sommerville et al. (2010a) who provide evidence of inequitable benefit distribution 
and elite capture mentioned above. However despite growing interest, empirical 
evidence on the extent to which PES schemes increase household welfare amongst 
participants and particularly those implications for non-participants remains scant; to 
date, anticipated benefits for the rural poor remain more hypothetical than real (Engel 
et al. 2008; Pagiola et al. 2008, 2005; Tschakert 2007; Wendland et al. 2010; Wunder 
2006).  
More generally, Wunder et al. (2008) indicate that in the majority of cases, PES 
schemes have had some positive but point-wise, quantitatively small poverty 
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reduction effect, although gains are seldom huge. This said, the author also states that 
it is unlikely that PES schemes, given their current small scale, contribute to huge 
poverty exacerbation effects, nor does he believe PES will contribute significantly to 
poverty alleviation (Wunder, 2005). 
In practice, PES schemes have the potential to affect three categories of ‘poor’. These 
categories include (a) on the supply side: poor environmental services sellers (project 
participants), (b) on the demand side: poor environmental service buyers and (c) 
derived effects: other poor potentially impacted by the implementation of the PES.  
On the supply side, the question is what participation filters exist which may prevent 
participation of the poor? 
2.4.1 To what extent are the poor able to participate in PES? 
The poor face explicit PES access rules and underlying structural impediments. A 
number of barriers constrain the successful participation of actors within PES 
schemes and in general it is those ‘poorer’ members which are largely left out. 
Wunder (2008) identified four selection criteria constraining the participation of the 
poor within PES. These include: eligibility; desire; ability and competitiveness.  
Many of the facets preventing eligible enrolment, such as insecure tenure, lack of 
access to credit, lack of information, lack of title and small land holdings are often 
directly correlated with poverty (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Mahanty et al., 2013). 
Moreover, poorer and more vulnerable families often have fewer diversification 
options, constrained by a smaller asset base (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Landell-Mills 
and Porras, 2002; Pagiola et al., 2005; Tschakert, 2007; Wunder, 2008).  
If eligible, the poor also require the ability to enrol. For households that rely entirely 
on subsistence living, setting aside land or resources may not be feasible. 
Landholders owning plots of only a couple of hectares, or those fishing for 
subsistence only, would find it almost impossible to set aside resources 
predominately for environmental service production. Studies from Ecuador and 
Guatemala found farmers with the smallest landholdings less willing to participate in 
a PES set-aside scheme, believing it to compromise food security (Grieg-Gran et al., 
2005; Southgate et al., 2009). In those instances where active investment is required, 
conversion to more biodiversity-friendly agriculture practices of fishing practices, 
poorer households may lack the necessary skills, labour or capital (Southgate et al., 
2009; Wunder, 2008). When these new practices are complex, accessing technical 
assistance can prove harder for those poorer households (Pagiola et al., 2008).  
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Taking eligibility, desire and ability together it can be seen that there is a serious risk 
that PES schemes can in fact exacerbate impoverishment, increasing the relative 
poverty of those unable or unwilling to participate. Indeed, the overall conclusion of 
an extensive literature review conducted by Centre for International Forestry 
Research (CIFOR) concluded that concerns should sit with the non-participating poor 
(Wunder, 2008).  
Recent evidence suggests that to a large extent the poor are often not able to fit the 
criteria. Miranda et al. (2003) show that in the Virilla PES watershed project in Costa 
Rica, three quarters of participants already earned over US$ 820 per month, thus were 
hardly the poorer members of society in the first place. Information on the 110 
landowners receiving payments indicated that over 80% owned properties of over 70 
hectares; a mere 6% of enrolees owned properties of 30 hectares or less. In fact, most 
landowners taking part were not dependent upon their land, and 65% were either 
professionals, employed in trade or retired (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Miranda et al., 
2003). A larger study by Zbinden & Lee (2005) found a similar pattern within the 
northern lowlands of Costa Rica. On average, participants were found to be better 
educated, typically urban dwellers and proportionally reliant upon off-farm sources. 
Participants were also more likely to own larger farms than nonparticipants (Zbinden 
and Lee, 2005). More recently, analysis of an agro-forestry PES scheme located in the 
Sofala Province, Mozambique found male-headed and higher income households 
were favoured as project beneficiaries (Hegde and Bull, 2011).  
However, Uchida et al. (2007) found that participating households in the Chinese 
SLCP had, in general, lower initial levels of income, house values and asset holdings 
than non-participating households. Within a Nicaraguan silvopasture PES project, 
Pagiola et al. (2008) found poorer households able to participate extensively within 
the aforementioned scheme, in some cases to a greater extent than their wealthier 
counterparts. Moreover, participation was not limited to the simpler, least expensive 
interventions. Poorer households accounted for a 51% and 70% decline in degraded 
pastures and area under annual crops respectively; a substantial share of land use 
changes. The extreme poor appeared to display a slightly greater degree of difficulty 
in participating, although this difference is relative (Pagiola et al., 2008).  
2.4.2 To what extent do the poor realise benefits? 
Once eligible, willing and able to participate, the question is whether PES actually do 
make those poorer service providers better off? And if so to what extent do they 
actually benefit? 
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The commodification of environmental services is often structurally skewed against 
the interest of local stakeholders and tends to favour elites (Corbera and Brown, 2010; 
Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Mahanty et al., 2013; McAfee and Shapiro, 2010). Poor 
landowners generally own marginal lands of low productivity and lack a strong voice 
to best negotiate contract rules and payments (both at the local and contract level) 
(Wunder, 2008).  
The realised benefits of any PES will of course vary, and are perhaps dependent upon 
the degree to which poverty alleviation is considered within the remit of project 
objectives. Evidence from past poverty reduction interventions suggest that 
geographical targeting and self-selection criterion found within PES schemes can 
contribute to their pro-poor performance. A review of targeted poverty reduction 
programmes found projects that used geographical targeting and self-selection 
achieved higher rates of transfer to lower income households (Coady et al., 2004). 
Recent evidence does indeed suggest that poor households can benefit financially and 
otherwise subject to favourable contract design and institutional conditions (Mahanty 
et al., 2013). However, worryingly, realised benefits often prove to be dependent on 
ownership of a sufficient asset base in the first instance (Clements et al., 2010; Jindal et 
al., 2010; Mahanty et al., 2013; Sommerville et al., 2010a; Wunder, 2008).  
Where PES are appropriately designed to enable adequate access of the poor, its 
success to lift participants out of poverty will ultimately rely on its ability to promote 
long-term diversification into alternative occupations and behavioural change 
(Uchida et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2004). PES have been theorised to further influence 
poverty through promoting alternatives e.g. ‘off-farm’ labour (Groom and Palmer, 
2012a, 2012b; Groom et al., 2010; Kelly and Huo, 2013; Uchida et al., 2009). Some 
suggest that this is simply through a simple labour substitution mechanism whereby 
PES merely reduces the need for on-farm work (Kelly and Huo, 2013). Others suggest 
more complex relationships. Recent analyses suggest that for credit constrained 
households PES schemes can promote diversification and poverty alleviation through 
relaxing liquidity constraints, for example when a household does not have the 
means to finance its shift into another more profitable market. Research into the SLCP 
suggests that through the relaxation of credit constraints, many participants have 
indeed reallocated household members’ time to more lucrative off-farm work, and 
that they did so at a higher rate than non-participants (Uchida et al., 2009). High 
transaction costs, insecure tenure and other constraints have also been shown to 
inhibit off-farm labour, self-employment and the seeking of wage-earning jobs 
(Groom and Palmer, 2012a; Uchida et al., 2009). Evidence also suggests that 
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constrained and unconstrained households will react differently to PES schemes and 
potential impacts will be different; for those unconstrained households poverty 
reduction will only occur as a result of temporary compensation since their allocation 
to off-farm labour did not change (Groom and Palmer, 2012a; Groom et al., 2010). 
Further evidence provided by Groom et al. (2010) also indicates that constrained and 
unconstrained households exhibit differing responses to the SLCP intervention. 
Moreover the various constraints themselves, such as access to credit, markets, 
technology, household composition, tenure and land quality to name a few will have 
an impact (Groom and Palmer, 2012a; Groom et al., 2010; Liang et al., 2012); a better 
understanding will hopefully enable a better targeted, more cost-effective policy. 
Indeed, as well as improving overall efficiency, working alongside other instruments 
and policies can assist in relaxing those constraints which at present reduce the ability 
of such households to participate (Groom et al., 2010).  
In addition to fiscal benefits, which may in fact not be substantial – PES schemes can 
have further more profound benefits. PES programmes have been shown to provide 
more stable incomes as well as numerous non-income benefits. Participation within a 
PES scheme has, in some cases, the potential to increase smallholder tenure security, 
particularly against neighbours and squatters. Local acceptance of tenure is often 
dependent upon economic use of land or resource. By creating local recognition of the 
tangible income-generating value of conservation areas and practices, resources can 
become less susceptible to grabbing, as was witnessed in the Bolivian Los Negros PES 
pilot programme. Participants received maps with demarcated boundaries helping 
demonstrate the economic value of the ‘idle’ land, giving higher de facto protection 
from landless migrants (Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 2008).  
Beyond tenure consolidation, PES schemes have been shown to increase human and 
social capital. PES can strengthen local community institutions as well as support the 
development of new ones. Payments can fund the cost of management by village 
institutions, particularly over common-pool resources, including such things as 
monitoring and sanctioning non-compliance (Clements et al., 2010).  Furthermore, 
PES schemes which require technical inputs bring training and new skill sets, often 
up-front, allowing diversification.  
2.4.3 Implications of project design for poor within PES 
Variations in PES structure and design include: environmental services provided; 
location; eligibility rules for participation; payment or incentive type; as well as the 
composition and social norms of different stakeholders. The possible effects for all 
involved will very much depend upon all of these factors. Projects may not reduce 
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local poverty if they in fact simultaneously reduced availability of a staple crop, 
thereby increasing its price beyond that of basic income gains.  
It goes without saying that if PES programmes wish to include poverty alleviation in 
their manifesto, effort is needed to understand and reduce those initial barriers which 
inhibit and/or constrain the participation of the poor; lack of capital remains a 
significant barrier to access. Moreover, PES schemes continue to reduce informal 
access to many resources and understanding possible land-use and ownership reform 
is imperative in order not to exacerbate existing inequalities (Mahanty et al., 2013).  
Beyond this, however, the type of project implemented can exacerbate or limit equity 
implications of PES. Although ex-post studies do not appear to exist, modelling by 
Zilberman et al. (2008) indicates that two different PES scheme types can have very 
different outcomes; PES which diverted land vs. working-land programmes resulted 
in different implications for a range of stakeholders. Analysis assumed that the PES 
would affect two outcomes – an agricultural good and an environmental service - and 
affect four groups: rural landowners, rural landless, urban consumers and 
beneficiaries of the environmental services. Working-land schemes were mostly 
found to have better distributional effects than land-diversion programmes. This was 
mainly due to the generated employment opportunities; setting areas aside generally 
having the opposite effect. Zilberman et al. also found that the landless were most 
likely to gain from PES schemes which led to both higher output prices and wage 
rates but where agricultural product had a relatively small share in their overall 
consumption set. Under targeted payments, small unit landowners with low land 
productivity and limited potential for supplying environmental services will gain 
little rent and likely be affected similarly as the landless poor.  
Again, the overall implications of all schemes depended on effects on food and living 
expenses relative to benefits received, as well as potential multiplier effects 
(Zilberman et al., 2008). Currently, dramatic effects appear quite unlikely, as areas 
enrolled within PES schemes are relatively small (Pagiola et al., 2005). 
2.5 Merging PES into a marine and coastal context 
Policy development for fisheries management has proved problematic. Sustainable 
fisheries continue to be the exception rather than the rule. Growing populations and 
unregulated coastal zones mean that most coastal artisanal fisheries are now 
considered overfished or collapsed (Defeo and Castilla, 2005; Hawkins and Roberts, 
2004). 
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MPAs are the most prolific management tool in virtually all the world’s oceans and 
seas (Agardy et al., 2003) and  are touted as the most efficient management tool for 
overexploited fisheries within low-income tropical countries (Pollnac et al., 2001).  
2.5.1 Marine Protected Areas 
MPAs take many forms, for example no-take zones, multiple use, temporal closures 
and can be implemented at a national, regional or community level.  However, they 
have the common characteristic of being a management intervention that is spatially 
organised (Christie and White, 2007).  
Clear evidence exists that MPAs can improve fisheries health; in the last five years 
new, rigorous and defensible evidence has emerged which shows that MPAs do 
improve fishery yields and conserve biodiversity (Agardy, 2000). Today, virtually all 
coastal countries have implemented some form of MPA (Agardy et al. 2003) and in 
2002 and 2003 respectively the World Summit on Sustainable Development and 
World Parks Congress called for the establishment of a global system of MPAs 
(Balmford et al. 2004, Kelleher 1996). 
Despite this, the majority of MPAs worldwide show disappointing levels of 
compliance (Beger et al., 2005; Depondt and Green, 2006; Hargreaves-Allen et al., 
2011). An initial broad assessment in the mid 1990s found that only one third of 383 
MPAs had met their management objectives, a further third only partially and the 
remaining third not at all (Hargreaves-Allen et al., 2011; Kelleher et al., 1995).  More 
recently, of 400 MPAs in the Philippines only some 20-25% are considered successful; 
furthermore, over 66% and 90% of Caribbean and East Asian MPAs respectively have 
failed to reach their management goals (McClanahan 1999; Pollnac et al. 2001).  
Poor design, lack of appropriate scientific evidence and disregard for social contexts 
of many vulnerable stakeholders has led to the failure of many MPAs to meet their 
management objectives. Conflicts arising from the economic dislocation and 
marginalisation of artisanal fishermen are not uncommon, and lead to the rejection of 
the imposed MPA or loss of interest after initial support (Christie, 2004).  
MPA success is, in the large part, dependent upon local community and stakeholder 
involvement; research highlights social factors, and not biological or physical 
variables, to be the primary determinants of MPA success or, indeed, failure (Mascia 
2003). In particular, fisher co-operation and their recognition of MPA boundaries are 
integral. In most cases, rebuilding stocks requires a significant reduction in fishing 
effort, at least in the short term. For those with limited means to buffer these losses, 
costs can be particularly high (Mohammed, 2012). Alternative occupations have been 
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recommended for fishers displaced due to catch scarcity or displaced by MPAs 
(Sievanen et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2006; Teh et al., 2008; Worm et al., 2009). Indeed, 
Pollnac et al. (2001) found the presence of successful alternative income projects 
among one of the six most important indicators of successful community-based MPA 
management. 
Under the current situation it is highly unlikely that MPA budgets will stretch to 
cover the opportunity costs of displaced fishermen. In truth, insufficient funds for 
effective basic MPA management costs are the norm worldwide (Depondt and Green, 
2006).  
However, the limited success of MPAs has not led to a reduction in their 
implementation; MPAs continue to become the mainstream management tool in 
virtually all the world’s oceans and seas (Agardy et al., 2003). Other interventions 
used such as catch limits remain unsuitable and costly in an artisanal developing 
world context due to dispersed landing sites and multi-species catch.  
PES can provide additional funds outside of government budgets, donor funding and 
trust funds: traditional MPA funding sources. Under such an approach, beneficiaries 
of MPAs can deliver the funds required to compensate fishers for forgone 
opportunity costs. Alternatively PES can circumvent the need for MPA establishment 
providing direct compensation for resource protection.  
2.5.2 Implications for poverty in a marine and coastal setting 
Although advocated as having the ability to address both conservation and poverty 
concurrently, as previously described, few PES schemes have been carefully 
documented. Very little is known about the possible distributional implications 
within terrestrial PES schemes, much less within a marine and coastal setting where 
PES programmes remain in the proposal stage (Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2008). 
In the first instance, can PES contribute to community development and poverty 
alleviation? To what degree will fishers wish to participate? To what degree will poor 
fishers wish to participate? What factors may prevent their participation? Given the 
troublingly low compliance rates within MPA design, will the sole inclusion of an 
incentive package inspire compliance and behaviour change? How best can schemes 
be designed in order to promote participation?  
As previously mentioned, some claim that PES will in fact increase relative poverty in 
places; under a terrestrial PES scheme, landless poor may become relatively worse off 
as profits may be restricted to only those with tenure rights over resources. Further 
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barriers to PES market access may exist based on gender, kinship or other divisions 
(Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Wunder, 2005). It is likely that many lessons can be 
learnt from terrestrial PES schemes but significant differences do complicate matters 
within coastal communities. Fishermen have long been thought of as the ‘poorest of 
the poor’, and fishing as a last resort. However, fishing communities are far from 
homogenous units; important differences exist between individual resource users 
regarding access, assets, knowledge and institutional linkages (Tschakert, 2007); all 
resource users are not equal. Indeed poverty, and relative degrees thereof, are 
multifaceted and vary widely within fishing communities; further discriminations, 
marginalisations and exclusions exist within fishing communities (Jentoft et al., 2010).  
Béné (2003) identifies four categories of discrimination within fisheries systems: 
economic exclusion, social marginalisation, class exploitation and political 
disempowerment.  These mechanisms are described in Table 2.3. The ability of fishers 
and coastal peoples to adopt marine PES programmes will be further influenced by 
one, few or all of these discriminations. It is important that one can identify those 
more vulnerable fishers whom may not, for some reason or another, be eligible or 
desire to participate.  
In the second instance, can demand successfully fund such schemes? What are the 
issues surrounding the realisation of this demand? As yet, few buyers are confident 
about PES and its potential to deliver the environmental services promised (Wunder, 
2005). This problem may be more profound in a marine setting where weak tenure 
exists and environmental services are more diffuse, fragmented and to a large extent 
‘invisible’ (Pagiola, 2008). However, recent interest has been shown by such 
organisations as Forest Trends 3 , a number of NGOs including The Nature 
Conservancy and CARE, as well as the Mexican Government4 (Muñoz 2009, pers 
comm.). Furthermore, blue carbon is emerging as an important market for marine 
PES (Murray et al. 2011).  
 
 
                                                      
3 Forest Trends is an interdisciplinary not-for-profit organisation initially focussing upon market-based 
approaches for forest conservation. The organisation now also looks at such practices for marine 
conservation through its marine branch MARES. 
4 The Mexican Government is in the early stages of implementing a programme which attempts to 
reduce the fishing mortality of the endangered vaquita dolphin. Payments are made to fishermen to 
incentivise the uptake of gear more ‘vaquita friendly’, payments are intended to cover the opportunity 
costs of associated losses due to the use of new nets which, while enable vaquita to more readily escape 
from the nets, are less effective at catching fish vs. the previous gillnets. Entry into the fishery is 
regulated by a licence cap.  
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Table 2.3 Typology of intrasectoral “socio-institutional” processes leading to the 
denial of individuals or groups’ commands over the resources 
Discrimination 
process 
Definition Access 
denied 
Nature of 
discrimination 
Comments 
Economic 
exclusion 
Process which leads to the 
leaving out from a 
particular economic 
activity of certain 
individual due to their 
economic/financial 
inability to access the 
factor of production 
necessary to enter and/or 
operate this activity 
Yes Economic  
Social 
marginalisation 
Process which leads to the 
denial of the command 
over a resource, service of 
commodities for certain 
actors based on such 
criteria such as caste, 
gender, or ethnic origins 
Yes Social Like exclusion, 
marginalisation refers to 
situations where actors 
are denied access and use 
of a resource (as opposed 
to class exploitation). The 
two concepts, however, 
differ by the nature of the 
barriers: economic in the 
former social in the 
second 
Class 
exploitation 
Situation where a higher 
class is perceived as being 
in the position of 
extracting surplus labour 
from a (lower) working 
class is considered as not 
receiving its “fair share”: 
in the benefits created by 
an economic activity 
No Social Exploitation differs from 
exclusion and 
marginalisation in that it 
corresponds to cases 
where the poor are not 
denied access to the 
resource/economic 
activity 
Political 
disempowerment 
Situation where actors are 
left out: from participation 
and/or decision-making 
processes leading to 
low/poor opportunities to 
control and govern their 
own commands over 
resources. This may result 
in reduction or even 
denying of access and use 
of the resources. The 
initial barriers are due to 
asymmetrical power 
relationships based on 
social stratification 
Yes/No Political 
(power) 
Under situation of 
disempowerment, actors 
(users) may access the 
resources (e.g. the 
fisheries). What they do 
not access is the decision-
making process (e.g. 
management system) 
which govern the 
modalities of access to 
and use of these resources 
Source: (Béné, 2003). 
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2.6 Summary of key findings and research questions 
However hampered by teething problems, the idea behind PES remains a solid one; 
adequate compensation mechanisms for conservation interventions are long overdue. 
A more equitable approach has lead to an uptake of PES projects within the 
conservation portfolio, particularly those projects which aim to address such 
supplementary goals as poverty reduction. Up until recently, as can be seen by 
available data, these projects have remained limited to terrestrial schemes providing 
watershed and carbon services. However, within the last year, there has been a 
growing interest in the use of PES within a marine context.  
Given the preceding discussion, the question remains: what is the feasibility of 
marine PES? To what extent can we address the issues raised within a marine 
context? 
With a greater focus on social responsibility within conservation, PES instruments are 
likely here to stay. Yet as can be seen, there is much to learn surrounding marine PES 
and their feasibility as a conservation tool, and the rapid uptake of PES schemes by 
development practitioners in recent years requires urgent investigation.  
In reality, a PES scheme may often not be the optimal mechanism. Marine and coastal 
environments are very different from their terrestrial counterparts. Understanding 
the similarities and these differences, as well as the possible distributional 
implications of marine PES schemes will be integral to the future success of marine 
PES in meeting their goals.  
Identifying those instances where marine PES will be applicable, and indeed where 
they are not, where they can contribute to rural poverty and where they can work 
alongside pre-existing tools will be important to their realisation within the marine 
setting. Furthermore, it will be central to their long-term success; if marine PES do not 
quickly adapt to the marine setting appropriately it is likely that they will be rejected 
by communities before their foot is even in the door. 
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Chapter 3 
Examining the issues in marine Payments for 
Environmental Services through expert elicitation 
3.1 Overview 
In contrast to the previous research papers, here we focus on issues associated with 
particular promoting confidence in marine PES instruments more generally. The 
paper uses expert interviews collected via web surveys to highlight benefits and 
perceived challenges in developing the tool for the marine environment. As expected 
within a marine context, ill-defined property rights features as a prominent barrier. 
Other obstacles relate to the more fluid and invisible nature of the marine 
environment and issues of monitoring and enforcement. However, we challenge 
these perceived limitations and discuss opportunities for marine PES to add to the 
current marine conservation portfolio. The results are widely applicable due to 
continuing high levels of dependence on and degradation of marine resources 
globally, as well as the recent growing interest in marine PES schemes.   
The following section presents an introduction the paper. Section 3.3 introduces the 
current status of marine PES as well as the use of expert opinions in qualitative 
research and decision making for policy. Section 3.4 explains the methods used and 
Section 3.5 the expert profiles. Section 3.6 presents questionnaire findings. We 
conclude with the discussion and conclusion in Section 3.7 and 3.8 respectively.  
3.2 Introduction 
Over the last few decades, increasing pressure and a high dependence on coastal and 
marine ecosystems has seen the development of policy and legislative instruments 
which seek to protect, conserve and manage these resources (Borja et al. 2008). In the 
past, many countries have attempted to implement regulatory instruments to 
promote more sustainable use of marine resources, for example through no-take 
zones, restriction of fishing gears or via implementation of fishing permits 
(Mohammed 2012). However, these instruments have largely failed to extinguish 
unsustainable practises, particularly among those coastal communities located within 
low-income countries. For the most part, regulations do not adequately compensate 
for loss of earnings or inspire compliance, and enforcement proves difficult across 
multiple landing sites (Mohammed 2012).  
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Recent years have seen the emergence of a new tool in the conservation portfolio 
called ‘Payments for Environmental Services’ (PES). The premise of PES emerged as a 
solution to realign private and social costs resulting from land and resource use 
changes (Jack et al. 2008). The PES framework states that natural resource users are 
paid to conserve or manage natural resources more sustainably. The notion is that 
PES represent a win-win situation, able to improve compliance through 
compensation. As such, PES appear to be continually acknowledged as an alternative 
to failed regulatory mechanisms (Mohammed 2012), and more recently have seen a 
growing interest from the marine conservation and development arena. This has lead 
to a rapid adoption of PES, unfortunately with little critical discussion or analysis of 
long-term impacts (Redford & Adams 2009). However, as with any conservation 
instrument, implementation is far from simple.  
Much uncertainty still surrounds PES, and to a greater degree marine PES schemes. 
Bringing these instruments to the coastal and marine environment represents a 
complex challenge. However, to date there has been little critical analysis of marine 
PES, both empirically and hypothetically. A lack of tangible examples limits the 
literature on marine PES to discussion pieces and policy briefs.  
The purpose of this paper is to better understand the benefits and challenges of 
bringing PES to the coastal and marine environment. The paper presents the findings 
of questionnaires conducted with 42 experts in the field of PES and/or marine 
conservation and management. Results are based upon present understanding of the 
current marine environment and PES experience. In this final chapter a qualitative 
methodology is utilised. A qualitative approach enables useful insights to be drawn 
out from the findings, highlights diversity and, importantly, allows experts to frame 
their thoughts unprompted. The qualitative results presented herein also 
compliments previous quantitative chapters, drawing on a different but equally 
informative methodology.  
The results are widely applicable due to a global dependence on marine resources, 
their ever-growing degradation and the recent flourishing of PES schemes within this 
marine context.   
3.3 Marine PES and expert elicitation for policy design 
3.3.1 Current status and knowledge on marine PES 
The environmental services produced by coastal and marine systems have been well 
documented; these are summarised in Table 3.1. However, while PES programmes 
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have established themselves within the terrestrial conservation portfolio, marine PES 
instruments remain very much in their infancy.  
Table 3.1 Services provided by coastal and marine ecosystems 
 Coastal Ocean Open Ocean 
Provisioning  Fisheries & aquaculture Fisheries & aquaculture 
Services Fuel wood Alternative energy 
 Alternative energy Strategic & other minerals 
 Natural products Natural products 
 Genetic and pharmaceutical Genetic and pharmaceutical 
 Transportation Transportation 
Regulating  Weather regulation Weather regulation 
Services Carbon sequestration Carbon sequestration 
 Shoreline stabilisation Nutrient regulation 
 Natural hazard protection Waste disposal 
 Nutrient regulation  
 Waste disposal  
Supporting Soil formation Nutrient cycling 
Services Photosynthesis Primary production 
 Nutrient cycling  
Cultural Tourism  Tourism  
Services Recreation Recreation 
 Spiritual values Spiritual values 
 Education Education 
 Aesthetics Aesthetics 
Source: Forest Trends & The Katoomba Group (2010) 
More recently, discussion of such markets within the marine context has emerged in 
the grey literature (e.g. Forest Trends & The Katoomba Group 2010; Mohammed 
2012; Pagiola 2008). Marine PES programmes remain for the most part in the proposal 
stage. With the rise of global climate change concerns, the inclusion of mangroves 
within the carbon mitigation mechanism REDD+ has seen a recent flurry of attention, 
including media and policy (Murray et al. 2011; Weaver 2011; Zwick & Kett 2010). 
Beyond ‘blue carbon’, marine PES schemes have also been proposed to improve 
coastal water quality as well as to promote compliance and compensate for 
restrictions to fishing areas (Begossi et al. 2011; Lindahl & Kollberg 2009).  
Lindahl & Kollberg (2009) discuss the potential of mussel farming to reduce ocean 
acidification. Under an extension of the EU agri-environmental aid programme the 
authors argue that mussel farmers could be paid support for operations which as a 
consequence reduce eutrophication from nearby sewage plants. In Brazil, a payment 
scheme operates within artisanal fisheries. Called the defeso, fishers receive a ‘salary’ 
based on the minimum wage which compensates for opportunity costs lost during a 
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closure period whereby fishing is prohibited by the government for fish reproduction 
(Begossi et al. 2011). 
A recent International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) briefing 
paper by Mohammed (2012) discusses the application of marine PES as a mechanism 
to compensate fishers for loss of earnings; to induce restoration of coastal habitats; to 
incentivise protection of endangered species and to promote sustainable fishing 
practices. In their 2010 report ‘Payments for ecosystem services: Getting started in marine 
and coastal ecosystems: a primer’ Forest Trends & The Katoomba Group highlight the 
possible role of PES in the marine environment. More specifically they mention 
marine carbon sequestration and capture, water quality and pollution filtration, 
shoreline protection and stabilisation, marine biodiversity protection and fish nursery 
habitat protection. 
Within the academic literature, terrestrial PES are by no means presented as a 
panacea for conservation. Authors speak of complexities in design, implementation 
and equity (e.g. Corbera et al. 2007; Engel et al. 2008; Ferraro 2008; Gibbons et al. 2011; 
Jack et al. 2008; van Noordwijk et al. 2007) as well as enabling environments (e.g. 
Benítez et al. 2006; Engel & Palmer 2008; Engel et al. 2008). In addition, ex-post 
analyses of environmental success, economic efficiency and/or distributional 
implications remain scarce (Pascual et al. 2010; Wunder 2008). More generally, the 
application of PES schemes has run ahead of a sound understanding of the 
appropriate tools for effective implementation; few design recommendations are, or 
indeed can be, drawn from empirical evidence (Milne & Adams 2012).  
For the greater part, the literature pertaining to marine PES schemes is in a practical 
sense non-existent. And while marine PES can learn some lessons from already 
limited literature of their terrestrial counterparts, marine systems exhibit fundamental 
differences which may have further ramifications for their success. Marine 
ecosystems have several characteristics unlike those found on land. Marine systems 
are highly mobile making them potentially harder and more expensive to monitor 
(Mohammed 2012; Pagiola 2008). Another, more pertinent, issue also stems from this 
trait: these dynamic systems can make causation difficult to prove. Unlike in 
watershed PES, where benefits roll downstream, in marine environments benefits are 
multi-directional and widespread. As such, identifying demand may prove difficult 
(Begossi et al. 2011; Pagiola 2008). While not exclusive to the marine environment, 
marine systems are also subject to ill-defined and insecure tenure, as well as multiple 
and fragmented resource users, which can make identification of appropriate 
suppliers more challenging. 
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3.3.2 Expert opinion in policy design & decision-making  
Increasingly, expert opinion has been sought to inform decision-making within new 
policy design, particularly in cases of high uncertainty or where data is lacking (Lowe 
& Lorenzoni 2007; Weible 2008).   
Expert judgement is not intended as a substitute for empirical research. However, it 
can provide useful insights for researchers, practitioners and policy makers, as well as 
raise awareness of potential issues while research for definitive results is on-going 
(Granger Morgan et al. 2001; O’Neill et al. 2008), highlighting benefits and challenges 
in new policy design. Indeed, specialised knowledge and expertise are considered 
important factors in any decision-making process, have been used extensively to 
solve problems related to environmental hazards (González et al. 2007; Morgan & 
Henrion 1992), and feature regularly within the political sciences (Dorussen et al. 
2005).   
Expert interviews can be a key strength in aiding design processes and highlighting 
future research needs. Results can be qualitative or quantitative (Hagerman et al. 
2010).  Expert elicitation does not need to identify consensus, but instead can 
highlight and voice diversity in thoughts and opinions, and make new knowledge 
available. Furthermore it is available almost immediately and unlikely to be reduced 
on the time-scale relevant for policy formation (González et al. 2007; Hagerman et al. 
2010; O’Neill et al. 2008).  
The complexity of many environmental systems and an urgent need to address issues 
of degradation mean that, often, expert knowledge and experience is the best 
evidence available (Fazey et al. 2006). Indeed, qualitative methods are being 
increasingly used in global assessments of marine conservation instruments 
(Balmford et al. 2004; Hargreaves-Allen et al. 2011; Hockings 2003).  
As we are interested in the various views and technical issues of bringing PES to the 
marine environment, we consider expert elicitation an appropriate methodology for 
this study. 
3.4 Methods  
3.4.1 Expert selection 
Marine environments are complex systems, as is the practical implementation of PES 
schemes. In order to fully understand the issues surrounding the transfer of PES to 
the marine environment, expert elicitation was not limited to solely PES experts. 
Those working in marine conservation hold important insights to the applicability of 
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PES in a marine context, and to a greater degree their experiences are not within the 
literature. For this reason we purposely sought the opinions of individuals working 
in one or both the field of PES and marine conservation, and included academics and 
NGO practitioners alike.   
Expert opinions are elicited on the suitability of PES as a policy tool within the marine 
environment. There is no agreed definition underpinning what constitutes an ‘expert’ 
in the expert knowledge elicitation literature (Lowe & Lorenzoni 2007). In our case, 
we consider ‘experts’ to be those individuals with specialised knowledge on the 
topics PES and/or marine conservation management. Expert criteria included 
demonstrated experience in PES or marine conservation research as indicated 
through academic papers and/or PES or marine policy development and/or PES or 
marine policy implementation.  
Expert selection was carefully considered, as this inevitably affects survey outputs. 
Individuals were identified through a review of the literature (academic and grey), 
review of relevant NGO programmes and key actors in design and/or 
implementation, referrals from experts themselves and the author’s own personal 
knowledge of the fields. Experts were also solicited to take part in the survey via 
notification on the Coral-List forum5  
Participating experts included leaders in the field of PES and marine management, as 
well as experts with specialised and/or practical expertise within one or both of these 
fields. In some cases expertise overlapped. A small number of respondents indicated 
no publications or field experience within the aforementioned disciplines. Those 
individuals with no publications or field experience and which were not individually 
solicited (e.g. from the web-search) were omitted from analyses. However, a number 
of these respondents were retained as they were still considered as experts due to 
publications and/or vast practical experience in a closely related field and carried 
valuable contributions.  
3.4.2 Questionnaire design 
Expert opinions were elicited through a structured on-line questionnaire. The full 
questionnaire is reported in Annex A1. The questionnaire was carefully designed 
                                                      
5 Coral-List is an Internet forum funded by NOAA’s Coral Reef Conservation Program. Its purpose is to 
facilitate discussions on coral reef ecosystems and related subjects. http://www.coralreef.noaa.gov 
 
 
 63 
over a period of three months. Questions were developed from the literature, through 
discussions with colleagues and the author’s own knowledge of literature gaps.  
In order not to frame initial thoughts and lead results, the first round of questions 
were open-ended. Experts were invited to comment on benefits and limitations of 
implementing PES in a marine setting, the possible use of PES schemes within a 
wider portfolio of marine conservation instruments and the possible role of PES in 
coastal development and poverty alleviation.  
3.4.3 Questionnaire implementation 
During January and early February 2012, the web survey was piloted with six experts 
specialising in PES systems and marine conservation. Given the wide range of PES 
schemes possible and the subjective nature of the open-ended questions, 
unambiguous wording was imperative. Furthermore, given the long length of the 
survey, design needed to minimised fatigue. Initial piloting identified and corrected 
these issues to the best ability of the author. A second round of piloting was then 
undertaken, after which no further changes were made to the survey.  
Experts were invited to complete the final on-line survey between February and June 
2012.  
3.4.4 Response Analysis 
Open-ended questionnaire responses were coded using a ‘grounded’ approach (e.g. 
Charmaz 2006; Corbin & Strauss 2008; Curnock 2010). The method is an open and 
iterative process in which statement context and underlying meaning are carefully 
considered and key issues drawn out. This allowed themes and views to emerge from 
the raw data itself, rather than fixing responses into preordained categories 
(Moustakas 1994). The conclusion is a wide variety of responses, some of which were 
later ‘nested’ within a common theme.  
The following gives an example of the coding process:  
Q.1.b. What do you believe are the challenges of bringing PES to the marine 
environment?  
Response: The demand is unclear. Often poor service users and providers pose 
problems for payments. Use rights are overlapping and boundaries are unclear. The 
nature of the resource is a dynamic one. Monitoring of the ES is perhaps more 
complex.  
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The response raises five issues which were subsequently coded: (1) uncertainty in 
demand; (2) poor service buyers unable to pay; (3) complex user rights/issues with 
identification of appropriate service providers; (4) dynamic nature of marine 
resources and (5) monitoring of PES will be complex/expensive.  
(1) and (2) were further nested within a central theme: issues in securing appropriate 
demand finance.  
3.5 Expert profiles 
During February and July 2012, 57 web surveys were submitted. Of these fifteen were 
incomplete and disregarded 6 . Thirty experts targeted via email completed the 
questionnaire, a response rate of 41% (total sample=74). The final results presented 
are based on 42 web surveys. Participation experts are listed in Annex A2. 
3.5.1 Summary of expert knowledge profile 
Relevant expert knowledge and experience is displayed in Table 3.2. As can be seen 
experience is fairly matched across both fields of interest. Marine conservation 
experts feature slightly higher within the final sample; 60% of respondents noted 
practical expertise with marine conservation tools. In comparison 52% recorded 
experience with PES tools. PES authors comprise 38% of the sample. Table 3.3 
indicates expert familiarity with PES implementation and literature.  
Table 3.2 Expert knowledge and experience across disciplines (% of final sample, 
n=42)  
 No. of programmes/articles 
 0 1-4 5-9 > 10 
Practical experience with PES instruments 48 43 5 5 
Practical experience with marine conservation 
instruments 
41 33 17 10 
Peer-reviewed publications in PES  62 24 7 7 
Participating 
organisations 
Advanced Conservation Strategies; CEMARE, CIFOR, Comunidad y Biodiversidad; 
Conservation International; Coral Reef Research Foundation; CORDIO; Duke 
University; Ecosystem Equity; Environmental Defence Fund; Fauna & Flora 
International; Georgia State University; IIED; Imperial College London; James Cook 
University; Legal Ray Consultants; London School of Economics; National Fisheries 
Authority; NOAA; NEF; Stockholm University; Sustain Value; Tetra Tech ARD; The 
Nature Conservancy; US Environment Protection Agency; UNDP; University of 
British Colombia; University of KwaZulu-Natal; University of  Rhode Island, 
University of  Washington; WCS; World Bank; WRI; WWF;  ZSL 
                                                      
6 Completed surveys were considered those in which respondents answered all compulsory questions as 
well as at least 50% of open-ended questions. 
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Table 3.3 Expert familiarity with PES literature and implementation (% of final 
sample, n=42) 
Overall, how closely do you follow the academic research developments within the PES literature? (e.g. 
peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters) 
Do not follow Very occasionally Somewhat Closely Very closely 
0 29 38 21 12 
     
Overall, how familiar would you say you are with applied PES instruments? (e.g. how well do you 
understand the issues relating to PES implementation in the field) 
Not at all      
familiar 
A little     
familiarity 
Average   
familiarity 
Good        
familiarity 
Very good 
familiarity 
2 24 21 24 29 
 
3.5.2 Expert views on defining characteristics of PES 
Prior to questioning specific to marine PES, we took a more broad interest in those 
criteria respondents believed must be met in order for a scheme to be considered a 
true-PES.  
For the most part, there exists no formal definition of PES within the literature 
(Sommerville et al. 2009). However, the most widely accepted interpretation – 
particularly within the academic literature - defines PES by the following five criteria: 
(1) a voluntary transaction; (2) PES involve a well-defined environmental service (or 
land use likely to secure that service); (3) the service is ‘purchased’ by at least one 
service buyer; (4) the service is ‘provided’ by at least one service provider; and (5) the 
payment is conditional on service provision (Engel et al. 2008; Sommerville et al. 2009; 
Wendland et al. 2010; Wunder 2006). However in the last few years the definition has 
softened and become less restrictive (Shelley 2011). More recently Tacconi  (2012) 
defines PES as “a transparent system for the additional provision of environmental 
services through conditional payments to voluntary providers”.  
A wide variety of results were seen, as demonstrated in Table 3.4. The conditionality 
criteria received the widest consensus, with 81% of participants believing it to be 
necessary for a true PES scheme. Not mentioned within Wunder’s definition, is the 
need for a PES to be adequately enforced, although this is perhaps inherent in (5). 
Interestingly, only around a third of interviewees believed PES schemes must be a 
voluntary transaction, and only 5% that the incentive must be cash.  
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While it is seen that some experts were previously not well accustomed to PES as an 
instrument, these results are also believed to be indicative of the growing trend 
towards a relaxed definition of PES as a tool.  
Table 3.4 Expert agreement on those criteria PES instrument must meet in order to be 
considered TRUE PES scheme 
PES criterion % agreement 
a. the PES scheme must involve a well-defined environmental service 76 
b. the environmental service to be purchased must be purchased by at least one 
service buyer 
64 
c. the environmental service to be provided must be provided by at least one service 
provider 
69 
d. the parties involved in the PES transaction must be involved in a voluntary 
capacity 
31 
e. the PES payment must be conditional on environmental service provision 81 
f. the incentive offered for the environmental service must be positive 60 
g. the incentive offered for the environmental service must be cash 5 
h. the scheme must provide environmental services to a level above those provided in 
the absence of the programme (i.e. must be additional) 
55 
i. the environmental service must be provided by service providers with well 
established property rights 
31 
j. the PES scheme must be adequately enforced 69 
k. none of the above 2 
 
In order to gain consistent results across respondents, PES was defined within the 
survey as per Sommerville et al. (2009), whereby PES are approaches that (1) transfer 
positive incentives to environmental service providers that are (2) conditional on the 
provision of the service.  
3.5.3 Expert familiarity with marine PES 
Experts were presented with an information page which presented: a definition of 
marine PES; an example list of possible marine environmental services; and an 
example of a marine PES vs. a payment scheme not considered a marine PES7. 
Experts were then asked their previous familiarity with the information presented. 
Respondent familiarity with the information presented and marine PES schemes is 
displayed in Table 3.5.  
                                                      
7 The main difference between the two schemes relied upon a conditionality in one scheme vs. a one-off 
payment. 
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Table 3.5 Expert familiarity with information presented on marine PES 
Were you previously familiar with the information presented on this page?  
Not familiar Somewhat familiar Familiar Very familiar 
2 33 43 21 
 
Approximately 65% of experts claimed previous familiarity with the statements 
presented. While just over 35% were somewhat or unfamiliar with the information, it 
is important to note that experts were elicited due to their experience in PES or 
marine conservation science and how this then transfers to this lesser known field.  
3.6 Results 
Tables 3.6- 3.10 present the frequency and distribution of all responses emerging from 
the data. Italicised topics are nested within overarching themes. However, given the 
wide range of responses, this paper limits discussion to a number of key topics as 
well as a few interesting ideas not previously discussed within the literature.   
3.6.1 Benefits of bringing PES to marine environment 
Table 3.6 displays the full record of the coded results for question 1.a: “What do you 
believe are the benefits of bringing PES to the marine environment?”. As anticipated, 
experts expressed many of the common and prominent themes pertaining to the 
advantages of PES more generally, as well as a fewer more specific marine related 
topics.  
3.6.1.1 Behaviour change and the promotion of local enforcement through incentives 
and compensation 
Almost one third of experts mentioned the ability of PES schemes to incentivise 
behaviour change as an important benefit.  
In coastal settings, where poverty and resource dependence are both considered to be 
high overall, one might expect the provision of compensation for opportunity costs to 
be an important benefit of marine PES over other previous instruments; indeed the 
transfer of benefits to resource-users/owners was mentioned by a quarter of experts 
(28% of responses). However, only five respondents mentioned compensation for 
opportunity costs specifically. The ability of PES to promote additional – non-
financial – benefits was also highlighted (23%). Beyond investment into alternative 
occupations, securing tenure, empowering local communities, as well as promoting 
social capital and conflict resolution were mentioned.  
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Table 3.6 Coded responses: Q1a. What do you believe are the benefits of bringing PES 
to the marine environment? (n=40) 
 No. 
respondents 
%    
responses 
Incentivise behaviour change 12 30 
Promote local enforcement/lower enforcement costs 5 13 
Sustainable finance 4 10 
Conditionality of instrument 2 5 
Cost effective conservation 2 5 
Outcome-based conservation 1 3 
Promotes participation/involvement 1 3 
   
Transfer of benefits to resource user/owner 11 28 
     compensation of opportunity costs 5 13 
     monetary incentives 4 10 
     transfers ES value to users/owners 2 5 
compensation for time-lag between benefits accruing and closure of fishing 
sites 
2 5 
   
Highlights value of environmental service 9 23 
highlights true value of ES/places value on ES 9 23 
cost of natural capital incorporated into individual/policy decisions 6 15 
   
Additional social benefits 9 23 
investment into alternative occupations 4 10 
local empowerment/ownership of initiative 2 5 
transfer tenure to resource user 1 3 
investment into social capital/conflict resolution 1 3 
protection of  fisher livelihoods 1 3 
   
A need to better protect marine environment 8 20 
current poor condition of marine environment 6 13 
failure of existing instruments 3 8 
   
Improved environmental performance 4 10 
improved marine sustainability 3 8 
precise spatial targeting 1 3 
lower incentives required in marine PES (due to faster lifecycle 
regeneration) 
1 3 
reduce fishing effort 1 3 
 
The ability of PES schemes to promote local enforcement and reduce enforcement 
costs was highlighted by 13% of experts, and as mentioned by one respondent, may 
be particularly valuable within a marine setting: 
“Community conservation has the criticism that it does not ensure environmental 
protection…, in a large part because “new” profitable activities are integrated as 
complements rather than substitutes to the “old” environmentally damaging 
livelihoods. That criticism was primarily for terrestrial conservation and basically 
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due to the fact that it’s hard to exclude people from e.g. forests. It seems to me marine 
conservation would have a much more difficult time of such exclusion, so the need for 
a truly conditional conservation mechanism is greater. You don't have to exclude 
only monitor…change the incentive structure and monitor well… So where 
enforcement is very difficult (e.g. coral reef) a conditional mechanism that only 
required monitoring, and not exclusion, may be less effort and a more effective use of 
money.”  
3.6.1.2 PES as a transitory instrument 
PES was considered particularly well suited to the marine environment by two 
experts for characteristics little discussed within the literature. And in stark contrast 
to the general view of marine PES being a greater challenge.  
“PES particularly useful in areas where the spatial resource use pattern is important 
(its difficult to achieve surgical precision in resource use patterns with ITQs for 
example)” 
“…the key difference is that marine resources tend to regenerate much faster than 
terrestrial resources. This difference makes marine PES far more likely to be 
successful at lower levels of incentives than for terrestrial resources. For example, 
local people will probably see fish stocks recover much quicker after a closure, and this 
will encourage them to support the PES programme and to support the new 
institutional framework created (e.g. enforcing closure). With terrestrial systems 
fundamentally sustainable management is not in the interests of people because the 
rate resources regenerate is slower than investing the capital in another type of land 
use. Under these circumstances I think payments need to be larger and sustained for 
longer” 
Indeed, the notion that PES payments, while initially conditional on ES delivery, need 
not be continuous over the entire period of marine conservation was mentioned by a 
small number of respondents (n=3). These experts toy with the idea of PES as a 
bridge to cover short falls in loss of earnings from initial management restrictions. 
Once stocks recover to a level above initial costs, payments can be weaned out: a 
transitionary payment as it were.  As one expert put it, a ‘kickstart’ to more 
sustainable opportunities.  
“Potentially a way to offset the opportunity costs of marine management (e.g. MPA 
or gear restrictions), and encourage participation. This is particularly important in 
areas where resource users are often poor and, although they often have diversified 
livelihoods, they are generally limited in economic opportunities. Income from PES 
could be used to kickstart other more ‘sustainable’ livelihood opportunities.” 
“If I believe no-take zones work, then fishers will also see them work, but they need to 
be compensated for this time lag in giving up areas of fishing grounds.” 
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“Possibly play a key role in getting a system started. Start up costs are a problem in 
marine conservation and this may be one way to help get over this barrier.” 
3.6.2 Challenges of bringing PES to marine environment 
Perhaps more interesting from a research perspective are those challenges which 
need to be addressed in order to transition PES to the marine environment. Of the 42 
expert surveys submitted 41 responded to Question 1b. What do you believe are the 
challenges of bringing PES to the marine environment? Results are displayed in Table 3.7.  
3.6.2.1 Complex tenure in a marine setting 
As can be seen, by far the most pertinent challenge for marine PES raised by experts 
relates to the complex tenure systems seen in marine and coastal areas; as many as 
61% commented on this issue. Of these 76% mentioned a lack of property rights more 
specifically: 46% of the total sample. Multiple users and the identification of 
appropriate service providers were also cited as an issue, 29% and 27% of 
respondents respectively.  
As put by one expert:  
“One particular related problem that is acute in the marine environment is the lack of 
property rights in space or species and thus the difficulty in enforcing claims.” 
Additionally; 
“Different from forests or terrestrial ecosystems, marine ecosystems are not owned 
by any well-identified owner. Instead many users gather on these ecosystems and it 
is therefore difficult to identify one service buyer and one service provider.” 
3.6.2.2 Marine ecosystems 
The nature of marine ecosystems was stated as a challenge to marine PES 
implementation by over a quarter of respondents. Of these, the dynamic nature of 
marine ES was cited by a smaller subsample. Closely related to this issue was the 
dislocation between service provision and end product (n=3). Indeed, as one expert 
noted, within marine systems organisms are not only highly mobile but can require 
varying environments at different stages in their life development:  
“Marine animals are highly mobile; as adults and at early life stages. Sustainability 
of fish stocks and biodiversity is dependent on many factors that affect them 
differently at different life stages.” 
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Table 3.7 Coded responses: Q1b. What do you believe are the challenges of bringing 
PES to the marine environment? (n=41) 
 No. 
respondents 
%    
responses 
Complex tenure systems in marine & coastal environment 25 61 
lack of tenure/property rights 19 46 
many resource users (sometimes conflicting) 12 29 
difficulty in identifying appropriate service providers/owners 11 27 
complicated contracts 1 2 
   
Effective monitoring & enforcement 17 42 
enforcement difficult and complex 12 29 
monitoring complex and expensive 9 22 
free-riding 4 10 
exclusion of others e.g. roaming bandits/poachers 3 7 
ensuring compliance 3 7 
ensuring conditionality 1 2 
   
Nature of marine ES 11 27 
dynamic nature of marine ES 4 10 
externalities/outside damaging influences 3 7 
unclear boundaries 3 7 
dislocation between production and consumption point 3 7 
spatial connectivity of ES 2 5 
slow recovery of ES 1 2 
temporal nature of life stages of marine environment 1 2 
protection of marine environment requires large scale 1 2 
   
Lack of scientific knowledge about marine ES 13 32 
inadequate scientific knowledge of complex marine ES flows/delivery 
channels 
7 17 
difficulty in valuing marine ES/inadequate scientific knowledge about 
true marine ES values  
4 10 
uncertainty in generating and proving additionality 1 2 
risk undervaluing in scale up 1 2 
inadequate science on how to address/counteract marine threats 1 2 
   
Uncertainty in available level of demand finance  8 20 
unclear demand/who are buyers 6 15 
lack of financial support 2 5 
poor service buyers 1 2 
   
Negative social consequences 8 20 
conflict creation 4 10 
ensuring appropriate distribution of benefits/equity 4 10 
exacerbation of poverty/inequality 1 2 
   
Difficulties with institutional framework 6 15 
lack of regulatory framework 3 7 
government inertia/lack of political will 2 5 
convoluted jurisdictions  1 2 
donor resistance to cash 1 2 
   
Dislike of PES concept 3 7 
commoditisation of ES 2 5 
hinders understanding of real environmental issues 1 2 
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Another noted: 
“Mobility of target resources:…. their mobility across different areas can make it 
more difficult to yield a positive environmental protection result from protecting a 
particular habitat” 
Furthermore, one expert questioned whether PES would be able to function at the 
scale required within a marine setting, an issue mentioned for marine tools more 
generally.  
Worth noting, was expression of the slow positive environmental response (i.e. the 
reversibility of ES) within the marine environment as a barrier by one expert. For 
example hard coral reefs can take long periods to regenerate but a short time to 
destroy. The opposite was previously cited as a benefit (Section 3.6.1.2). This is 
perhaps not unexpected given the wide range of variation between marine ES overall, 
and points to the suitability of PES for those marine ES with quicker recovery periods.  
The more fluid nature of marine ES over terrestrial ES perhaps gives rise to the 
subsequent barriers to marine PES as expressed by respondents. 
Just over 30% of respondents cited a lack of scientific understanding about marine ES 
as a barrier. For example:  
“The invisibility of many (if not all) of the ecosystems provided,” 
“Determining the cause and effect relationships, managing situations where there are 
complex interactions.” 
Half of these responses (17% of total sample) made mention of the inadequate 
scientific knowledge surrounding complex marine ES flows and delivery channels. 
Somewhat related was a concern that there was a greater difficulty in accurately 
valuing the true value of many marine ES: as mentioned by a third of this subsample, 
10% of the total group. Indeed, difficulty in generating and securing additionality 
was further mentioned by one expert specifically. Interestingly, concern was 
expressed about the risk of undervaluing marine ES during the scaling up process.  
“There is also a major risk of undervaluing the marine ecosystem when case studies 
are applied at a larger scale… This is because the larger scale the more difficult it is to 
replace the ecosystem goods and services and interactions are too complex to 
understand impacts of alternatives.” 
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Experts also cited externalities as a greater concern than in the terrestrial 
environment. These externalities challenge both the quantity and quality of the 
service provision. PES will be only be effective in those areas where it is unaffected by 
outside forces such as run-off pollution. The most obvious externality faced by the 
marine ecosystem is perhaps that of rising sea temperatures and coral bleaching.  
3.6.2.3 Effective monitoring and enforcement 
Linked to issues previously discussed such as complex and dynamic ES, unclear 
boundaries, complex tenure rights, and in stark contrast to the benefits mentioned in 
the previous section, effective monitoring and enforcement of marine PES were 
mentioned as challenges by just under half of the expert pool (42%). Just fewer than 
thirty percent of all responses collated mentioned that enforcement would be difficult 
and complex within a marine context. Complex and expensive monitoring was also 
cited by 22% of respondents. Free riding of ES benefits and difficulties in excluding 
roaming bandits and poachers were highlighted responses.  
3.6.2.4 Securing demand finance 
All of these challenges and attributes perhaps feed into to a further challenge: 
uncertainty in demand. Concerns in securing demand were mentioned by just less 
than one-fifth of experts. The most prominent concern related to identification and 
securing of buyers for these more ‘invisible’ ES (n=6; unclear demand in Table 3.7). 
Lack of financial support was highlighted by a further two experts. One response 
highlighted the issue of poor service providers. Indeed coastal fishing communities 
have been identified within some of the most vulnerable socio-economic groups. 
Asking such communities to pay for the provision of improved ES would likely be 
unviable as well ethically unsound.  
3.6.2.5 Social implications 
Remarkably, no one directly mentioned the injection of money into cash-strapped 
coastal communities. However a likely knock on from this, negative social 
consequences was mentioned in 20% of responses. Three effects were coded: conflict 
creation (10%); difficulties in securing appropriate distribution of benefits (10%); and 
an exacerbation in inequality (2%).  
3.6.3 PES within the marine conservation portfolio 
Experts were also asked about the potential of marine PES as a ‘stand-alone’ 
instrument. Coded responses are displayed in Table 3.8.  
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Table 3.8 Coded responses: Q2.a. Do you believe marine PES have the potential to 
better protect the marine and coastal environment over other marine 
conservation tools? (n=41) 
 No. 
respondents 
%    
responses 
YES 11 27 
where local conditions enable 4 10 
where barriers overcome 3 7 
direct incentives more powerful 2 5 
incentive structure more scalable 1 2 
   
NO 5 12 
strict enforcement still required/issues of ill-defined tenure 2 5 
unviable for severe degradation &/or large areas 1 2 
does not address fundamental issues of expolitation 1 2 
moral hazard/bad precedent 1 2 
   
COMPLEMENTARY 27 66 
brings additional benefits to portfolio which other instruments are lacking 25 61 
will have difficulties working alone 5 12 
 
3.6.3.1 Marine PES as a stand-alone tool 
Just under 30% of respondents believed marine PES has the potential to better protect 
the marine and coastal environment over other existing tools. However, almost half 
of these responses were caveated with the mention of barriers to be overcome or 
definitive conditions which need to be put in place to enable successful 
implementation. Only two of the 11 positive responses mentioned actual benefits of 
marine PES above other instruments. The direct incentive structure of PES was cited 
as more powerful than other current tools; this direct incentive structure was also 
believed to be more scalable over the larger seascape than other instruments by 
further respondent.  
Only 12% of respondents answered question 2.a. negatively, doubting the potential of 
marine PES to better protect the marine and coastal ecosystems. Of these, two 
respondents cited the issues of enforcement as it related to ill-defined tenure within 
the seascape. Another claimed PES as unviable for those areas where extreme 
degradation had occurred, or indeed over large areas more generally, and as such less 
suited to a marine setting. Indeed, a couple of responses raised issue with the 
apparent ‘cost-efficiency’ of PES in the marine environment: a major ‘selling point’ of 
PES instruments within the literature. Backed up also by the high proportion of 
respondents raising issue with monitoring and enforcement in Section 3.6.2.3. 
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“In practice, I wonder whether all the resources intellectual and otherwise put into 
the development of the concepts and strategies and policies and implementation etc 
are not better used elsewhere.” 
 “PES has more costly monitoring and enforcement issues.” 
Only two respondents felt marine PES an unsuitable instrument in principle. One 
expert felt that the incentive structure sets a bad precedent within the marine 
conservation as well as promoting moral hazard. The other did not believe PES 
would address the root causes of over-exploitation, which it was stated would require 
a greater focus on individual values and behaviour.  
3.6.3.2 Marine PES as a complementary tool 
By far the greatest consensus was for the use of PES within a wider portfolio of 
instruments, implementing PES alongside other marine conservation tools. Sixty one 
percent of experts believed as a tool, PES could bring additional benefits over other 
pre-existing mechanisms.  
To name a few: 
“Conditional incentives will be a good addition to the arsenal of marine conservation.” 
“PES schemes in terrestrial systems have proved to strengthen institutional 
alliances…They have also helped reduce migration away from rural areas and 
maintain traditional methods in resource management. They helped generate and 
maintain new sustainable economic activities and employment.” 
“They may complement other means or possibly play a role in getting a system 
started. Start up costs are a problem in marine conservation and this may be one way 
to help get over this barrier.” 
“The benefits of marine PES would be that some businesses would be compensated for 
reduced levels of effort and could therefore remain in business. This allows 
communities to maintain their traditions,” 
When asked in more detail about the potential complementarity of marine PES 
(Question 2.b, Annex A1), a resounding 93% of respondents expressed a positive 
response for the potential of marine PES when used alongside pre-existing 
instruments.  
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“I predict that we’ll see that hybrid systems that combine regulatory protection, some 
stakeholder management involvement and PES will be the most successful. Because 
each can be used to complement and address the others’ weaknesses” 
One expert went as far as to say that PES should not be viewed in isolation.  
“PES should be viewed as a set of best practices that can be employed in virtually any 
ocean and coastal conservation project that involve right-holders, right holder 
commitments, and project funding.” 
Another stated PES would be useless in isolation. 
“I think they are useless in isolation. First and single prize for a successful marine 
conservation strategy will be a MPA under a co-management approach where long-
term sustainability (i.e. operating costs and profits) is obtained through a sound 
scientific and socio-economic PES scheme.” 
These observations are particularly astute for use within local artisanal fishing 
communities. Moreover, one expert highlighted the issues of cash-injections into local 
institutions, and under which these local schemes should perhaps be utilised more as 
a last option. 
“any PES programme has to think very carefully about the impact money has on the 
local institutions, perceptions and social norms. This isn’t well understood or 
thought about in great detail. I would certainly advocate for more traditional 
conservation tools first (that don't involve $$), and then resorting to PES if its felt 
that the payments or incentives from PES are necessary to encourage sustainable 
resource management.” 
3.6.4 PES and pro-poor design 
By far the greatest disparity of expert opinion centred on the extent to which marine 
PES, and indeed PES more generally, should address poverty within its design. The 
overarching themes are displayed in Table 3.9. A number of key underlying elements 
are also coded and displayed.  
As can be seen from Table 3.9, experts expressed wide disagreement as to the extent 
marine PES should attempt to address poverty issues. Just over 45% of the sample 
stated that marine PES must address or should largely attempt to address poverty 
and be pro-poor in design, 21% and 26% respectively. Indeed, as many as one fifth of 
the expert pool stated that marine PES MUST attempt to address poverty. Of this 
twenty percent, half cited long-term sustainability as the main motivator.  Although 
legitimacy and compliance were only mentioned once within this overarching theme, 
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their importance should not be overlooked. Legitimacy and compliance, in particular, 
although not directly mentioned are expected to be explicit in many other issues such 
as long-term sustainability. The large degree of overlap of coastal areas and high 
levels of poverty was further stated as reason for strong support of pro-poor PES 
design by two the experts.  
Table 3.9 Coded responses: 3.a. To what extent should a marine PES scheme explicitly 
attempt to address poverty and be pro-poor by design? (n=39) 
 No. 
respondents 
%     
responses 
Must address 8 21 
long-term sustainability 4 10 
legitimate 1 3 
compliance/support 1 3 
   
Should largely attempt to address 10 26 
compliance/support 3 8 
overlap of coastal ES and poverty 2 5 
trade-offs must be considered 2 5 
   
Only when compatible with PES goals 7 20 
in areas of high poverty/developing countries 3 8 
complicated enough 1 3 
   
Should not address 6 15 
overemphasis can lead to environmental failure/weaken environmental 
objectives 
3 8 
reduces efficiency 2 5 
not a poverty tool 2 5 
poverty drivers should be addressed at source 1 3 
   
Inherent in design 3 8 
through compensation offered 2 5 
due to voluntary nature 1 3 
   
Unsure 2 5 
 
One expert went on to discuss implications for the non-participating poor, a topic 
rarely covered in the literature.  
“If the scheme is seen as illegitimate, you risk certain community members 
overfishing the area to be protected or directly sabotaging the programme. But I 
would also be concerned about the implications for the poor non-participants. There 
are examples where an influx of money by certain groups cause a massive inflation of 
staple foods in the local markets, such that the poor could no longer afford those foods.” 
In stark contrast 15% of experts indicated that marine PES should not be addressing 
poverty in its design. Half cited the loss of environmental gains as the predominant 
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reasoning (8% of total sample). One respondent maintained that PES would have 
difficulty dealing with the inherent causes of poverty.  
“There is a problem in making PES pro-poor as the drivers of poverty probably need 
to be addressed at the source – i.e. more equitable distribution of resource rights etc. It 
is difficult for PES to reverse engineer what are fundamental injustices at a deeper 
level.” 
Another went as far as to say that poverty should be dealt with as a separate 
instrument all together. 
“Solve environmental problems with one instrument, and solve poverty problems 
with another, and don't worry about the interactions between the two…Don't try to 
solve two problems with one instrument unless you can definitively show that the 
two problems are causally linked (which we haven’t). Lets do “non-poor” PES and 
measure the impact on poverty. Perhaps there will be positive effects for the poor that 
are not directly related to the transfers themselves.” 
The same expert went on to say: 
“Don't screw the early marine PES schemes up with more constraints on their 
ability to function. Let’s figure out how PES works in the marine environment 
without additional targeting requirements and then we can fiddle with it if we don't 
like how things are turning out on the social side. Don't assume lack of targeting to 
poor means poor wont benefit.” 
Issues with trade-offs between pro-poor design vs. efficiency and environmental 
performance were also made by some of those who believed marine PES should 
attempt to be address poverty to some degree. In response to the question one expert 
wrote: 
“This is a reasonable goal, but should be approached with care. Too much social 
engineering can ruin a reasonably good market-based approach.” 
A further subset of experts indicated that marine PES should only address poverty 
when this is explicit within the goals of the intervention, 20% of the final sample. 
However of these, just under half, n=3, stated that it should be an explicit goal in low-
income/less developed countries.  
Interestingly, three respondents believe PES to be in a sense inherently ‘pro-poor’ in 
design. Two respondents claimed that marine PES would alleviate poverty through 
the compensation mechanism. The other stated that the inherently voluntary nature 
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of a PES scheme would mean that those not benefiting would simply decline to 
participate.  
3.6.5 Essential conditions in bring PES to marine environment 
In a final question experts were asked what conditions they felt absolutely essential 
for a marine PES to function successfully. This question received the lowest response 
rate of the six questions: 27 of 42 respondents. Results are reported in Table 3.10.  
Again enforcement and tenure were predominant responses. Adequate enforcement 
was an essential requirement in 26% of responses; tenure was cited by 15%.  
Interestingly, and not previously highlighted in expert responses is that “good 
understanding of social and economic implications” was the second most stated 
condition, five responses: 19%.   
Table 3.10 Coded responses: Q.8.a. Are there any conditions that you see as being 
absolutely essential for a marine PES to function successfully? (n=27) 
 No. 
respondents 
%    
responses 
Adequate enforcement 7 26 
Good understanding of social and economic implications 5 19 
Adequate monitoring procedures 4 15 
Tenure over ES 4 15 
Good institutions/governance 3 11 
Stakeholder involvement/participatory process 3 11 
Equity/distributional considerations 3 11 
Good understanding/science of ES 2 7 
Clear/simple ES path 2 7 
Appropriate incentives 2 7 
Appropriate sanctions 2 7 
Use in combination with other marine instruments 2 7 
Demonstrate ES value to buyer 2 7 
Legitimacy 1 4 
Long-term financing 1 4 
Compliance 1 4 
Transparency 1 4 
Education programmes 1 4 
 
3.7 Discussion 
Expert elicitation highlighted the benefits and challenges in bringing PES to the 
marine environment, as well as to investigate how best to transfer these instruments. 
Various themes were raised by experts across all questions. Many common and 
prominent topics were mentioned as well as some lesser-cited issues.  
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While the current literature focuses very much on the opportunities for marine PES, 
there is little critical analysis of the difficulties of implementing marine PES. For 
example, how these may differ from terrestrial models, and to what degree these are 
indeed limitations. For this reason, within the following themes, we focus discussion 
on the barriers where research is perhaps more pertinent. 
3.7.1 Challenges for marine PES 
3.7.1.1 Tenure 
As expected, issues relating to tenure featured prominently within the data. Indeed, 
issues pertaining to complex tenure systems within the coastal and marine 
environment were cited by nearly two thirds of respondents and just fewer than half 
mentioned a lack of property rights more specifically. In fact, issues of tenure were 
mentioned by 50% more respondents than the next highest featured limitation.   
However, in defining PES criteria only approximately a third believed ES need be 
provided by service providers with well-established property rights. Within the 
terrestrial PES literature similar concerns have been voiced, yet PES arrangements 
have been established and functioning despite land titling not being fully formalised 
(Vatn 2010). However, under the relaxation of a ‘true PES’ scheme, the literature 
speaks of PES as a means to cement property rights for resource owners (Landell-
Mills 2002; Muradian et al. 2010). This in itself is seen as a positive incentive. In many 
coastal and marine settings the state is regularly the rights holder (Lau 2012); 
communities often have little control over the resources on which they depend, 
incentivising individual over-exploitation. As such, cementation of property rights 
could prove an important incentive in itself. In Bolivia the Los Negros pilot PES 
project helped participants demark land thereby giving it higher de facto protection 
from landless migrants (Pagiola et al. 2005; Wunder 2008). In a marine setting, the 
implementation of ITQs within industrial fisheries has had positive economic and 
environmental consequences (Costello et al. 2008; FAO 2008; Worm et al. 2009). While 
ITQs prove difficult to implement in artisanal fisheries due to multispecies catch and 
multiple landing sites PES schemes could hold similar opportunities.  
The past few years have seen the advancement of new instruments for ocean 
governance which transfer property rights to local communities. These include such 
examples as community-based management (CBM), ocean zoning and marine 
conservation agreements (Lau 2012). Furthermore, these mechanisms can be highly 
successful. For example, community-based MPAs have been shown to be effective in 
achieving conservation and fishery targets (Horigue et al. 2012). And in those areas 
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with less experience with such instruments, potential exists; in Tanzania, legislation 
exists which can grant property rights over inshore waters to Beach Management 
Units (BMUs). BMUs comprise community fishing organisations which are in turn 
able to set management rules and control access to fishery resources (Tanzanian 
Fisheries Division 2005). In 1999, Chile passed legislation which grants exclusive 
territorial user rights for fisheries8 (TURFs) to registered artisanal fisher organisations 
within inshore coastal areas (Gelcich et al. 2008). 
PES can work alongside pre-existing instruments to help transfer and secure local 
property rights, and while this will indeed be a challenge this ability should also be 
seen as an opportunity. As one expert put it:  
“PES schemes can also act as a catalyst in areas where there is no legal framework 
behind an ecosystem, which is especially true in marine environments which remain 
one of the least protected environments in the world.” 
Or another: 
“I do not think investing in clarifying property rights and local management 
institutions is key. This doesn't necessarily need to be a pre-requisite for establishing 
a PES scheme, but should go in tandem with efforts to establish PES.” 
The main challenge for marine PES as it relates to tenure is perhaps not the lack of it, 
as mechanisms exist to transfer rights where governments are willing, but in fact the 
identification of appropriate stakeholders. As mentioned by approximately a third of 
the expert pool, marine systems are subject to many resource users within a small 
finite space. Difficulties were cited relating to the identification of appropriate service 
owners. Indeed creating legitimate marine PES schemes will be a challenge. With so 
many stakeholders, there will undoubtedly be winners and losers.  
Indeed, perhaps one of the most obvious ways forward in coastal PES, at least for 
those instruments targeting artisanal fishing communities, is application of 
community contracts. Community contracts target many users, but in doing so 
include a complex set of incentives to induce participation, i.e. payments, outreach, 
legal frameworks (Sommerville et al. 2010). However, given that these artisanal 
communities are some of the most vulnerable worldwide, defining these common 
property rights and creating equitable and fair incentives will be more relevant. 
                                                      
8 TURFs allow beneficiaries the right to limit access to fishery resources within a limited sea territory, to 
determine the amount and kind of resource use and to extract benefits from the use of these resources as 
well as from future returns (Christy 1982). 
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However, marine PES can learn from previous community instruments in areas of 
equity. Sommerville et al. (2010b) look at PES community contracts within forestry 
communities in Madagascar and make recommendations for improving perceived 
equity. Work by Fisher et al. (2010) has already linked CBM and PES in fresh water 
systems – as can be seen in Table 2.2 of the previous chapter. The authors show that 
lessons learnt from CBM can shed light on key implementation issues in PES. Blom et 
al. (2010) also show what lessons can be learnt from previously implemented ICDPs. 
Similar lessons can be learnt within the coastal environment. 
A recent paper by Swallow et al. (2009) has made further steps towards identifying 
and characterising relevant stakeholder in PES schemes, which they label 
“ecosystems stewards”. While such criteria may be in their infancy, creating an 
infrastructure for the identification of appropriate stakeholders will be key in marine 
PES implementation and much more work is needed in this area.  
3.7.1.2 Enforcement 
Related to this theme of multiple resource users and the identification of appropriate 
stakeholders are issues of enforcement and monitoring. Under these conditions 
exclusion of inappropriate actors is considered more difficult. Just under a third of 
experts mentioned effective enforcement as a barrier in transferring PES to the marine 
environment. Cited as an essential condition for successful marine PES schemes, it is 
highly unlikely that marine PES will be able to function without adequate 
enforcement. 
However, PES is by no means alone with this issue; this is a story which is 
widespread across marine conservation interventions. A common tool in low income 
and artisanal fisheries, MPAs show disappointing results in compliance and 
enforcement of regulations (Hargreaves-Allen et al. 2011) and the failure of 
community-based management initiatives is often blamed on ineffective enforcement 
(Crawford et al. 2004). In fact a recent study by Mora et al. (2006) claimed only 2% of 
MPAs to be adequately protected. Within the marine environment particularly, local 
community perception of conservation instrument is an important contributing factor 
to success (Christie 2004). As one expert put it:  
“compliance is the biggest challenge in marine conservation,” 
Inducing local compliance may in fact be an advantage of marine PES over other 
tools. Pollnac et al. (2001) cite “successful alternative income projects” and a relatively 
high level of community participation in decision making” as two of six key factors in 
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the overall success of community based MPAs. Perhaps one of the most valuable 
services a marine PES can provide is to inspire local enforcement and transfer 
ownership to local communities. As such marine PES schemes can be seen as a 
mechanism to induce participation, inspire compliance and promote local 
enforcement.  
PES also include a conditionality not previous seen within marine management tools. 
Including incentives which are conditional on behaviour changes differentiates PES 
from previous interventions which merely promoted alternatives in isolation 
(Sievanen et al. 2005; Ferraro & Kiss 2002). In particular, where projects need to 
induce support from non-participants, benefits can be shared across communities to 
induce wider compliance. Well-designed in-kind benefits have a greater potential to 
reach non-participants and reduce conflict. Although not cash, well-designed in-kind 
incentives should retain conditionality. As always there will be winners and losers, 
therefore, alongside sustained benefits, enforcement of community contracts should 
also rely on graduated sanctions.  
With multiple resource users, local buy-in will depend on making sure environmental 
and economic improvements are retained by relevant communities. Yet, while local 
enforcement and sanctions can induce in-house compliance, other stakeholders do 
exist. Migrant and roaming fishers as well as overlapping use areas are common 
within marine environments (Ferse et al. 2010; Daw 2008). As mentioned by a 
subsample of the expert pool, these parties can create difficulties in guaranteeing 
benefits both locally and globally. While this can initially be seen as a problem, again 
it is a widespread problem within marine environments. As discussed before with the 
cementation of tenure, marine PES can provide infrastructure as well as finance to 
enable better protection of these environments from outside forces, channelling long-
term benefits to local and global stakeholders and promoting sustainable practices.  
Even when compliance is strong, leakage can continue to be an issue. MPAs generate 
spill-over benefits whereby fish stock disperse out from the protected area. However, 
this is often accompanied by fishers concentrating efforts at reserve boundaries 
(Kellner et al. 2007). As such, environmental benefits remain localised. Marine PES 
schemes have the advantage that they rely on incentivising behaviour change. In this 
way marine PES have the potential to promote more sustainable behaviour and not 
just displace fishers to MPA boundaries.  
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3.7.1.3 Monitoring 
Monitoring is an important facet of any PES scheme, and if not robust conditionality 
is lost and incentives are unlikely to influence behaviour (Sommerville et al. 2011). 
Experts cited complex and expensive monitoring as a challenge to successful marine 
PES as linked to the nature of marine ES. Furthermore, the lack of scientific 
knowledge about marine ES was seen as a significant barrier. Worth noting was one 
concern relating to undervaluing marine ES when scaling up projects given complex 
interactions, and larger difficulty in replacing ES. 
To a much greater extent marine environmental services are dynamic and invisible. 
This indeed does create a challenge in securing additionality and guaranteeing 
environmental performance in marine PES.  Although more data poor than terrestrial 
systems, sufficient ecological understanding exists as it relates to how management 
decisions can improve ES delivery in marine and coastal systems (Lau 2012). For 
example, no-take zones have been shown to increase fish population and biomass, as 
well as showing spill over into adjacent areas (Lau 2012; Russ et al. 2003; Williamson 
et al. 2004). Moreover, mangrove forests are long known to buffer coastal areas from 
storm activity (Barbier et al. 2008; Dahdouh-Guebas et al. 2005), as well as a more 
recent acknowledgement of their part in carbon sequestration (Murray et al. 2011; 
Weaver 2011; Zwick & Kett 2010).  
Action-based payments are widespread in terrestrial ecosystems and continue to be 
more common throughout all project types. These payment types assume 
relationships between actions and environmental outputs (Skutsch et al. 2011; 
Sommerville et al. 2009; Wunder et al. 2008). Payments can be made for management 
inputs and/or opportunity costs incurred (Skutsch et al. 2011). However, it is true 
that using such proxies may reduce overall efficiency of payments, and moves should 
be made to pilot PES which are more output-based. However, as in terrestrial, action-
based payments can be a good starting ground for marine PES.  
Moreover, definite improvements have been made in the modelling of marine ES in 
recent years. Recently new tools have been designed which can model ecosystem 
service linkages within marine and coastal environments, such as the InVEST tool 
created by the Natural Capital Project9. 
Indeed, within expert responses there was a call for more practical experience with 
marine PES.  
                                                      
9  Available at: http://www.naturalcapitalproject.org/InVEST.html  
For more information see http://www.naturalcapitalproject.org/marine/MarineInVEST_Apr2010.pdf 
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3.7.1.4 Demand 
By far the one of the greatest challenge for marine ES is uncertainty in demand. 
Although only mentioned by slightly less than one-fifth of experts, without 
appropriate levels in demand, marine PES will remain unviable. The most prominent 
issue mentioned by experts related to the identification of buyers. 
Previously mentioned challenges limit demand in marine PES. Insecure tenure, 
diffuse and dynamic marine ES often with dislocated production and consumption 
points makes identification of appropriate buyers difficult, or indeed makes the case 
for their buy-in challenging. Securing demand when one cannot identify appropriate 
buyers nor guarantee service delivery will prove difficult. In addition, few if any 
working examples of marine PES exist. While some experts speak of marine PES 
examples, the author knows of no marine PES in practice which are both conditional 
and financed by private buyers. 
Interestingly, no experts mentioned the problem of leakage directly, although it is 
perhaps inherent in many of the issues raised. Dealing with problems of leakage 
within a marine environment will be more complex, however insurance mechanisms 
and confidence buffers can tackle some of these issues.  
Promoting buyer confidence is paramount. Assuring buyer confidence will very 
much depend on previous success stories and improved science surrounding marine 
ES flows. As discussed in the previous section (Section 3.7.1.3) marine ES modelling 
continues to improve and new tools are being developed. Improved mapping and 
trade-off analysis will further assist in identifying appropriate buyers among 
overlapping beneficiaries (White et al. 2012). Alongside this, marine PES schemes 
need practical examples. Low-hanging fruits exist. Certain marine PES will be simpler 
to implement, for example, marine PES which focus on simple ES and small-scale 
initiatives with few stakeholders. Mangroves and carbon sequestration seem an 
obvious option. Carbon has pre-developed markets and ES delivery can be easily 
modelled. But marine PES need to move beyond carbon as well as demonstrate long-
term sustainability of finance (Lau 2012; Murray et al. 2011; Weaver 2011).  
As in terrestrial PES, it may be the case that government and not-for-profit 
organisations will take the lead. A growing portfolio of case studies will serve to 
promote confidence in service delivery and private buy-in.  
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3.7.2 PES in the marine conservation portfolio 
Results showed a clear preference for marine PES to be used alongside pre-existing 
instruments.  
Given the nascent nature of PES, particularly in the marine environment, these 
instruments are perhaps best to compliment other pre-existing instruments. Indeed, 
as already mentioned by a number of experts, PES should not be used in isolation. 
Within the expert pool there was a consensus that PES could address a number of 
underlying weaknesses in current tools. Sixty percent of experts mentioned bringing 
additional benefits lacking in other instruments. Marine PES can help to inspire 
behaviour change and improve compliance through the conditionality criterion. 
Furthermore, the requirements for investment may promote regional and local 
development of regulations such as devolution of property rights. For some tools, 
such as MPAs, marine PES may be a simple tweak to current management policies.  
The key question which ultimately leads on from this is then to what extend and 
under what circumstances should marine PES schemes combine with current policy 
tools. Again more pilots and working examples of marine PES will help answer such 
questions.  
3.7.3 Marine PES as a pro-poor instrument 
By far the widest divergence in opinions was seen in the degree to which marine PES 
schemes should be pro-poor. One fifth of experts believed marine PES must address 
poverty, whereas 16% stated that schemes should not attempt to address poverty 
within design. 
Disagreements mainly revolved around the loss of environmental gains in project 
design (i.e. efficiency) vs. long-term sustainability. For some, the most immediate 
need was to demonstrate that PES could work in a marine context as previously 
noted in Section 5.4. Others stated that PES schemes could not address the underlying 
drivers of poverty and as such should not attempt to do so. For others, however, 
marine PES schemes which did not seek to address poverty would be seen as 
illegitimate and fail in the long-term.   
With a high degree of overlap in coastal ES and impoverishment the degree to which 
PES attempt to recognise poverty is an important question – at its very least it should 
do no harm. With multiple actors and possible community contracts, perhaps the 
question is not whether it should be designed as pro-poor but how in fact it should be 
designed to prevent poverty exacerbation.  
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Just less than ten percent of experts questioned believed PES schemes to be inherently 
pro-poor by their very design; this was mainly due to their voluntary nature. As put 
by one respondent:  
“A marine PES scheme will be pro-poor if it makes poor people better off. To me, this 
is secured in the voluntariness of the agreement, i.e. poor people will only voluntarily 
“play ball” if they gain. How much rent is offered to people over and above their 
estimated provision costs (=pure welfare gains) is a matter of programme design and 
negotiation power…”  
However, in dealing with artisanal fishing communities for example, community 
contracts are likely to be a predominant feature. This moves away from the notion of 
individual voluntary participation; in fact, only 30% of experts stated that parties 
must be involved in a voluntary capacity.  
As communities move into agreements with service buyers, there will be winners and 
losers. Sommerville et al. (2010) show PES success is related to high levels of 
perceived fairness of PES payment distribution. However, coastal artisanal fishing 
communities can possess very unique features. Several forms of exclusion and 
marginalisation occur in fishing communities, and rent appropriation is common 
(Béné 2003). How this relates to property appropriation may be of particular concern 
within areas with currently ill-defined tenure systems.  
One expert mentioned the possibility of improving PES design towards poverty 
factors through utilising basic quotas: 
“Its possible to make PES more pro-poor by some basic quotas (e.g. in one of our 
programmes we made sure that a % of households were female-headed households)” 
Badly designed marine PES may have barriers to participation which could further 
exacerbate poverty; this is something which will very much depend on the eligibility 
criteria and where the ‘bar’ is set. For example, a PES targeting one type of fishing 
gear may have implications for other fishers.  
Furthermore, some poorer community members may simply be ineligible to 
participate from the onset, e.g. are farmers only. Interestingly and perhaps 
worryingly, very little mention of the implication for non-participants has been made 
both within elicited responses from experts as well as current literature. Of notable 
exception was one response by one expert.  
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“I would be concerned about the implications for the poor non-participants. There are 
examples where an influx of money by certain groups cause a massive inflation of 
staple foods in the local markets” 
More work is needed in determining the implications for non-participants under 
community contracts, both in a terrestrial and coastal context where little empirical 
work exists.  
Experts made no mention of cash injections into potentially cash-strapped 
communities as a challenge in marine PES, although one expert mentioned it later in 
a discussion relating to pro-poor design. Perhaps this is due to a growing acceptance 
that incentives need not be cash. Indeed, acknowledging that there will always be 
non-participating poor within community contracts highlights the need for further 
non-monetary benefits; such can potentially be beneficial to a wider group of 
stakeholders. This said, one must not lose the conditionality attached to PES in 
moving towards in-kind benefits. Designing such incentive structures will be an 
interesting development in PES research.  
Again as mentioned above PES may have better success in meeting poverty goals 
through working alongside other pre-exising tools.  
3.7.4 Marine PES as a ‘kickstart’ 
As mentioned by a few experts, a number of marine ES have the advantage of 
relatively fast regeneration periods. As such, marine PES have the potential to be 
used as transitory mechanisms.  
Conservation interventions have in the past overlooked social needs which in turn 
has led to subsequent conflict and disregard for the instrument (Christie 2004). Many 
compliance issues in marine conservation stem from issues of initial opportunity 
costs. As mentioned by a few experts, marine PES have the potential to compensate 
user’s opportunity costs for initial restrictions. As ecosystems recover and additional 
benefits begin to accrue from the environmental services themselves, payments can 
be stepped back and finally stopped. This quality could be particularly useful in 
many coastal communities where poverty levels are high and few non-fishing 
activities exist; in particular alongside such mechanisms as MPAs.  
3.7.5 Limitations 
It should be noted that this paper focuses very much upon how the pre-mentioned 
factors pertain to artisanal fishing communities. Marine and coastal environments are 
complex and diverse and of course one model will never fit all. Some feature of a 
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marine environment will never be amenable to marine PES. As described by one 
expert, the marine environment can show slow recovery periods but require only a 
short time to destroy. Interestingly, the opposite was previously cited as a benefit. 
This is perhaps not unexpected given the wide range of variation between marine ES 
overall, and points to the suitability of PES for those marine ES with quicker recovery 
periods. In addition, artisanal fishing communities show high levels of diversity both 
within and between communities (Coulthard 2012). Different cultural values and 
understandings of social well-being may result in PES being wholly unsuitable in 
some contexts.  
One should also mention that due to a relatively small sample size, finding consensus 
within such a wide range of issues is difficult, and given time and energy constraints 
experts are expected to mention only those which they see as most important.  
3.8 Conclusion 
This paper adds to the emerging marine PES literature, moving beyond policy pieces 
to critically analyse expert opinion as it relates to marine PES. More specifically 
expert opinions are qualitatively analysed as they relate to benefits and barriers of 
marine PES implementation, their role within the marine conservation portfolio as 
well as those criteria essential for their successful application.   
Given the large, expansive nature of marine resources, expensive enforcement and a 
number of various users compliance is key, as one expert put it. Legitimate and 
equitable contracting to the appropriate stakeholders will be required to reduce 
perverse incentives, free-riding and disregard for marine PES. It is likely then that, at 
the artisanal level at least, marine PES will rely on community contracting, designed 
to induce participation and compliance in order to reduce excessively expensive 
enforcement costs. Marine PES, can in fact, help induce community management and 
problems associated around collective action, investing in and promoting local 
institutions.  
Investment into generating these local institutions and ultimately securing 
compliance as well as exhibiting successful case studies will be key to securing 
demand and ultimately PES success. However, in balancing the needs of artisanal 
users, it is important that marine PES do not lose sight of their environmental goals 
and become yet another ineffective conservation tool. 
Results indicate that barriers still present themselves for marine PES. However, 
lessons can be learnt from the terrestrial experiences with PES and from the vast body 
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of experience in issues of marine management, and to some degree barriers can be 
overcome. In many cases these are challenges throughout marine conservation 
instruments and, in actual fact, PES can promote research and legislation relating to 
such issues as tenure and ES modelling. As such, marine PES should be seen as 
another instrument in the conservation toolkit, and one which can work alongside 
and improve pre-existing interventions through the provision of long-needed 
incentives and conditionality.  
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Chapter 4 
Determinants for participation: a review 
4.1 Overview 
In this chapter we review the literature surrounding adoption decisions in a number 
of related and representative fields including conservation agriculture, agroforestry, 
microfinance and Community-based Management. Household and individual 
determinants influencing participation decisions are discussed in Section 4.3. Where 
relevant we also look to fishery exit and compliance decisions within the fisheries 
literature in order to better interpret fisher decision-making processes. The chapter 
concludes with hypotheses as to how determinants will affect fishers’ response to the 
proposed hypothetical marine PES in Section 4.4.  
4.2 Introduction  
It is highly probable that marine PES schemes will rely on contracts made with 
‘fishing communities’, whether that be a fishing fleet, a specific fishery, or an artisanal 
community. There are two reasons for this assumption:  
1. Given the common pool nature of marine resources, contracts are unlikely to 
be targeted at the individual level; and  
2. Devolving tenure or fishing rights will occur at the fishery/community level.  
This will have pros and cons for design. Marine PES can be seen as a potential 
solution to the collective action problem of marine conservation. Fishing 
communities, whether they be a fishing fleet or artisanal community, can sign up to 
participate in marine PES schemes. However, participation will require compliance 
by all fishers with access rights within the target area; for this reason community 
contracts will be key. As a result any marine PES programme, while voluntary at a 
community level, may be obligatory at the individual level.  
As a result, realising those determinants of marine PES participation is pertinent. In 
the first instance, under a democratic system, community enrolment in a scheme will 
only take place once a threshold of willing participants has been reached. In the 
second, under the assumption of utility maximisation, those stakeholders not wishing 
to participate consider themselves to be worse off under such a scheme. Both are of 
concern for different reasons. If marine PES cannot inspire enrolment, they are dead 
in the water. However, perhaps more worryingly, are the implications for those 
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reluctant to enter into these schemes. Can those PES schemes which make certain 
members of the community worse-off be justified?  
If marine PES schemes are to successfully enter into the marine conservation portfolio 
they will need to promote participation as well as ‘do no harm’.  
Marine PES programmes will therefore benefit from an understanding of the 
following: 
1. Design factors which promote marine PES adoption. 
2. Determinants of fisher’s willingness to participate at the individual level.  
Understanding how schemes can be designed to inspire fisher interest has obvious 
benefits: promoting adoption in order to reach a participation threshold. Instrument 
design can be extremely important in achieving adequate acceptance and compliance 
within the fishery sector. Fishers have long been documented to hold varying 
preferences for conservation management restrictions (Cinner et al. 2009; 
McClanahan & Mangi 2004) and any restrictions will likely be viewed as 
unfavourable and therefore not readily accepted (Kabii and Horwitz, 2006). As has 
been documented, gains and losses are not necessarily valued the same; the loss of a 
‘bundle’ can be perceived as a greater cost than the gain of an equivalent (Kahneman 
et al., 1990). As such, in order to inspire compliance, instrument design will be 
particularly important in these settings as well as in rural low-income areas where 
monitoring and enforcement efforts are often ineffective (Lundquist & Granek 2005; 
McClanahan et al. 2005; Christie 2004). Identification of restriction trade-offs and an 
appropriate method for design and analysis are discussed further in Chapter 7.  
The second, less tangible, research objective seeks to understand those potential 
equity issues associated with a non-voluntary PES scheme. Who are those fishers who 
consider participation a welfare-loss within the community? What are the 
endogenous barriers to their participation? And perhaps more pertinently, could 
these be the poorer and more vulnerable members?  
In order to answer these questions we require an understanding of who are those 
willing to sign up and how these fisher’s differ from those more resistant community 
members. The PES literature centres on the assumption that participants will enrol if 
and when PES payments are larger than the opportunities costs forgone, however the 
picture is never this simple (Kosoy et al., 2008; Mahanty et al., 2013; Wunder, 2008). 
To date PES research has largely focused upon ecological, economic and political 
barriers. Such emphasis is perhaps not surprising given the mandate of PES to 
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improve environmental outcomes or its reliance upon market forces to achieve this 
(Petheram and Campbell, 2010). A large part of this literature discusses the capacity 
of PES to better enable the participation of poorer households through project design 
and eligibility rules (e.g. Wunder 2008; Pagiola et al. 2005, 2008; Zilberman et al. 
2008). Less documented is a critical analysis and quantification of how household 
determinants influence peoples’ perceptions and decisions; in particular how these 
variables drive or obstruct a change from current behaviours and the adoption of new 
PES schemes, or indeed how these relate to current livelihood strategies (Petheram 
and Campbell, 2010; Sesabo and Tol, 2005; Zanetell and Knuth, 2004). In order to 
design more successful development-conservation programmes, there is a need to 
better understand those factors which motivate human behaviour and how these 
relate to the adoption of new and novel livelihood schemes.  
4.3 Determinants of participation: a review 
The decision of an individual to participate is generally assumed to follow the 
random utility model (1) 
     (1) 
whereby Xi is a vector of attributes that characterise the individual (fisher) i, a(Xi) is 
the fisher’s profit i, b(Xi) is the non-monetary utility of the fisher i, and !i is the error 
term. As such, the utility of a fisher choosing to participate will be:  
   (2) 
where P is the PES payment. A fisher will choose to adopt the PES programme (Y = 1) 
if he does not suffer a utility cost e.g.:  
          (3) 
           (4)
  
In the context of PES, few attempts have been made to understand these attributes 
(Xi) which drive participation (Kosoy et al., 2008), and none within the marine 
context. More generally, however, the importance of factors which determine 
participation in environmental protection programmes have been widely 
acknowledged; this has led to a considerable amount of research on schemes such as 
the UK’s Agri-Environmental Schemes (AES), the US’s Conservation Reserve 
Program, forestry conservation projects more generally and CBM initiatives (Cooper 
U(Xi) = V (a(Xi), b(Xi)) + ✏i
U(Xi) = V (a(Xi) + P, b(Xi)) + ✏i
U(Xi, Y = 0)  U(Xi, Y = 1)
V (a(Xi), b(Xi)) + ✏i  V (a(Xi) + P, b(Xi)) + ✏i
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2003; Defrancesco et al. 2008; Falconer 2000; Knowler & Bradshaw 2007; Mullan & 
Kontoleon 2009; Wossink & van Wenum 2003; Vanslembrouck et al. 2005).  
More recently however, the participation literature has expanded to encompass PES 
scheme determinants (Zanetell and Knuth, 2004). However, with the exception of a 
few works (see Chen et al., 2009; Mullan and Kontoleon, 2009; Pagiola et al., 2008; 
Uchida et al., 2007; Zbinden and Lee, 2005), PES studies have tended to focus on a 
developed world context. There is presently limited empirical evidence on individual 
determinants of PES participation within the developing countries (Sesabo & Tol 
2005; Zanetell & Knuth 2004). The study of PES or PES-like participation in a 
developing country and/or marine context is important because there are a number 
of reasons why individuals may respond differently. Unlike in a developed context 
where schemes take place in reasonably well-functioning markets, households are 
faced with imperfect markets and institutions. Not only this but they face additional 
constraints such as low and erratic income, difficulties in accessing credit and 
insecure tenure (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Mullan and Kontoleon, 2009). This is 
particularly true within the coastal environment where rural fishing communities 
face limited markets, are subject to high variation in day-to-day catch and income, 
commonly experience economic reversals and more often than not operate in what is 
effectively ‘open-access’ areas (Béné et al., 2010; FAO, 2001; Pollnac, 1991).  
Furthermore, scant empirical research exists on the motivations of individuals to 
partake in more restrictive programmes for nature conservation (Kabii and Horwitz, 
2006); what will effectively be the norm within marine PES. Within low-income 
countries, participation studies have generally focused upon the adoption of more 
environmentally-sound or climate-resistant agricultural practices and participation 
within micro-finance initiatives (Akoten et al., 2006; Diagne, 1999; Nguyen, 2006; 
Shete and Garcia, 2011; Zaman, 2004) as well as conservation management 
programmes (Datta and Sarkar, 2010; Musyoki et al., 2013; Zanetell and Knuth, 2004).  
Adoption decisions associated with these practices hold much in common with 
current PES schemes. PES schemes assume a behavioural change. In some PES 
programmes this will be a setting aside of land or an amendment to current 
management practices and, as such, an amendment to the individual’s current 
production function. It has been well documented that within imperfect markets 
household demographics and asset endowment can significantly affect production 
decisions, both terrestrially (Dercon & Christiaensen 2011; Bandiera & Rasul 2006; 
Mendola 2005; Van Dusen & Taylor 2005; Smale et al. 2001; Dercon 1998), and in a 
coastal context (Sesabo & Tol 2005; Allison & Ellis 2001).  
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Studies on conservation agriculture, agroforestry, microfinance and CBM have 
identified a number of household and individual determinants influencing adoption 
decisions. Individual characteristics, attitudes, household assets and structural factors 
(such as farm structure) are shown to be important (Adhikari and Boag, 2013; 
Defrancesco et al., 2008) as are perceptions of risk and the benefits of the programme 
itself (Kabii and Horwitz, 2006). Here we examine the literature as it relates to these 
schemes, both within a developing and developed context in order to draw 
conclusions as to how it might relate within a marine PES framework. In addition, 
where relevant we look to similar adoption, fishery exit and compliance decisions 
within the fisheries literature in order to better interpret fisher decision-making 
processes.  
4.3.1 Individual characteristics as determinants of participation 
Age, gender and education have all been shown to influence adoption decisions.  
4.3.1.1 Age, education and household size 
Age and education have both been regularly assessed in participation models, but are 
difficult to link to participation decisions (Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007).  
In a recent review of the motivations and determinants influencing participation in 
land-restricting conservation practices, older landholders were presented as 
significantly more resistant to uptake (Kabii and Horwitz, 2006). Older landholders 
were characterised as more sceptical to the benefits of adoption, since benefits may 
not occur in their lifetime. Moreover, landowners with longer tenure showed greater 
opposition to restrictive management as they believed their lengthy experience gave 
them a better ability to deal with conservation threats (Kabii and Horwitz, 2006). 
However, overall studies show varying results for age as a determinant in the 
adoption of conservation agriculture. Age has demonstrated positive, negative and 
insignificant correlations in uptake decisions across a number of studies (Clay et al. 
1998; Knowler & Bradshaw 2007; Mercer 2004; Neill & Lee 2001; Okoye 1998). 
Relating to the adoption of PES, Chen et al. (2009) showed age to be a positive 
determinant of re-enrolment.  
Education is commonly shown to positively correlate with the decision to adopt or 
participate in conservation agriculture (Deressa et al. 2009; Knowler & Bradshaw 
2007; Mercer 2004; Swinton & Quiroz 2003; Traore et al. 1998) as well as PES schemes 
(Adhikari & Boag 2013; Zbinden & Lee 2005). And higher education is generally 
found to be positively associated with environmental concern (Olli et al., 2001). 
However some studies have found education level to be an insignificant determinant 
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(Clay et al., 1998; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007) or even negative (Nyangena, 2008). 
Studies relating to the adoption of microcredit have also shown mixed results: 
Khandker (2005) found education to have a negative effect on borrowing, whereas 
Evans et al. (1999) list the lack of education as an important barrier to participation.  
Perhaps confounding the lack of significance of these variables as a determinant is the 
possible correlation between education and age with other variables such as wealth. 
For example, a study by Defrancesco et al. (2008) demonstrated a greater refusal to 
enter AES schemes by market-orientated farms which were operated by highly 
educated and relatively young farmers, who were planning to invest further into 
their farm business. More generally though, low variation in education among low-
income respondents in many studies and heterogeneous data categorisations further 
compounds comparison of these variables across studies (Baumgart-Getz et al., 2012; 
Mercer, 2004). 
For fishers, it is more common to witness a resistance to change from older, more 
experienced fishers. These older fishers generally feel there are few other options 
available to them, and/or it is too late to change (Barr and Mourato, 2009). Baticados' 
(2004) study of a fishing cooperative in Capiz, of the Philippines, demonstrated age as 
a negative predictor of willingness to participate in a coastal resource management. 
Although not age per se but often highly correlated, fisher experience has also been 
shown to predict fishery exit decisions. In the South China Sea biogeographic region 
of the Philippines, Muallil et al. (2011) confirm fisher’s experience to strongly and 
negatively determine willingness to exit the fishery. However, not all studies agree; 
although negative in its direction, Gelcich et al. (2009) could find no significant 
relationship between willingness of artisanal fishers to participate in the creation and 
administration of a local MPA in Chile. Although not PES related but perhaps of 
relevance, age has also been seen to be a determinant of non-compliance with fishing 
regulations such as illegal gear use and effort-limiting regulations (Akpalu, 2011a, 
2011b). However, in this case a younger age often predicts higher non-compliance. 
Muallil et al. (2011) also found educational attainment to influence the likelihood of 
fishery exit; a similar study by Cinner et al. (2009) showed no such relationship.  
We predict fisher’s age to influence willingness to participate within the proposed 
PES. It is anticipated that this effect will be negative, with older fishers more resistant 
to change. However, it is possible that given the ‘rule-breaking behaviour’ of younger 
fishers these results could be confounded. Education is expected to positively 
influence adoption decisions, however again given the lack of variability seen within 
the local context it is not unexpected if no effect is seen.  
 97 
Like both education and age, household size is also thought to influence adoption 
and participation decisions. The hypothesis is that increasing household labour leads 
to an increase in the available labour needed to undertake new adoption behaviour 
(Nkamleu and Manyong, 2005). However, results are scant and variable across 
studies. Dolisca et al. (2006) suggest a positive significant relationship between 
household size and forest management participation in Haiti. Deressa et al. (2009), on 
the other hand, show no such relationship within adoption decision for climate 
change adaptation in Ethiopia. Nkamleu and Manyong (2005) show household size to 
be a significant and positive determinant in only some certain adoption decisions 
such as adoption of live fencing and apiculture; however this result did not apply to 
all adoption decisions, nor did it affect only those adoption decisions requiring 
increased labour. The fishery exit literature offers no insights on the role of household 
size in determining an exit decision. One might anticipate, that household size could 
influence marine PES adoption in one of two ways and in combination with other 
attributes. For example, those with larger households might be able to rely on other 
income means, or alternatively might have a higher number of people dependent on 
fishing gains.  
4.3.1.2 Gender 
Gender is an important attribute for participation and refers to socially pre-
determined ideas and practices of what it means to be male or female (Baden and 
Reeves, 2000; Mercer, 2004). Yet, gender is likely to influence participation indirectly 
and in a convoluted manner. A female’s choice to participate may be restricted by 
gender norms which can separate male and female roles within rural areas (Agarwal 
2009; Agarwal 2001; Mwangi et al. 2011; Sturmheit 1990). These social and cultural 
norms can influence female access to resources, the resource involved, their control 
over the resource as well as further access to technology and markets. Furthermore 
differing educational limitations and household commitments mean that women and 
men respond differently to development opportunities (Allison and Ellis, 2001; The 
World Bank et al., 2009). Rural women rarely have legal or – in the case of many 
coastal areas – defacto control over natural resources: women own less than 2% of 
titled land globally (OECD, 2001). Moreover, women often have limited access to new 
technologies and skills as well as the education, knowledge and/or confidence to 
implement them, or indeed the finances to purchase them in the first instance. Nor do 
women often have the time to invest in their development. Within artisanal coastal 
communities a woman’s identity is very often closely tied to reproductive and 
household work (De Silva, 2011). For example, women spend considerable amounts 
of time caring for children and the elderly, preparing meals and collecting water. 
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These household commitments mean that women generally have much more diverse 
livelihood strategies than their male counterparts, and a primary purpose to provide 
subsistence to their household. As such, considerable restraints are placed on what 
women can realistically do in terms of time, labour and activities outside of the house 
(Tindall and Holvoet, 2008; Weeratunge et al., 2010).  
Female participation has been shown as a significant factor in many conservation 
initiatives (Agarwal, 2009; Westermann et al., 2005). Within a fisheries context, female 
involvement has been associated with greater community acceptance of fishery 
management regulations, as well as reduced conflict amongst fishers (Sultana and 
Thompson, 2008). An understanding of the differing motivations, norms, capabilities, 
and incentives is important in facilitating female participation and is largely ignored 
within the development and resource management literature. Of notable exception 
are the works of Agarwal (e.g. Agarwal 2001; Agarwal 2000; Agarwal 1997) and more 
recently, within the realm of artisanal fisheries (Peterson & Stead 2011).  
When eligible and able to participate, evidence suggests that women hold different 
attitudes to their male counterparts. Women have been shown to view natural 
resources (and fisheries) as a means of meeting basic needs as well as a support 
mechanism for improving self-reliance; on the other hand males can often view such 
resources as a source of income (Dolisca et al., 2006; Porter and Mbezi, 2010; Walmsey 
et al., 2006; Weeratunge et al., 2010).  Some claim that this manner in which women 
view their natural resources make them more likely to promote conservation values 
and practices (Westermann et al., 2005).  
Overall, the effect of gender on adoption is mixed. A recent review of agroforestry 
adoption studies found gender to be a significant determinant in 60% of explanatory 
models in which it was included, where the gender variable was described as the 
proportion of males in the household (Pattanayak et al., 2003). However, it is not clear 
if this is a ‘gender effect’ per se or a reflection of the resources available to the 
household. A study by Nkamleu & Manyong (2005) in Cameroon found male-headed 
farming households to more commonly adopt agroforestry practices. Wilson (1996), 
however, found no differences in conservation-orientated attitudes or participation in 
AES schemes based on gender. However, the author goes on to note that only 8% of 
all respondents were female and most women owned small farms where profit 
maximisation was considered an important factor, and possibly over-riding other 
preferences. Moreover, in contrast, Gladwin et al. (2002) found women in female-
headed households were significantly more likely to adopt improved fallows than 
both men or women from male-headed households. In a similar vein, Chen et al. 
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(2009) also found females 30% more likely to re-enrol plots in the Chinese SLCP PES 
programme.  
In the marine setting, Peterson & Stead (2011) report gender preferences within an 
MPA non-compliance study on the island of Rodrigues, West Indian Ocean. The 
authors report that primary drivers of non-compliance were lack of food and income 
security. They go on to say that willingness to change occupation may come to be an 
important factor for compliance in those MPAs with high levels of displacement. 
Findings show that different groups were more willing to change jobs, and while this 
binary choice may not be gender related per se, the type of job individuals were 
willing to consider showed a significant relationship with gender.  
This said, gender should not be over-simplified or over-generalised. It is important to 
note that women, much like fishers, are not a homogenous unit. Varying personal 
and household attributes will influence female behaviour in a similar manner to male 
counterparts: income, education, marital status and age are all influencing factors 
(Nuggehalli and Prokopy, 2009).  
Evidence seems to suggest that women hold values which make them more likely to 
promote environmental protection (Agarwal, 2000; Agrawal et al., 2006; Westermann 
et al., 2005). However, at the same time women have additional limitations on their 
time, their technical capacity and their social weave which may make it more difficult 
to engage with conservation programmes on the same level as their male 
counterparts (Agarwal, 2000). The general absence of literature on female fishers, or 
indeed female farmers, makes it difficult to predict the influence of gender on PES 
adoption. However, within the proposed marine PES scheme the dominant fishing 
type for women, tandilo, would become illegal. It is anticipated that the initial utility 
loss experienced by women would for this reason be greater than for their male 
counterparts. One might assume that the more restrictive nature of the PES 
restrictions on women may reduce their willingness to adopt the scheme.  
4.3.1.3 Income 
The literature pertaining to income and adoption of conservation practices can be 
split into two parts; income can have both a positive and negative effect for two very 
different reasons. For many adoption schemes, an initial investment is required; here, 
income generally shows a positive influence on participation for the simple reason 
that non-adopters cannot afford this initial investment. Indeed, income and farm 
profit are often seen as a significant and positive determinants in many conservation 
agriculture practices (Deressa et al., 2009; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007).  
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On the flip side of this coin, higher earners may be less keen to adopt new practices 
for fear of greater losses. Within the fishing literature, willingness to exit fisheries is 
more often than not, negatively correlated with income (Cinner et al., 2009; Daw et 
al., 2012; Ikiara and Odink, 2000). 
The technology adoption literature here perhaps gives a less accurate indication than 
it does for other attributes. One of the key features of a PES scheme is that it is able to 
compensate for loss of earnings. In addition, the restrictive nature of the marine PES 
does not necessarily require initial investments into additional technologies. Looking 
to the PES and AES literature may be more appropriate.  
Results from PES adoption literature are mixed. Delacote et al., (undated) 
demonstrate household income to be a positive adoption determinant in the Natura 
2000 forest biodiversity conservation programme, a French government incentive 
where participants can gain exoneration from a “land value tax”. A similar result is 
seen by Baumgart-Getz et al., (2012) who suggest that the burden of investment into 
better management practices is less severe for these individuals. Langpap (2004), 
however, find the income as insignificant in an analysis of landholder participation in 
the US Endangered Species Act.  
The variety seen could also be a by-product of the various different types of income 
which are often lumped as one variable. For instance ‘income’ can represent on- and 
off-farm product. The positive influence of ‘off-farm’ income on PES adoption has 
been frequently cited and is discussed further in Section 4.3.3.2. The evidence for ‘on-
site’ income is mixed: on the one hand, Deressa et al. (2009) show on-farm in 
agricultural adoption decisions; on the other, Bergseng and Vatn (2009) indicate on-
site income to have a negative impact on participation in biodiversity conservation.  
If income is a barrier to the adoption of practices that require change which are not 
originally compensated for, poorer individuals may be less likely show an interest in 
the PES (Mahanty et al., 2013; Wunder, 2008; Zilberman et al., 2008).  
Overall, within the proposed marine PES one might expect higher, more invested, 
earners to be more resistant to change and increased restrictions. However, if poorer 
fishers are also more hesitant to change, or require changes they see as ‘expensive’, 
income may show a u-shape distribution, whereby both poorer and richer fishers are 
less keen to adopt said scheme.   
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4.3.1.4 Fishing type 
It is worth noting that not all fishers are equal. Fishers are a widely heterogeneous 
group (Béné, 2003), but can be more closely grouped based on fishing type (Crona 
and Bodin, 2006), e.g. the types of fishing gear used.  
Not covered within the participation literature for obvious reasons, these differences 
may also have implications for PES adoption. For example, Akpalu (2011a) note that 
fisher compliance with effort-limiting restrictions can be influenced by their skill set. 
The author predicted that less skilful fishers were more likely to violate fishing 
regulations which restricted effort. However, overall, little empirical work has looked 
into the implications of gear type on fishery compliance or exit decisions.  
It is anticipated that some fishers may be more easily able to adapt to any introduced 
PES restrictions, for example those currently using illegal fishing gear will be more 
heavily impacted hence more resistant to adopt. However, this may be overridden by 
adequate compensation. In addition, some gears require a greater initial investment 
and may be correlated with issues of investment and ownership. And akin to those 
with higher asset investment (as discussed in Section 4.3.3.1) may be less willing to 
change.  As yet, there is no clear mechanism as to how gear type will influence 
marine PES adoption.   
4.3.2 Individual environmental beliefs and attitudes 
More generally, attitudes and perceptions are important drivers of behaviour 
(Falconer, 2000). A resource owner’s attitudes have been shown to significantly 
determine participation choice (Falconer 2000; Wilson 1996). Research indicates that 
the presence of conservation attitudes is, more commonly than not, a positive 
motivator (Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007; Langpap, 2004). In fact, an awareness of, 
and concern for, environmental issues has been cited as perhaps one of the more 
critical factors affecting adoption (Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). However, 
awareness of environmental damages can also act as a negative determinant. Zanetell 
& Knuth (2004) present findings which suggest that fishers with a high level of 
concern about the current and future state of their fisheries may be less willingness to 
participate in CBM programmes. The authors suggest this is due to defeatist attitudes 
which arise from perceived over-whelming and insurmountable barriers.  
Moreover, environmental concern as a significant motivator may take a backseat to 
economic determinants in those instances where a landholder’s basic economic and 
survival needs are not met, or only adequately met (Zanetell & Knuth 2004).  
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It is anticipated that those fishers with greater environmental concerns would be 
more willing to partake in the proposed marine PES with these fishers anticipating 
greater benefits. That said, one might predict these determinants to show a lesser 
correlation where fishers are confined by other more immediate motivators such as 
income and consumption smoothing.  
4.3.3 Individual perceptions of risk and vulnerability 
Household and individual decisions are not made solely on the financial reward 
offered. While potential income will affect the choice to participate in new activities, 
considerations about the riskiness of said action will also play in an individual’s mind 
(Allison and Ellis, 2001; Frewer, 1999; Sesabo and Tol, 2005). Perceptions of risk will 
be determined by ones potential vulnerability and resilience to income shocks 
(Ezemenari et al., 2002). The notion that perceptions of risk and uncertainty have 
important implications for adoption decisions is acknowledged within the 
participation literature, and has even been demonstrated to increase the required 
taking-price (Isik and Khanna, 2003). The inability of households to smooth 
consumption across negative shocks – that is a household’s vulnerability – has been 
shown to lead to underinvestment in profitable but potentially more risky projects 
(Dercon & Christiaensen 2011; Pearlman 2012) . Risk and uncertainty have long been 
recognised to reduce the adoption of a variety of agricultural innovations (Mercer, 
2004). In practice, households with a lower ability to spread risk may choose to adopt 
the ‘least risky’ strategy or maintain the status quo, often perceived as the safest 
strategy (Pagiola et al., 2005; Tschakert, 2007). Worryingly, it is often poorer 
households who are more vulnerable and less able to spread risk.  
Households have developed a number of mechanisms to mitigate economic and 
consumptive shocks, particularly within artisanal fishing communities which are 
defined by high levels of variability in catch and income (Dercon 2002; Pollnac 1991). 
Asset endowment, occupational diversity, as well as social capital – e.g. local 
institutions, shared knowledge and norms – are some of the many mechanisms 
households can employ to spread risk (Alderman and Paxson, 1992; Sesabo and Tol, 
2005). Each is discussed below, in turn.  
4.3.3.1 Asset Endowments 
The accumulation of assets is one adaptation used to manage risk and smooth 
consumption (Moser 2008, 1998). Asset endowment has been shown to determine the 
degree to which one discounts future gains. Those who possess more endowments 
have a greater ability to survive in times of food insecurity (Nyangena, 2008) and this 
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capacity enables households to invest in unproven and potentially riskier 
technologies or initiatives but which may be, in the long-term, more profitable 
(Dercon & Christiaensen 2011).  
Asset endowment has received attention within the participation literature in the 
form of farm size, livestock, savings and tenure as well as ownership of other material 
goods. Within the agroforestry forum, both the theoretical and empirical literature 
indicates resource and asset endowments as critical to adoption decisions, where 
early adopters tend to be wealthier households (Mercer, 2004). In reviewing the 
recent agroforestry adoption literature, Mercer (2004) cites asset endowment as a 
positive determinant in all studies where ‘assets’ were included as an independent 
variable. Participation in community forest conservation has also been shown to vary 
depending on crop land, livestock endowment, farm-size and land ownership; where 
all these factors positively predict higher involvement (Musyoki et al., 2013). When 
considering microfinance participation, assets such as home and telephone ownership 
have also been shown to positively affect adoption decisions (Pearlman, 2012).  
Secure tenure can also strongly predict improved conservation practices 
(Gebremedhin & Swinton 2003). In a recent agroforestry adoption review comprising 
37 empirical studies, Mercer (2004) found that when significant more secure tenure 
always predicted adoption, and in only a few studies was it insignificant. No studies 
displayed reverse correlation. Similar results were shown by Baumgart-Getz et al. 
(2012) and Pattanayak et al. (2003). On the flip side of the coin, in those areas where 
insecure tenure is a particular issue, solidification of tenure can be a motivating 
factor, as has been seen in Joint Forestry Management (JFM) programmes (Datta and 
Sarkar, 2010).  
Farm size is a commonly assessed factor within the adoption literature, and can be 
particularly important in those schemes which require set-aside or decreased 
harvesting. One assumes that those farmers with larger holdings will be more able to 
invest in those schemes which require initial restrictions. However, empirical 
evidence is mixed (Baumgart-Getz et al., 2012; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007; Mercer, 
2004), and has even shown negative results (Nyangena, 2008). These conflicting 
results are perhaps due to the conflicting motivations; while larger holdings can 
represent a greater area with which to set-aside land for conservation practices it can 
also represent a greater investment into the sector. However, a meta-analysis of AES 
participation in the US found ‘capital’ – a measure of investment into the farm 
controlled for farm size – to be a positive determinant of adoption (Baumgart-Getz et 
al., 2012) 
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Asset endowment has received some attention within the PES participation literature. 
Notably, Zbinden & Lee (2005) show farm size to be a significant positive 
determinant of participation in Costa Rica’s PSA PES programme. Uchida et al. (2007) 
also found landholdings to be significantly higher for those participating in the 
Chinese SLCP conservation programme when compared to non-participants. In 
addition, Ma et al. (2010) identified land area and on-site farming practices as 
important considerations for PES enrolment. A study by Sesabo & Tol (2005) show 
similar considerations were present within a coastal setting. The decision for fishing 
households’ decision to participate in various new income-generating activities was 
influenced by endowments such as land and fishing assets. Determinants of 
resistance to exit fisheries have been shown to include ownership of fishing assets; 
greater ownership of fishing assets can predict a decreased willingness to exit the 
fishery (Cinner et al. 2009; Ikiara & Odink 2000). Moreover, Barr and Mourato (2009) 
found that fishers’ owning their own equipment would require larger incentives to 
sign up a marine PES which restricted access to previously fished sites. 
Interestingly there are perhaps two types of asset one must consider within marine 
PES, as presented within the fisheries’ exit literature and PES literature more 
generally. Although assets can spread risk, they also can represent a greater 
investment into the sector. For this reason one might consider fishing assets and other 
assets as having different and opposite influences on marine PES adoption. It is 
predicted that fishing assets will negatively influence adoption and other household 
assets will have a positive effect.  
4.3.3.2 Occupational diversity 
Income and occupational diversity are other adaptions to smooth consumption and 
manage risk within developing countries (Alderman & Paxson 1992; Dercon 2002; 
Reardon et al. 2007), and an important strategy within many fishing villages, where 
fishers commonly involve themselves in other economic sectors to smooth the effects 
of catch variation (Allison and Ellis, 2001; Coate and Ravallion, 1993). Quite simply, a 
multiple income portfolio reduces the risk of livelihood failure by spreading it across 
more than one source thus improving the ability to withstand shocks (Allison and 
Ellis, 2001). In addition, experience with other activities may give possible actors a 
greater confidence of success in undertaking new activities, as has been shown in the 
AES literature by the likes of Baumgart-Getz et al. (2012), D’Emden et al. (2008), 
D’Souza et al. (1993) and Defrancesco et al. (2008). Interestingly, results from Kosoy et 
al. (2008) indicate that the diversification of production activities through, say, PES 
schemes can act as a participation driver.  
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Terrestrially, off-farm activities have been shown as an important determinant in a 
number of agri-conservation studies, as well as PES (Chen et al., 2009; Deressa et al., 
2009; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007; Zbinden and Lee, 2005). Those with investment 
into alternative occupations are believed to have proportionally lower opportunity 
costs associated with decreased production, are less concerned about possible hidden 
costs of programme adoption and are more interested in potential on-site amenities 
generated by conserved areas (Kabii and Horwitz, 2006). A study of participation 
within the Costa Rica’s national PES programme, found participants had higher 
incomes and were proportionally more reliant on off-farm sources when compared 
with non-participants (Zbinden & Lee 2005). Chen et al. (2009) found that off-farm 
income originating outside of the local area significantly increased the number of 
land plots re-enrolled into the Chinese SLCP PES programme. These results are 
replicated in a number of agri-conservation and FSM studies (Deressa et al. 2009; 
Dolisca et al. 2006; Knowler & Bradshaw 2007; Swinton & Quiroz 2003).  
Moreover, Defrancesco et al. (2008) showed that a high dependency on farming 
activities for household income acted as a constraint to participation in AES schemes. 
A review of participation within conservation easement programmes also indicated a 
higher representation of part-time farmers over full-time ones (Kabii and Horwitz, 
2006). In the marine setting, Gelcich et al. (2009) found occupational mobility to be a 
significant predictor of willingness to participate in the creation or administration of a 
locally co-managed Chilean MPA. In addition, empirical work by Cinner et al. (2009) 
suggests that fishers with greater access to alternative occupations would more 
readily stop fishing once stocks began to show a decline. 
For the very poor an alternative income source can be the difference between a 
marginally viable livelihood and destitution. An income portfolio which best 
mitigates risk is one that has a low covariate risk between its components, e.g. the 
factors which create risk for one income source (e.g. climate) are not the same as the 
factors for another (e.g. urban job security) (Dercon 2002; Ellis 2000). However not all 
diversification strategies are created equal.  In reality, poorer households are often 
marginalised from more favourable labour markets, which may require larger 
upfront capital, land or higher skill sets (Woldenhanna and Oskam, 2001). As a result, 
diversification by the poor still tends to leave them highly reliant on the exploitation 
of natural resources be it fishing, agriculture or the harvesting of ‘wild’ products; and 
these risks are not as uncorrelated as one would wish. In contrast the better off are 
more disposed to enter into less resource dependent activities such as trade, 
transport, shop keeping and small businesses (Ellis & Allison 2004).  
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It is predicted that fishers with a higher occupational diversity will be more likely to 
participate in the proposed marine PES for two reasons: one, fishers with alternative 
occupations will be better able to spread risk and so be less risk-adverse; and two, 
fishers with more than one livelihood are less invested into the sector and are able to 
redirect efforts and additional money to alternative occupations. It is further 
hypothesised that those fishers with investments into alternative activities not 
directly related to the environment – such as farming – would be even more likely to 
adopt the PES as the correlation between say business and fishing and farming and 
fishing would be less.  
4.3.3.3 Social capital 
A much less tangible concept, the role of social capital in household risk mitigation 
and consumption smoothing has also been well cited (Allison and Ellis, 2001; Coate 
and Ravallion, 1993; Dercon, 2002; Ellis, 2000; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; 
Rosenzweig, 1988; Townsend, 1994). Broadly speaking social capital refers to the 
shared knowledge and understandings, social norms and bonds which facilitate 
collective action (Ostrom, 1999; Pretty, 2003; Woolcock, 2001).  
The role of social capital, much like that of asset accumulation and income 
diversification, has been well documented within the participation literature. While 
its exact definition is subject to debate, broadly speaking social capital refers to the 
shared knowledge and understandings, social norms and networks which facilitate 
collective action (Ostrom, 1999; Woolcock, 2001).  
The idea that social capital can influence an individual’s adoption decision is situated 
within the theory of embeddedness. An alternative to the rational actor hypothesis, 
social embeddedness was first introduced by Polanyi in 1944. Revisited by 
Granovetter forty years later, Granovetter (1985) argues that “behaviour and 
institutions are so constrained by on going social relations that to construe them as 
independent is a grievous misunderstanding”. Social embeddedness argues that 
market behaviour and decision-making are driven simultaneously by economic and 
non-economic motives and remain positioned within structures of social norms, 
social relationships and reciprocity networks (Breetz et al., 2005; Granovetter, 2005; 
Mariola, 2012). These social norms can play an important role in an individual’s 
decision matrix. At its broadest level, these norms are defined as an understanding of 
how community members will behave under given circumstances (Chen et al., 2009). 
Moreover, reciprocity relationships have been suggested as playing a considerably 
more important role within poorer societal groups, where the possession of this social 
capital may enable access to goods and services often commoditised by higher 
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income groups (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Wakefield and Poland, 2005). Indeed, 
increased social capital has been shown to lead to greater risk sharing among villager 
members, acting as an informal safety net (Narayan and Pritchett, 1997).  
Within the adoption literature, social capital and embeddedness has received 
considerable interest as it relates to the adoption of improved agricultural technology 
within low-income settings (e.g. Bandiera and Rasul, 2003; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; 
Conley and Udry, 2010; Isham, 2002; Matuschke and Qaim, 2009). However, this 
literature investigates the role of social capital as it relates to the improved access to 
information and the reduced transaction costs associated with the dissemination of 
this information, as well as the perceived risk associated with new technologies 
previously tested by neighbours and counterparts. This may be less pertinent to the 
adoption of a marine PES scheme within this setting, which at the time of this study 
was in a hypothetical stage.  
Within the PES literature, the influence of social capital on adoption has received 
much less attention. Recently, Ma et al. (2010) found spatial variation effects, possibly 
from interpersonal communications as well as other socio-economic factors. Although 
not at the individual level, Gong et al. (2010) found that lower levels of village social 
capital constrained participation in a PES forest project in Guangxi, China. In 
addition, Chen et al. (2009) found that social norms had a significant effect on an 
individual’s intentions to re-enrol in PES projects at the village level, and that, 
aggregated, perceptions of neighbouring behaviour could substantially reduce PES 
programme costs. The intention to re-enrolment were shown to be highly affected by 
the re-enrolment decisions of neighbours and tended to conform to the majority: 
witnessing 10% of neighbours reconverting at least part of their SLCP programme 
plots back into agriculture was estimated to reduce a participant’s intention to re-
enrol by 6.4% on average. The effect of social norms was seen to be highest when 
payments were at an intermediate level; at higher and lower payment values it is 
anticipated that financial considerations override these effects. In a more recent 
empirical analysis of PES adoption, van der Horst (2011) cited the frequent 
occurrence of PES micro-clusters in environmentally sensitive areas as evidence for 
strong neighbourhood effects. In a fisheries context, Sesabo and Tol (2005) found a 
households’ decision to participate in various income-generating activities was 
influenced by household structure and local institutions. In particular, the authors 
noted how households with higher social capital, in the form of access to social 
networks, showed increased participation in other livelihood occupations.  
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Perhaps most relevant to the question of social capital and adoption within our 
marine PES setting is the strand of literature focussing on how social capital enables 
individuals to take more ‘risky’ stances much as asset endowment does. And 
consequentially how this relates to willingness to adopt novel, and possibly risky, 
untested programmes. This strand has received considerably less interest within the 
conservation literature, and is almost lacking in how it can affect PES trading 
outcomes (Breetz et al., 2005; Mariola, 2012).  
More generally, social capital as it relates to reducing risk has been cited to improve 
participation rates within AES, microfinance and CBM as well as investments into 
conservation agriculture practices (Nyangena, 2008; Pearlman, 2012; Polman and 
Slangen, 2008; Togba, 2012). Put simply, social capital captures the nature of social 
relationships and uses this information to explain observed behaviours and outcomes 
(Adger, 2003). It is however notoriously difficult to measure. In order to better 
understand (and indeed measure) social capital it is perhaps best thought of as five 
distinct but related dimensions (or proxies), as defined by the World Bank’s Social 
Capital Implementation Framework. These are: 1) Trust; 2) Groups and networks; 3) 
Collective action; 4) Social inclusion and 5) Information and communication (The 
World Bank, undated).  
4.3.3.3.1 Trust 
At the individual level trust is the element which underlies the existence of social 
capital (Polman and Slangen, 2008). Trust is the mechanism which enables people to 
coordinate their actions for mutual benefit and as such overcome those market 
failures which arise through uncertainty (Ostrom, 1990). Quite simply the more 
people trust each other the more likely they are to contract with each other; trust 
lubricates cooperation serving to reduce transaction costs between individuals and 
buffers risk. Indeed a lack of trust will have negative consequences as all economic 
exchanges have an element of trust embedded within them (Mariola, 2012; Pretty, 
2003; Sekhar, 2007). Trust is the most encompassing feature enabling collective action, 
and the other forms of social capital, for the greater part, contribute to successful 
collective action by enhancing trust between individuals. However, although trust 
among actors can often be explained as an outcome of other forms of social capital, it 
is also true that some aspects of trust are not reducible to these other forms (Ostrom 
and Ahn, 2001). For example, activity in voluntary organisations, although shown to 
increase trust between members, is only very weakly associated with generalised 
trust, where generalised trust is the measure of an individuals expectation of others 
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trustworthiness based upon more general information about social groups and 
situations. (Bjørnskov, 2006).  
Trust in the implementing authority has been shown to be an important component 
in many conservation adoption decisions in both developed, developing and 
transitioning economies, for example JFM in India (Datta and Sarkar, 2010), AES in 
Europe (Polman and Slangen, 2008), as well as soil conservation initiatives in Eastern 
Europe (Prager et al., 2012) and Kenya (Nyangena, 2008). Similar reservations can be 
seen in PES initiatives. Recent reviews of farmer participation in water quality trading 
(WQT) schemes found trust to be an important determinant (Breetz et al., 2005; 
Mariola, 2012; Perrot-Maitre, 2006). Within these studies, a mistrust of regulators 
negatively influenced farmer’s initial willingness to participate in the WQT scheme. 
In fact, the lack of trust in an environmental regulatory body has been shown to 
single-handedly stifle the adoption of conservation practices in a number of studies 
(Moore et al., 2008; Parker et al., 2009). The authors conclude that trust lubricates 
programme success through increasing the efficiency of outreach, improving the 
credibility of information and buffering the risks perceived by farmers.  
It is not surprising that trust appears to play such a strong effect in the adoption of 
PES-like programmes. These financial incentives come with a number of perceived 
risks. In order to engage in a PES scheme, resource owners must often explicitly 
acknowledge that environmental damage is being done, and by them. This is 
certainly the case in the proposed marine PES herein: fishers must admit to those 
practices damaging the environment and concede fishing efforts as too high. In this 
way fishers can open themselves up to a number of risks: increased scrutiny; 
imposition of new regulations; possible loss of autonomy related to operations; 
increased government oversight and of course possible reneging on payment (Breetz 
et al., 2005; Langpap, 2004; Mariola, 2012). All this leads to a greater sense of 
uncertainty about future production values and profitability. Quite simply, the higher 
the trust the more a participant believes the scheme to function both in the long-term 
through trust in the information provided about the scheme, faith that undesirable 
effects will be mitigated and belief in the payment itself (Kabii and Horwitz, 2006).  
Polman and Slangen (2008) analyse various types of trust as it relates to the design of 
various agri-environmental contracts within the European Union. Interestingly, 
general trust was seen not to have an impact on willingness to participate in any of 
the tested schemes. However, trust in government was seen a significant determinant 
in those cases where contracts imposed restrictions on intensive practices. In PES, 
more specifically, trust between buyer and seller has been argued as an essential 
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requisite (Corbera et al., 2007; Fisher et al., 2010; Vatn, 2010). Within a marine setting, 
a lack of trust in implementing bodies, and/or protected area managers has be 
demonstrated to lead to lower levels of compliance (Stern, 2008). 
We hypothesise that trust will be an important motivation factor in marine PES 
adoption.  
4.3.3.3.2 Groups and networks 
Individuals come together to promote mutual interests and overcome mutual 
problems. Engagement in groups and networks allows those with common interests 
to benefit from coordination, conflict resolution, information sharing and building of 
common knowledge and trust (Pretty, 2003). Whereas group membership denotes an 
actor’s participation, social networks relate to the structure of one’s relationships and 
the types of connections involved.  
Although social capital is created through interaction and more palpable at the group 
level through its network structures, it also has implications at the individual level 
(Uphoff, 2000; Woolcock, 2001). Social capital can be deconstructed into two separate 
but interrelated concepts: a) structural and b) cognitive (Uphoff, 2000). Structural 
social capital is associated with the various forms of social organisation, including the 
roles, rules, precedents and procedures as well as the assortment of network ties. At 
the individual level, cognitive social capital derives from the mental processes and 
resulting ideas relating to trust, reciprocity and learning. These are reinforced by 
culture, ideology and specifically the local norms, values, attitudes and beliefs, all of 
which contribute to cooperative behaviour and collective action (Uphoff, 2000). These 
two domains are intrinsically linked. Although true that networks with their roles, 
rules, precedents and procedures display a life of their own, ultimately they all come 
from cognitive processes, linked in practice though individual expectation. And it is 
this, in turn, which prescribes individual behaviour (Uphoff, 2000). Hence people’s 
behaviour, experience and participation within groups and networks will have 
overall implications in their future choices and behaviour, as well as their knowledge 
of the expectations placed upon them and the expectations they place on others. 
Group membership and presence within social networks has been shown as an 
important determinant in decisions to adopt novel agricultural practices (Bandiera 
and Rasul, 2006, 2003; Gabunda and Barker, 1994; Isham, 2002; Swinton and Quiroz, 
2003). Swinton & Quiroz (2003) demonstrate a clear link between the number of 
household association memberships and the adoption of sustainable agricultural 
practices, or more specifically the area placed under fallow. However, much of the 
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adoption literature relates to the associated learning and reduced cost of information 
dissemination. Disentangling these effects from other group effects such as informal 
insurance networks is difficult.  
Group memberships and network structure, quite simply, provide social ties. Social 
ties carry numerous benefits including the transfer of information and learning as 
well as reciprocal norms. These sharing arrangements can be viewed as implicit 
insurance structures (Nyangena, 2008). Food and/or financial assistance are extended 
through such networks. As discussed previously, these structures enable members to 
place higher values on long-term investments than non-members with similar flow 
and stock wealth. These networks have been shown to be important within rural and 
low-income societal groups (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003) as well as in fishing 
communities more generally (Bodin and Crona, 2008; Crona and Bodin, 2006; Isham, 
2001). 
4.3.3.3.3 Collective action 
Collective action refers to instances where individuals work together for a shared 
good or benefit. When not imposed by an external force, collective action can be used 
as a proxy measure of underlying social capital (The World Bank, undated). For 
example, the degree to which one volunteers in a local group and/or attends 
community events is an indication of collective action. Many studies have shown 
collective action to be facilitated by social capital (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2001; 
Krishna, 2003; Narayan and Pritchett, 1997; Ostrom, 1999, 1990; Putnam, 1995). 
Whereas other forms of social capital mentioned refer to the structure of social 
relationships, collective action is perhaps better described as a flow associated with 
social capital; indeed it is a process which ultimately relates to its underlying social 
relationships. This dynamic nature of collective action, however, means that collective 
action is inherently hard to measure (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). A more 
comprehensive discussion on collective action can be found in Section 4.3.3.4. 
4.3.3.3.4 Social inclusion 
Social inclusion is the measure of an individual’s inclusion in decision-making and 
collective action, as well as access to institutions (Oxoby, 2009; The World Bank, 
undated). One’s degree of social inclusion will in turn influence the beliefs an actor 
might hold about access to these institutions and indeed any expected returns to 
social capital. Ultimately, the degree of one’s social inclusion affects the incentives an 
individual faces when investing in social capital or in deciding how to behave within 
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society. Those with higher levels of ‘social inclusion’ might be expected to have a 
higher belief in the success of investments (Oxoby, 2009).  
There is little empirical work explaining the role of social inclusion upon participation 
decisions but one might expect those with lower inclusion to be less able or likely to 
participate within conservation management activities. Those experiencing lower 
levels of inclusion are less likely to be involved within consultations and management 
decisions, nor are they likely to have access to many of the networks providing 
informal insurance.  
4.3.3.3.5 Information and communication 
The enhancement and maintenance of social capital ultimately relies on the ability of 
members to communicate with one another, as well as with others outside of these 
more closely tied networks. More specifically, information transfer through both 
network types has been shown to positively and significantly influence the adoption 
of technologies (Bandiera and Rasul, 2003; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and 
Udry, 2010; Isham, 2002; Matuschke and Qaim, 2009); transaction costs and perceived 
risk are reduced. However, as previously mentioned this dimension may be less 
relevant for the adoption of the proposed marine PES given its extremely novel and 
presently hypothetical nature.  
4.3.3.4 Determinants under a collective action scenario 
Where PES schemes require collective action and indeed collective enforcement, 
participants must rely on not only their compliance but also that of others, as in the 
marine setting; other determinants come into play. While much of the previous 
literature review examines individual motivations, when looking at such a collective 
action mechanism additional determinants relating to interdependent decision-
making will also be important.  
A collective good is any good whose consumption is non-excludable. While 
individuals receive utility from the good, they are however also bearing the costs of 
its production. Under the theory of utility maximisation individuals will only 
participate in so much as their utility gains exceed the costs of participation (Fischer 
and Qaim, 2011).  
There are a number of structural variables which predict the likelihood of collective 
action, these include: the number of participants involved; the heterogeneity of 
participants and information about past actions to name a few (Fisher et al., 2010). 
However, at the core of the ever-evolving theory of successful (or unsuccessful) 
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collective action are the degrees of trust between participants (Ostrom, 2010). And it 
is these structures and factors which enable people to trust one another and 
determine the level of trust (Nyangena, 2008; Ostrom, 2010).  
Mutual trust has long been considered an important factor encouraging collective 
action (Ostrom, 1990; Putnam, 1995). Although the specific definition of trust in this 
context varies, scholars agree that the term encapsulates an additional and distinct 
causal force encouraging cooperation in isolation from institutional arrangements 
(Raymond, 2006). Herein we describe the term as “a willingness to take risks on the 
behaviour of others based on the belief that potential trustees will ‘do what is right’” 
as defined by Hoffman (2002).  
Research in various areas of collective action has shown the presence of, and 
development of social capital and trust to be important positive determinants in 
dealing with collective action problems (Emtage and Herbohn, 2012; Krishna and 
Uphoff, 1999; Nuggehalli and Prokopy, 2009; Nyangena, 2008; Ostrom and Ahn, 2001; 
Pretty and Ward, 2001; Pretty, 2003). Within the adoption literature, Nyangena (2008) 
presented results confirming trust as a risk pooling mechanism which significantly 
predicted adoption of soil and water conservation in rural Kenya. More specifically 
Emtage and Herbohn (2012) indicate that ‘trust in others’ is an important determinant 
of how farmers will respond to new natural resource management policies. However, 
more recently authors have questioned the importance of trust in collective action 
and point to the other necessary factor – institutional mechanisms which limit free 
riding and sanction non-compliers – as the facilitating factor (Cook et al., 2007; 
Raymond, 2006).  
In rural coastal areas where enforcement and regulation are decentralised, and often 
lacking, the proposed marine PES will require a high level of compliance by local 
users. Under such a scheme sanctions can deter non-compliers; however, ultimately, 
the scheme will depend on the delivery of sufficient environmental services. Where 
resources are fluid, as they are in the marine environment, ‘non-compliers’ can do 
much harm. And where environmental service delivery is seriously injured it is likely 
that a programme will be discontinued; a statement to which effect is made within 
the questionnaire (as reported in Annex B1). Enrolment into such marine PES 
schemes may therefore be influenced by a fisher’s belief in the compliance of others, 
or indeed by one’s belief in the ability to free ride. For this reason it is anticipated that 
a fisher’s degree of trust in his fellow fishers will have an influence additional to the 
individual characteristics previously mentioned. Trust within fishing families and 
small fishing communities has been shown to encourage individual fishers to observe 
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fishing rules and sustainable practices (Grafton, 2005). As such, one can hypothesis 
that this trust will also influence a fisher’s likelihood to comply with and adopt any 
PES restrictions.  
It is hypothesised that those fishers’ with lower levels of trust in their counterparts 
will be less likely to sign up for any proposed marine PES scheme. By indicating low 
levels of trust in other fishers they will, in turn, anticipate low levels of compliance 
and a low return on any investment made into the common pool resources. On the 
flip side, fishers who believe their counterparts will also comply with PES restrictions 
will be more likely to sign up themselves. 
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4.4 Summary Hypotheses 
Drawing on the adoption literature associated with environmental innovation and 
technology, conservation agriculture, agroforestry, microfinance, CBM and previous 
PES studies we identify a number of factors which may influence a fisher’s decision 
to participate in a marine PES scheme. These are summarised in Table 4.1 along with 
the anticipated direction of the effect.  
Table 4.1 summarised the hypotheses derived from the literature.  
Attribute Hypothesis +/- 
Individual characteristics 
Age Older fishers will be more resistant to change hence 
adoption of marine PES 
_ 
Education More educated fishers will be more willing to adopt marine 
PES 
+ 
Household size Assuming HHsize to be a proxy for a measure of 
dependents it is hypothesised that household size will 
reduce a fisher’s likelihood to adopt novel schemes, hence 
the marine PES 
_ 
Gender  
(where male=1) 
The more restrictive nature of the scheme for women and 
the limited availability on their time outside of the home 
suggests women will be more resistant to the marine PES 
+ 
Fishing income Higher earning fishers will be more invested into the fishing 
industry hence more resistant to any restrictive marine PES 
_ 
Fishing type 
(where legal=1) 
Illegal fishers will be more resistant to the higher restrictions 
placed upon them  
+ 
Individual environmental beliefs and attitudes 
Positive attitudes to 
conservation  
Those fishers who hold positive attitude to the environment 
and conservation will be more likely to adopt a marine PES 
+ 
Individual perceptions of risk and vulnerability 
Asset endowment Those fishers with higher asset endowment will be more 
likely to adopt the novel marine PES scheme 
+ 
Occupational 
diversity 
Those fishers with great occupational diversity will be more 
likely to adopt the novel marine PES scheme 
+ 
Social capital Those fishers with higher levels of social capital such as 
trust/group membership and networks/social inclusion 
will more likely to adopt the marine PES scheme 
+ 
Collective Action 
Trust in fishers Those fishers with higher levels of trust in other fishers will 
be more likely to adopt the marine PES scheme 
+ 
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Chapter 5 
Site description 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter provides background to the study site. Data collection and methods are 
discussed in relevant chapters.   
The chapter is organised into seven subsequent sections. Section 5.2 presents a 
summary of why one might consider a marine PES in the Mtwara coastal region. 
Section 5.3 provides an overview of the fisheries sector in Tanzania. Background 
information is subsequently provided on the Mtwara region in Section 5.4 and more 
specifically on the sampled villages which form the basis of the research presented in 
Chapters 6 and 7. Section 5.5 discusses Tanzania’s enabling environment for marine 
PES. The proposed marine PES is laid out in Section 5.6 and relevant collaborations 
are described in Section 5.7.  
5.2 PES in Mtwara, Tanzania 
The Mtwara region in the United Republic of Tanzania offers an interesting case 
study for determining the suitability of a marine PES scheme within poor rural areas 
for the following reasons:  
1. The coast and marine waters around Mtwara represent areas of high 
biological significant. A critical node for the accumulation and dispersal of 
marine organisms across East Africa the Mnazi Bay – Ruvuma Estuary 
represents an area of high biodiversity and replenishment value at both the 
national and international level.  
2. High fishing pressure and destructive fishing practices significantly impact 
the health of the region’s coral reef and marine environment. Destructive 
fishing practices – such as dynamite fishing – are used extensively, directly 
destroying the reefs and/or preventing recovery.  
3. At present fishing along the coast is carried out under what is effectively an 
open-access regime. However, recent legislative structures in Tanzania 
promote local user rights and exclusion rules.  
4. Small-scale fishery interventions can play a significant role in human and 
socio-economic development and represent an entry point for poverty 
reduction. 
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5. Mtwara is one Tanzania’s largest urban areas and its population continues to 
expand with extensive migration into the area and a national annual growth 
rate of 2-6%. The region is considered among one of the country’s poorest and 
least developed. Coastal communities have relatively poor access to public 
infrastructure such as water and sanitation, have little to no access to credit 
and tend to live in poor housing conditions. 
5.3 The status of Tanzania’s fishers 
Tanzania remains one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 152 out of 182 in 
the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) human development index 
(HDI) (UNDP 2011). As many as 34% of Tanzania’s population are considered “basic 
needs poor10”, 38% in rural areas. Official poverty levels have remained fairly 
constant over the last ten year but absolute numbers have increased (NBS 2007).   
Tanzania’s 30,000 km2 coastal area currently supports a quarter of the of the country’s 
43 million strong population; a figure which is set to double by 2025 (World Bank 
2011; Gustavson et al. 2009).  
Marine resources make valuable nutritional and economic contributions to the 
communities living along the Tanzanian coastline and numerous islands. Marine 
capture fishing has long been regarded as one of the most important activities along 
the coast; the contribution these fisheries fluctuates between 2.1 – 5.0% of GDP for 
mainland Tanzania (Jiddawi and Öhman, 2002; Sesabo and Tol, 2005). Fish caught is 
primarily consumed on the domestic market and per capital consumption has been 
estimated at 25-30 kg person-1 year-1 (Jiddawi and Öhman, 2002).   
The fisheries sector is almost entirely dominated by small-scale, low-income fishing 
households. Together these fishers account for 95% of Tanzania’s total catch (Sesabo 
and Tol, 2005). In 2007, FAO reported approximately 150,000 registered artisanal 
fishers; of which over 20,000 were mainland coastal fishers; many other remain 
unregistered (FAO, n.d.; Jiddawi and Öhman, 2002).  
Like many other coastal African countries characterised by open-access and 
traditional methods. Marine capture fishing is mostly restricted to inshore coastal 
waters: typically to within 4km from shore within waters along the country’s narrow 
continental shelf. This is due to the limited range of traditional vessels and gear, and a 
lack of technical skills and capital to pursue gains in deeper waters (Masalu, 2000; 
                                                      
10 The basic needs approach defines the absolute minimum resources required to satisfy long-term 
physical wellbeing. The poverty line is then defined as the income needed to meet these needs.  
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Sesabo and Tol, 2005). As a result, recent years have witnessed increasing pressures 
upon coastal resources and a poor performance in Tanzania’s fisheries production 
(Sesabo and Tol, 2005). The country continues to experience crowding and 
overfishing of inshore waters (Jiddaw, 2001; Shao et al., 2003).  
5.4 Mtwara, Tanzania 
Located in the south of Tanzania and bordering Mozambique, Mtwara is the most 
southern of Tanzania’s five administrative regions (Masalu, 2000). Mtwara is 
considered among one of the country’s poorest and least developed regions, 
primarily due to lack infrastructure such as roads and energy. Thirty eight percent of 
the population live below the basic needs poverty line, with the coastal population 
considered amongst the poorest (Guerreiro et al., 2010; Malleret, 2004). Extending 
along 125 km of coastline are the region’s two coastal districts: Mtwara Urban and 
Mtwara Rural. Together these two districts comprise around 26% of the Region’s total 
population of 1.2 million: 92,602 and 204,770 respectively (Barr 2010; Guerreiro et al. 
2010). The study area is highlighted in Figure 5.1.  
Figure 5.1 Location of the Mtwara Region and study site within Tanzania  
 
1. Mtwara Region shown as shaded area. Boxed area indicates coastal area and location of study sites. 
Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mtwara_Region (12 June 2011). 2. Legend: + + + 
International border; ———  Rivers; ::: Coral reef. Taken from Shao et al., (2003) 
5.4.1 Biological significance of Mtwara’s marine environment 
The Eastern African Marine Ecosystem (EAME) extends from South Africa to 
Somalia, crossing Mozambican, Tanzanian and Kenyan waters: a distance of 4,600 km 
!!!!!!!!!!!!Tanzania!
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and encompasses an area of 540,900 km2 once you include its 200 nautical mile 
economic exclusion zone (Guerreiro et al., 2010). Considered one of the top marine 
ecoregions for biodiversity on earth, the EAME supports some 21.5 million people 
who directly rely on the goods and services it provides (Guerreiro et al., 2011, 2010).  
Mtwara’s coastal waters are of high national and international importance. The area 
contains some of Tanzania’s most significant biodiversity. It supports over 48 genera 
of scleractinian coral, 15 species of soft coral, 137 species of macro algae and 400 
species of fish. It is also an important area for dugong, humpback whales, turtle, 
dolphins, birds and pelagic fish (WWF, 2004). 
Moreover, this area is a major source of food and nutrients to adjacent waters. Its 
coral reef, which extends south from neighbouring region Lindi to the Mozambican 
border, connects with the Mozambican Quirimbas reef system. Together these reef 
systems are of critical importance as sources of marine larvae and spores which 
disperse out to northern and southern marine ecosystems; the Southern Equatorial 
Current diverges in this area creating an area of high replenishment capability (Shao 
et al., 2003; WWF, 2004).  
5.4.2 Fishers of Mtwara 
Households within Tanzania’s coastline communities are generally large families 
with low per capita incomes and high illiteracy rates. Most coastal communities 
remain isolated due to poor infrastructure such as roads, electrical services and water 
supply (Gustavson et al., 2009). As few as 2% of rural housing have electricity, 6% 
have bank accounts, 25% have modern walling and as many as 45% must travel more 
than 1 km to access drinking water. Malaria affects 69% and 60% of children and 
adults respectively, and households are also face with other notable diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, cholera and schistosomiasis (Gustavson et al., 2009; National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS), 2002).  
The livelihoods of coastal communities are highly dependent on natural resource 
extraction. Traditionally, livelihoods are based around subsistence and small-scale 
commercial activities such as artisanal fisheries, agriculture, mariculture, animal 
husbandry, salt and lime production, small-trade trade and crafts as well as 
mangrove and coastal thicket-related activities. Activities generally provide food, a 
source of shelter or provide limited income from local markets. A predominant 
feature of these coastal households is the need to be involved in several simultaneous 
livelihood activities to supplement incomes and maintain a consistent source of food 
(Gustavson et al., 2009). High and increasing poverty is prevalent amongst fishers: 
 120 
average yearly income in most Tanzanian coastal villages does not exceed US$ 100 
per person. Moreover, fish supplies per person are declining and excessive 
exploitation of the fishery continues (Cinner, 2010; Olale et al., 2010; Sesabo et al., 
2006). Yet, the number of households participating in the sector continues to rise due 
to relatively high prices and a high demand for fish products (Bagachwa et al., 1994).  
The coastal areas of Mtwara are no different, rural villages have no mains electrical 
supply, unreliable water supply and access to health, education and other basic 
services are only available in Mtwara town, a 20-40 km walk for some coastal villages. 
Communities largely rely on agriculture and artisanal fishing for their livelihoods, 
and annual per capita income remains below $100 a year (UNDP, 2002). Coastal 
villages all show a high dependence on marine resources (Malleret, 2004). This can be 
as high as 63 – 74% of households in some sea bordering villages with 54% of 
households directly depended on or were involved in fishing.  Figures which are 
homogeneous and consistent with other studies across Tanzania and Kenya (Malleret 
and Simbua, 2004). Agriculture productivity is generally limited and on marginal 
lands within this coastal zone due to poor soils. As a result, households rely on a vast 
array of livelihoods to meet basic needs (Malleret, 2004). In these villages, fishing 
generally remains the main activity for male-headed households while female-
headed households rely more so on agriculture. This said women do fish and fishing 
within the tidal zone can represent important sources of income (Gustavson et al., 
2009; Malleret, 2004).  
Fishing in the region is conducted entirely at the small-scale level utilising traditional 
methods. Vessels are mainly dugout canoes and some planked construction boats 
known locally as dhows; only 2-3% of boats are motorised (Shao et al., 2003). As such, 
fishing is generally carried out in shallow reef areas which are easily accessible from 
shore. Catch composition is multi-species and reef fish account for the majority of this 
catch. Most commonly species caught are demersal fish, followed by some large and 
small pelagics; crustacean, octopus and squid are also common. In some villages, 
where women fish with mosquito needs – locally known as tandilo – sardines can 
comprise up to 25% of local catch (Malleret, 2004; Shao et al., 2003). As in other 
regions of Tanzania, fishing is conducted using a wide variety of gear types (Malleret, 
2004). These different gear types and the subsequent frequency of use are described in 
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2 respectively.  
While men engage in many different types of fishing, women generally only partake 
in ‘tandilo’ and gleaning activities. In the past ‘tandilo’ fishing involved catching 
small fish ‘dagaa’ from shore and timing depended on low and high tides. Tandilo 
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fishing is normally conducted within intertidal areas close to shore, using mosquito 
nests sewn together. Fishing for these women is part of a larger portfolio of activities 
and is generally conducted for a couple of hours each day for two weeks in each 
month. Women also involve themselves in gleaning molluscs from the shore as well 
as collecting sea cucumber and octopus during spring tides (Malleret, 2004).  
Table 5.1 Gear types 
Gear type Description 
Nets 4-7” On average 50-150m in length and 20m in depth. Generally set overnight in 
deeper waters by 4-6 fishers. Target larger pelagic species such as shark 
Nets 2.5-3” From 50-100m long, usually set by boat and left overnight or day. Species 
targeted are mainly pelagics such as jack 
Beach seine Nets of very small mesh size (some 0.5”). Fishers based on beach spread seine 
over large area to encircle groups of fish. Non-discriminatory and mainly 
catches small fry and juveniles as well as larger demersal and pelagic fish 
Tandilo Mosquito nets used to fish close to shore. Nets are dragged along shore by 3-6 
women. One of most widely used gear types within the park. Non-
discriminatory, tandilo targets small fish including juveniles of larger species 
‘Juya’ Used as seines when groups of fish are spotted. May be in shallow or deep 
water. Fish are encircled in net, scraping bottom substrate when in shallower 
waters. Net is pulled and closed at bottom. Nets can be small (1-1.5”) or larger 
(3”) 
Traps These include traditional and fence traps. Fence traps can be left for days and 
are harvested at low tides. Traditional smaller traps are left overnight and 
mainly target demersal fish  
Spear and sticks These target lobster, octopus, sea cucumber and reef fish. Sticks and spears 
are used close to shore; spear guns can be used further out 
Handlines The most common fishing type among males, handlines are mainly used from 
boats and are often used alongside nets 
Longlines Longlines are fishing lines used from larger boats with multiple hooks. They 
target larger pelagics such as sharks. This gear is less common in the area 
Adapted from Malleret (2004) 
Figure 5.2 Gear use as % of fishers from household surveys: seafront villages  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Malleret (2004) 
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Mtwara’s coastal communities are predominantly of Makonde Malaba ethnic origin, a 
coastal subgroup of the main Makonde tribe of southern Tanzania. The predominant 
faith is muslim (Malleret, 2004). The principle language within the region is 
Kiswahili, although Makonde is spoken extensively within areas along the coast. 
Polygamy is common within the area and most houses are male-headed. Culturally, 
women are not generally included within decision-making processes; men generally 
make most decisions and are involved in community decision-making forums. 
Compared with other women of Tanzania, women in this region are generally more 
confined to their houses. Female drop-outs from primary education are also 
commonplace (Shao et al., 2003). 
Consistent with the rest of Tanzania, fisher numbers have risen within the region and 
productivity fallen (Harrison et al., 2010). In 1996, the number of registered fishers in 
the Mtwara coastal region was estimated to be 2050, approximately 10% of Tanzania’s 
total registered artisanal fleet, in 2010 this figure was more than double at 5,600 (Dadi 
2010). This number is anticipated to be much higher once non-registered male fishers 
are considered. Moreover, many women also engage in fishing activities and remain 
unregistered and outside of production figures. 
A number of locally accepted fishing practices are now known to be very destructive 
and are illegal. These include the use of small-mesh seine nets to capture fish from the 
seabed and around reefs. Nets are weighted and dragged across reef flats or are 
pulled around coral structures damaging them and other reef life. This often includes 
the beating and smashing of corals to scare fish into nets (Tobey and Torell, 2006). 
Moreover, the small mesh results in the capture of many juveniles. Other methods 
include catching more sedentary species with sticks, which also results in the 
trampling of reef flats. Dynamite fishing also remains a problem in the area (Dadi 
2010).  
The female fishing method ‘tandilo’ is one of the more destructive fishing types 
currently practiced within Mtwara’s coastal waters. This fishing method, which uses 
small meshing to catch sardines locally known as ‘dagaa’, results in both the 
trampling of reef beds and a high juvenile catch; the majority of the catch (61%) is 
below half the maximum adult size (Jiddawi and Öhman, 2002).  However, it is not 
generally perceived as damaging by the local communities and can represent one of 
the only sources of income for these fishing women (Malleret, 2004).  
In the last five years reported returns from fishing have significantly fallen. Declining 
stock and ascribed value (in Tanzanian Shillings: TSh) for fish catch in the Mtwara 
rural area are displayed in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Weight and value of fish catch landed by fishers in the Mtwara rural district 
for years 2004-2009 
Year Amount of fish (Tons) Value of fish (TSh) 
2004/05 120,240 83,825,290 
2005/06 112,860 63,730,117 
2006/07 94,321 65,755,586 
2007/08 76,513 53,341,021 
2008/09 61,245 56,639,934 
Source: Mtwara Rural District office 2010, in: Harrison et al. 2010   
5.4.3 Management of Mtwara’s marine resources 
Mtwara’s shallow reefs (located within 1-10m from shore) are almost completely 
degraded having been heavily impacted by human impacts and fishers with a limited 
ability to access alternative areas (Shao et al., 2003). 
In response to increasing environmental threats and high biological significance, the 
Tanzanian government gazetted Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park 
(MBREMP) in 2000. The region’s only marine park MBREMP is located to the west of 
Mtwara Region’s main city Mtwara. The park covers 650 km2, of which 
approximately 430 km2 is sea, including mangrove forests, islands, seagrass and coral 
reef ecosystems; the remaining 220 km2 is terrestrial (IUCN, 2005; Robinson et al., 
2012). The 70 km2 of mangrove forest found within the park accounts for almost 10% 
of Tanzania’s mangrove forests (Wagner et al., 2004). Figure 5.3 presents the Marine 
Park’s coastal border.  
One of the Park’s key objectives is to “enable local and Government stakeholders to 
promote sustainable resource use and biodiversity within the park” (Robinson et al., 2012). 
In 2004, eleven villages and three sub-villages were registered within the park11. The 
inclusion of the land and subsequent villages was to ensure that the local marine 
resource users were included within the management and planning process of the 
park, as required under Tanzanian law (Malleret, 2004).  
Formed under the Marine Parks and Reserves Act (1994), MBREMP is under the 
control of the Marine Reserves Park Unit (MRPU). MBREMP has four active working 
departments which are headed by the chief warden, supported by senior wardens in 
                                                      
11 MBREMP was originally established to be a zoned park, in practice to date no zones have been 
cordoned off as restricted use areas. In park fishers do however experience higher levels of monitoring 
and regulation of Tanzanian fishing laws. 
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each department. The departments include: administration, law enforcement, 
community conservation and research and monitoring (Robinson et al., 2012).  
Figure 5.3 Map of local area indicating study villages, Marine Park and hypothetical 
closure sites 
 
Marine park border shown outlined in thick yellow, hypothetical closures indicated by thinner white 
boxes. Taken and adapted from Google Earth (Version 6.0.1.2032) [Software}. Mtwara coastal view, TZ: 
Google Inc (2011). Available from: http://www.google.co.uk/intl/en_uk/earth/index.html 
 
MBREMP is effectively a multi-purpose marine park, and continues to allow fishing 
within its borders. Regulations within the park are essentially the same as those 
outside, albeit enforced more frequently. These include: prohibition of certain 
destructive gears such as beach seine nets and dynamite; mangrove cutting for 
commercial sale; and the use of nets with meshing smaller than 3”. Fishing within the 
park boundaries is restricted to artisanal fishers residing in those villages located 
within the park, however identifying fishers from within the park is difficult and 
proves hard to enforce (Robinson et al., 2012). 
Six park rangers enforce park regulations and responsibilities include: day-to-day 
patrolling activities including park boundaries and scuba to ensure compliance; 
regular checks of fishing gears; as well as assisting the prosecution process. Non-
compliant fishers risk confiscation of catch, fishing gears and boat (Robinson et al., 
2012). Not surprisingly, these rangers are spread thin and probabilities of being 
caught remains low. Consequently, coastlines within the park, like those outside, 
continue to suffer from growing human pressures. 
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In order to reduce extractive pressure within the Park, park managers are promoting 
the development of alternative and supplementation income-generating activities 
alongside enforcement (Robinson et al., 2012). To date MBREMP has implemented a 
variety of interventions to improve livelihoods and reduce reliance on inshore 
resources. MBREMP’s first initiative was a gear exchange in 2006. Villages were 
offered large mesh nets (5-6” mesh) in exchange for cheaper, illegal, small mesh nets. 
However, these nets proved inappropriate for traditional inshore fishing areas due to 
the lack of larger fish available; many fishers sold their new nets and reverted back to 
illegal alternatives. Subsequent gear exchanges took place in 2007 and 2008 with 
smaller 3” nets. However it still proved difficult to catch fish with these nets and little 
means of accessing deeper waters.   
Additionally, MBREMP have looked towards implementing supplementary 
livelihood and fishing technology programmes which have been supported by a 
number of NGOs including World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF). These have 
included beekeeping, fish farming and livestock projects as well as a number of net 
exchanges which offered boat and engines alongside larger nets (due to cash 
constraints, however, this option was offered to only a few fishing cooperatives). 
Unfortunately, overall significant benefits have only been realised by a relatively 
small group of villagers (Robinson et al., 2012).   
Outside of the marine park fishery enforcement falls under the mandate of the 
Fisheries Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Under 
decentralisation, the central Government’s role is to form policies and regulations 
which are implemented indirectly through the District/Municipal Councils. 
Supervisory roles go through the Regional Secretariat and the District 
Commissioner’s Office. The Organisational environment is described below in Figure 
5.4.  
There are a number of policies and legislation relevant to the management of coastal 
and marine areas. These are described in greater detail in Annex B2. However, most 
important for current comanagement and potential marine PES are the recent changes 
in legislation to Tanzania’s Fisheries Act (2003). These changes have seen the recent 
establishment of Beach Management Units (BMUs) at the fishing village level (Sobo, 
2012). This change in legislation essentially allows communities control and 
management over their local inshore fishing grounds through the development of 
BMU. A BMU is made up of a BMU Assembly and BMU Committee. All persons 
engaged in fishing activities at the beach level must register within a BMU Assembly 
in order to legally access the fishery. Furthermore, BMU Committees comprise 9-15 
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members who are elected by the aforementioned assembly (Tanzanian Fisheries 
Division, 2005). These units are community fisheries organisations with legally 
empowered roles and responsibilities over local fishery legislation. In particular a 
BMU is “able to set management rules locally and at lake wide level through by-laws and 
ordinance…. (and) allows control of access to fisheries resources by limiting number and types 
of fishing boats and gears in partnership with Government” (Tanzanian Fisheries Division, 
2005). Essentially BMUs are legally recognised comanagement instruments which 
devolve property rights over the coastal environment. The counterpart of BMUs 
within marine parks are Village Liaison Committees (VLCs). VLCs have fewer legal 
rights over resources as areas within marine parks are under the control of the 
MRPU. However, the MRPU’s mandate is to establish and ensure sustainable 
conservation of areas of outstanding marine ecological importance, and to manage 
them in partnership with the coastal communities (Silva, 2006).  
Figure 5.4 Organisation of Central and District Governments within the fishing 
community environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Shao et al., (2003).  
Continuous arrows indicate direct linkages; dotted arrows indicate indirect links with little 
implementation enforcement 
However, within the region few BMU and VLCs exist; many villages have no BMU 
and those documented VLCs are not fully functional (Harrison et al., 2010). In reality, 
local fishers have, in effect, minimal influence on legislation and regulations 
concerning fishing or natural resource management more generally. Relationships are 
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strained between enforcing entities and local users generally. Collective efforts at the 
village-level remain low due to low levels of trust between administrators, enforcers 
and the fishers themselves (Bunce et al., 2010; Shao et al., 2003).  
5.4.4 Village selection and characteristics  
Villages were selected to give a representative sample of the area. A marine PES 
scheme will require participation by all marine resource users so it was important to 
collect data across a variety of village types. Villages were selected from both within 
and outside of the Park boundaries and with varying levels of dependence upon 
marine extraction, although overall all villages are considered to be on the high-end 
of dependence on marine extraction regionally. 
Village selection was based on: the level of dependence on marine resources within 
the villages; high levels of extraction within proposed areas to be closed under the 
PES scheme; and ease of access12. Work by Samoilys (2010) and Yahya (2010)13 
identified areas of high biological significance to be closed under the proposed PES as 
well as those villages predisposed to access these areas. Six villages were chosen for 
sampling within Mtwara’s coastal districts: three within the marine park (Mngoji, 
Mkubiru and Msimbati) and three outside (Mikindani, Naumbu and Pemba). Village 
location is displayed in Figure 5.3.  
Table 5.3 presents village population counts and illustrates the variation in fisher 
numbers between the selected villages. Population sizes vary substantially from 912 
to over 11,000, however a great part of this variation is due to the presence of two 
larger villages within the study. Fisher representation within villages also differs 
widely; as little as 7.3% of Mikindani’s male population are fishers, in contrast to 
Mkubiru, Naumbu and Pemba where approximately all men fished. Similar patterns 
are seen within the female population, where again these three villages are seen to 
rely most heavily on the fisheries. It should also be noted that although the 
percentages do not look as large for Msimbati, this village actually contains the 
largest absolute male fisher population for any one village, and joint largest for 
women. These differences may in part be due to the relative isolation of Mkubiru, 
Msimbati, Naumbu and Pemba which are further away and with less developed 
connections to Mtwara town.  
                                                      
12 Some areas were impassible during the wet season and village access was not possible.  
13  Data was collected during the spring of 2010. Reports were based on reef surveys, primary 
socioeconomic data and secondary data. Data was collected from within the Park and from areas north 
of the Park up to Sudi Bay, approximately 40km north of Mtwara town (south of Mtwara is 
Mozambique). Selection of villages was based on identification of those with high use within proposed 
closed areas. Proposed areas were areas of high biodiversity based on in-water transects.   
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Fisher surveys were conducted with 662 fishers, of which 35 were incomplete and 
omitted from analyses. A final useable sample size of 627 was obtained. Mean 
demographics of the sampled fishers are displayed in Table 5.4. Data presented 
below originates from collected fisher questionnaires implemented within the 
sampled villages. Methods are discussed in relevant subsequent chapters.   
Average age of fishers was 35 and household size was 5.0, and comparable to the 
national average of 4.8 and 5.1 in rural areas.  
Table 5.3 Summary of village characteristics  
Village No. 
households 
Total 
population 
No of 
fishers 
(male) 
No of 
fishers 
(female) 
Fishers as 
% of total 
adult male 
pop 
Fishers as 
% of total 
adult 
female pop 
Within Park       
Mkubiru 360 1540 400 300 100.0 77.9 
Mngoji 570 1714 70 50 16.3 11.7 
Msimbati 1120 10140 1521 300 60.0 12.3 
Outside Park 
Mikindani 2777 11032 200 40 7.3 1.4 
Naumbu 612 1758 600 150 100.0 34.1 
Pemba N/A 912 228 78 100.0 34.2 
Source: Mtwara District Office (2010) 
Table 5.4 Mean demographic characteristics fishers sampled  
  In   Out  All In Out 
 Mkub Mngj Msim Mkdn Naum Pemb    
No.  162 81 106 47 124 107 627 363 264 
Male (%) 41.4 43.2 70.8 72.3 48.4 46.7 51.1 48.8 54.5 
Age 35.3 35.3 34.6 44.8 33.9 32.3 35.1 35.2 34.9 
HH_size 4.8 5.6 5.0 5.3 5.2 4.7 5.0 5.0 4.9 
Education (%)          
None 32.9 30.9 41.0 41.3 41.9 42.1 38.0 36.3 40.3 
Primary 63.4 67.9 57.1 58.7 53.2 57.0 59.5 61.2 57.0 
Secondary 2.5 0.0 1.9 0.0 4.0 0.9 1.9 1.7 2.2 
Other 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.4 
Where: In=villages located in park, Out=villages located outside of park; Mkub=Mkubiru, Mngi=Mngoji, 
Msim=Msimbati, Mkdn=Mikindani, Naum=Naumbu, Pemb=Pemba 
 
A number of fishing gears were sampled within the case site; the distribution is 
displayed in Table 5.5. The study aimed to survey men and women equally, as such 
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tandilo shows a higher percentage within the final sample than is representative of 
the area. Looking at male fishers independently a similar distribution of gear can be 
seen as found by Malleret (2004). Male gear use, as a % of male fishers sampled is 
displayed in Figure 5.5. The majority of male fishers used handlines or large nets, 
accounting for 65% of all male fishers interviewed.   
Table 5.5 Fisher numbers broken down by gear  
Gear type Number of fishers 
interviewed 
% of total 
sample 
% within      
Park 
% outside     
Park 
Legal      
Handline 116 18.5 21.2 14.8 
Large net (>3”) 91 14.5 11.0 19.3 
Juya 3 0.5 0.6 0.4 
Longline 1 0.2 0.3 0.0 
Stick/spear 32 5.1 2.8 8.3 
Trap 34 5.4 4.4 5.4 
Handnet 1 0.2 0.3 0.0 
Illegal     
Medium net (2-2.5”) 21 3.4 3.6 3.0 
Small net (1-1.5”) 17 2.7 3.6 1.5 
Beach Seine 1 0.2 0.0 0.2 
Dynamite 3 0.5 1.1 0.0 
Tandilo 306 48.9 51.2 45.5 
 
Figure 5.5  Gear use as % of male fishers surveyed 
 
Fifteen percent of fishers in the final sample earned 20,000 TSh or less a month from 
fishing (approximately US $13.8) and almost 8% earned on average only US$ 6.9 a 
month. The majority of fishers (61.1%) claimed to earn a monthly income between 
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20,000 and 40,000 TSh (US $13.8 – 27.6). These figures are consistent with previous 
socioeconomic studies in the area (Mallaret 2004) and national averages. National 
household fishing income figures are provided from comparison in Table 5.6.  
Table 5.6 Monthly Fishing income in coastal regions of Tanzania 
Monthly income from fishing              % of sample 
 Mtwara study site 
(individual earnings only) 
National figures  
(household) 
Less than 10,000 7.8 9.5 
10,001 – 20,000 8.3 10.3 
20,001 – 30,000 12.0 13.3 
30,001 – 40,000 30.2 35.0 
40,001 – 60,000 18.9 19.5 
60,001 – 100,000 9.8 10.0 
100,001 – 150,000 3.2 1.9 
150,001 – 300,000 2.8 0.3 
300,001 – 500,000 1.9 - 
Above 500,000 2.0 - 
Reluctant to divulge  3.2 0.3 
Total (number of reponses) 100 (540) 100 (369) 
(Adapted from Shao et al., 2003) 
5.4.5 Poverty status of fishing households along Mtwara’s coastline 
The definition of poverty has evolved beyond a focus on only low income and 
consumption and is now known to be much more complex (Allison and Horemans, 
2006). There are a number of varying definitions of poverty; poverty can mean 
different things to different people. Poverty is multi-dimensional and beyond merely 
having a low income. It includes facets such as: a lack of basic needs (e.g. access to 
food/shelter/health/sanitation); the lack of basic human rights; vulnerability and 
social exclusion; and feelings of powerlessness and humiliation. Fishing communities 
in low-income countries (as well as in those more developed) are often characterised 
by low levels of education, a lack of skills and physical assets, are highly exposed to 
accidents and illness, live in remote and isolated areas and are often without political 
voice (Allison and Horemans, 2006; Allison and Ellis, 2001; Townsley, 1998).  
The Tanzanian National Household Budget Survey (NBS 2007) states that Tanzanian 
households are more likely to be poor if they are: large; have a large number of 
dependents; have a head who is economically inactive and depend on the sale of food 
and cash crops or earn a living from natural products rather that being part of the 
formal sector. Poverty is also strongly related to education; households where the 
head has above-primary education are on average five times less likely to be ‘poor’ 
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than those where the head has received no education. The ownership of a number of 
key household products has also been strongly correlated with reduced rates of 
poverty, these include modern roofing, radios and telephones, as well as access to 
improved an water supply, modern or improved toilet facilities and electricity.  
As displayed in Table 5.7 education levels are low in the case study area, and 
consistent with regional estimates if a little lower than national figures. Overall, 38% 
of fishers surveyed had no education at all. NBS (2007) notes that nationally a quarter 
of the country’s adult population still has no education, and further reports only 10% 
have secondary education or above. Regionally secondary school enrolment in 
Mtwara is approximately 2.5% (Harrison et al., 2010). 
Table 5.7 presents further indicators from the sampled villages along side national 
averages. Average household size and percentage of population below 15 if fairly 
consistent with the national average.  
Table 5.7 Summary poverty profile for fishing households 
Indicator Total Within 
Park 
Outside 
Park 
National 
Average 
(rural areas) 
Average HH size 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.8 
Average % under 15s 45.3 43.4 48.0 43.9 
% HH head with any education 69.8 72.4 66.2 76.414 
% of HHs with modern/non-earth walls 16.3 2.5 35.4 90.4 (15.6) 
% of HHs with modern/non-thatch roof 11.9 9.8 14.6 55.5 (50.0) 
% HH owning radio 55.5 52.0 60.2 66.0 
% HH owning a cell phone 46.6 44.6 49.2 25.0 
% HH with electricity 1.6 2.5 0.1 12.5 (2.7) 
% HH with improved latrine 0.0 0.0 0.0 n/a 
National averages: NBS (2007)  
Key household materials appear lower than national averages. Only 16% of houses 
within the study site were made of ‘modern’ materials (e.g. materials more durable 
than earth), although this average is consistent with rural areas. Lack of modern 
roofing is more profound and lower even than rural averages. Differences are also 
seen for those villages found within the park and outside.  
Household income was approximated using data collected on average income from 
fishing as well as other household activities such as cash crops, small business and 
livestock. Subsistence smallholder production was included into household budget 
                                                      
14 Figure is for % adults overall with any level of education 
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using a multiplier of US $60 per hectare per annum for a mixture of selected root and 
cash crops15. Total household income was then adjusted as per number of household 
members. From these calculations it is estimated that approximately 42.7% of fishers 
within the surveyed areas are living below the basic needs poverty line. This 
percentage was higher for those communities living within the park (48.5%). More 
worrying still is that approximately 31.3% were found to be below the food poverty 
line, again with a higher incidence found within the park (37.2%). Results are shown 
in Table 5.8. This is much higher than the regional average of 17%. As can be seen 
from Figure 5.6 two thirds of households had earned the equivalent of 1,000 TSh or 
less per person per day, US $0.7. This percentage is again slightly higher for within 
park villages: 70.0% vs. 62.3%.  
Table 5.8 Percentage of fisher households under poverty lines 
 Total Within Park Outside Park 
Below basic needs poverty line 42.7 48.5 34.9 
Below food poverty line 31.3 37.2 23.3 
 
Table 5.9 Percentage of fisher households under poverty lines under a 25% error 
scenario 
 Total Within Park Outside Park 
-25% +25% -25% +25% -25% +25% 
Below basic needs poverty 
line 
51.5 34.2 56.1 40.8 56.6 25.3 
Below food poverty line 42.7 24.0 48.5 29.1 34.9 17.1 
 
Given the fluctuating nature of income within these rural communities, as well as the 
complexities in collecting accurate income data, two alternative scenarios were also 
modelled. Assuming possible deviations of 25% from the calculated household 
figures gives results as presented in Table 5.9. Under the worse case scenario, over 
50% of the fishers fall below the basic needs poverty line, and as much as 43% under 
the food poverty line. Even under the more optimistic scenario, 24% of fishers are still 
below the food poverty line, still much higher than the regional average.  
Figure 5.6 Proxy income data per person in fisher households per day 
                                                      
15 Value taken from Dobbin International, Spatial Development Planning Project: Perspectives on 
Regional Development. 2010. 
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Wealth ranking exercises were conducted with village-level focus groups which 
found similar patterns. In Mngoji, located within the marine park five wealth 
categories were defined: high income (5%); middle income & lower middle income 
(combined 25%); poor (50%); poorest (20%). In Naumbu, located outside of the park 
four wealth categories were identified: high income (1%); middle income (10%); poor 
(84%); poorest (5%). In both villages, the majority of fishers fell into the third wealth 
class or below: 52.6% in Mngoji, 90.1% in Naumbu. The poorest, bottom tier, 
members of the communities were comprised mainly of the elderly and disabled. 
5.5 Why PES? 
It is clear that the communities along Mtwara’s coastline are causing the degradation 
of the marine resources, resources which have huge ecological benefit to a wider 
group of stakeholders. However, it is also apparent that fishers have few alternative 
options which would allow them to reduce fishing effort in the region. Ineffective 
boats, nets and training limit access to more productive fishing grounds and marginal 
soils prevent decent agricultural productivity. Providing compensation to fishers for 
reducing fishing effort within critical inshore fishing grounds can protect and restore 
currently degraded systems. This marine PES programme can be seen as a temporary 
solution which will benefit fishers in the short and long-term (as productivity will 
increase) but also regenerate an area of high national and international importance. 
While it is not within the scope of this thesis to identify buyers, the sustainable use of 
Mtwara’s marine resources and elimination of destructive fishing practices has the 
potential to benefit a number of parties. Within Mtwara’s coastal waters destructive 
fishing and is the main cause of coral damage. Healthy coral reefs are important for 
not only sustaining local fisheries but also provide refugia for juveniles of pelagic 
species and are important in shoreline protection. The convergence of a number of 
currents in Mtwara’s waters and its importance as an area for the dispersal of number 
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species further corroborates the broader regional value of this space. In addition a 
small but expanding tourism market is growing in and around the park boundaries 
and Tanzania is considered a worldwide tourism destination. If dive tourism is to 
grow in the area, the tourism values of the reefs, such as biodiversity and landscape 
beauty, will need preserving and protecting. It is also feasible that a market for ‘blue 
carbon’ exists in and around Mtwara. The park alone houses 10% of Tanzania’s entire 
mangrove forests and contains rich areas of seagrass. Fishing practices are also 
known to cause trampling to local seagrass areas and mangrove clearing is a common 
problem (although not directly targeted within this proposed marine PES).  
Tanzania has past experience with PES and PES-like instruments. Recently, Tanzania 
begun the piloting of terrestrial PES and has been selected as a pilot country under 
the UN-REDD pilot programme and the bilateral Norwegian government support for 
REDD reddiness work (Fisher, 2012; Fisher et al., 2012). As a result the Tanzanian 
government has been involved in a number of activities to prepare for REDD 
including capacity building and developing a national framework for these PES 
schemes (Fisher et al., 2012). Care International (CARE) and WWF Tanzania has also 
been implementing an Equitable Payments for Watershed Services (EPWS) project. 
Commencing in 2005, the EPWS programme in the Kibungo sub-catchment of the 
southern eastern Uluguru Mountains is now piloting a water PES which engages four 
upstream communities and two downstream buyers (Lopa et al., 2012). The success of 
this scheme however has not yet been fully analysed.  
In addition, Tanzania has a well-developed history with Conditional Cash Transfers 
(CCTs). CCTs have a great deal in common with PES schemes and through their 
implementation have developed much of the institutional capacity needed for PES 
schemes more generally. CCTs are social ‘security net’ programmes which transfer 
cash to poor households on the condition that these households modify behaviour in 
some specified ways as to improve livelihoods. CCT programmes which impose a 
conditionality such as school attendance or implementation of specific health 
practices have been shown to be exceptionally effective in enhancing human capital 
within poorer societal circles (De Janvry et al., 2006).  
In Tanzania, household-level conditional cash transfer programmes have been 
implemented under a community-based approach. Funded by the Japanese Social 
Development Fund, the Tanzania Community-Based Conditional Cash Transfer 
programme (CB-CCT) has been realised under the umbrella of the World Bank and 
Tanzanian Government’s joint initiative: the Tanzanian Social Action Fund (TASAF) 
(Evans, 2008; Redko, 2013). Rolled out in 2010, the CB-CCT programme was designed 
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to enable poor and vulnerable communities fight poverty and promote economic 
growth as well as to prevent these groups falling further into poverty in the event of 
new shocks. Under the programme, 5000 households in 40 villages located across 
three Tanzanian districts were targeted (Kibaha, Bagamoyo and Chamwino). 
Conditions included primary school enrolment and 80% attendance for children aged 
7-15 and regular check ups for children younger than seven (three times a year) and 
elderly (once a year). Participating families benefited US$ 3 a month per child and 
US$ 6 a month per elderly; a maximum of US$ 18 per month was set for each 
household. The community-based management of the fund had three levels: central; 
district; and community. The overall management and monitoring and support to 
subnational authorities was conducted at the Central Government level. 
Responsibility for the technical support, training and follow-up of implementation at 
the village level was held at the District level (Figure 5.4). However, selection of 
beneficiaries, day-to-day implementation, registration and verification of compliance 
as well as release of direct payments all took place at the community level (Evans et 
al., 2012). Recent results suggest the programme has had significant positive results 
including a reduction in sick days for treatment households and as well as an uptake 
of health insurance. Girls were also seen to be significantly more likely to complete 
primary school: 23 percentage points more likely than comparison group 
counterparts (Evans et al., 2012; Tanzania Social Action Fund, n.d.). In Tanzanian 
communities such CCTs have also proved effective in changing behaviour and 
promoting less harmful activities such as incentivising safe sex (de Walque et al., 
2012).  
Despite recent legislative changes in Tanzania which facilitate community co-
management of CPRs, Mtwara’s marine resources continue to effectively be accessed 
and managed as open-access. There are a number of reasons why collective action has 
not been successful (as described in Table 5.10). At present the conditions required for 
CPR management are not met within the coastal region of Mtwara and a number of 
changes must be realised before effective management will exist. Securing these 
changes will be vital for the successful functioning of PES scheme. These are laid out 
in Table 5.10  
A marine PES programme can finance and incentive co-management of these CPRs. 
A PES can offer financing and promote institutional capacity for management, as well 
as provide appropriate incentives – enable communities some leeway to reduce 
extraction where needed in the first instance.  
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While all of the criteria laid out in Table 5.10 can be met, it is worth nothing that 
rebuilding trust and capacity will require dedicated time and effort by all parties. 
And, while previous lessons in CPR management do not necessarily preclude large 
areas from being successfully managed, the larger-scale and more abstract nature of 
the marine resource means that a good understanding of the resource and resource-
users will be critical for PES design (Fisher et al., 2010; Ostrom, 1990) 
5.6 The hypothetical marine PES programme 
Two schemes were presented to the fishers. The first was a proposed PES scheme 
within the area which offered community fishers conditional cash payments as 
compensation for the closing of certain zoned fishing grounds and the 
discontinuation of all illegal fishing.  
The scenario was presented as follows: 
“CARE International, alongside WWF, as previously mentioned are interested in 
improving the marine environment in the area, as well as supporting the local 
livelihoods, particularly of the fishers who rely on these resources. In order to do so 
CARE International is considering a conditional cash transfer programme. A 
conditional cash transfer programme would mean that community fishers would be 
asked to not fish in those specific zoned areas as shown in the map as well as stop the 
use of all illegal fishing gear in all areas, but also compensated for their loss of 
earnings from these changes. 
Enumerators: Again show the respondent the map, identifying all the areas where 
fishing would not be permitted, also explain the scenario as described below.  
The scheme would originally run for 4 to 5 years. The payments would be 
conditional upon all fishers within this community, NOT fishing in these designated 
areas or using illegal gear. The payments would be made on a monthly basis, and all 
payments would be cancelled if fishing continued within the designated areas and 
illegal gears continued to be used. During this time additional investment will be 
made into the development of alternative occupations which will increase the 
availabilities of alternative activities in the area. Monitoring would be a combined 
effort between local communities, who would all lose out if the rules were broken and 
the Marine Park authority inside park/BMUs officials outside park. In this time it is 
expected that fish stocks will have suitable recovered and fishing profits increased, as 
well as management practices improved allowing the long-term sustainability and 
profitability of the fishing.   
For example far away in the Pacific Ocean, closing areas to fishing has increased 
local fishers catch, both in size and amount. The improvements took a few years to be 
seen, as fish within these areas require time to mature and grow, however after this 
they often leave the protected area. This is why CARE International is looking to 
support the programme with conditional payments over the time it is required for the 
stocks to recover. However, now these small fishing communities in the Pacific 
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which have seen larger catches, more fish and higher income than neighbouring 
communities without such protected areas.” 
The scenario was presented as a joint intervention to be carried out via the 
International NGO CARE and WWF. The scenario was presented this way as at the 
time of the surveys CARE and WWF were in the process of conducting a feasibility 
study into such a marine PES and therefore would have been the likely facilitators if 
such a marine PES were to go ahead.   
The core areas were chosen as these had been previously identified via in-water 
surveys as areas of high biodiversity and ecological significance, for example areas of 
high replenishment value. The hypothetical closures in question are displayed in 
Figure 5.3.  The core zones to be closed were selected for the hypothetical scenario 
based upon the likelihood of which zones would likely be closed if the proposed 
marine PES were to go ahead. The core zones selected within the marine park were 
based on previous work by IUCN within the area. Zones were mapped through a 
participatory zoning workshop based on scientific data and representation of key 
ecological sites as well as input from communities (IUCN 2005). Outside of the park, 
core zones were selected for their similarity to core zones within the park, based on 
ecology and use from communities (Yahya 2010). The core zones to be closed 
represent a number of ecological sites including fringe reefs and intertidal zones. The 
zones within the park and outside of the park are for the most part used by the 
surrounding villages equally, segregated for the large part by those villages within 
the park utilising core zones within the park and those outside of the park utilising 
those located outside of park boundaries. This said a little overlap has been recorded 
but is more common for those villages outside of the park but closer to park 
boundaries. The most common differentiation would be the use of intertidal areas, 
which is most commonly used by women tandilo fishing. This said, women are 
known to also visit the fringing reefs at low tide, accessing such areas via boat.  
In addition, the scenario calls for all illegal fishing to cease. The majority of illegal 
gears in use are netting with mesh sizes below the legal minimum of 3”. The smaller 
meshed nets are responsible for catching of undersized fish and/or juvenile species. 
In addition tandilo and beach seining are responsible for the destruction of coral, 
mangrove and sea grass areas. 
The proposed marine PES is also likely to deliver a various types and levels of 
environmental services per fisher depending on the fisher’s own methods. Yet as 
previously discussed if all fishers are not considered within the marine PES, it is 
possible that non-participating fishers will absorb any gains made. Moreover, the 
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hypothetical PES has an element of poverty reduction within its design; that is the 
targeting of poor coastal communities to provide marine environmental services. As 
such, within this proposed marine PES all fishers are targeted due to: the mobile 
nature of the resources; a history of elite capture in the area; as well as to inspire 
compliance and reduce perverse incentives. The hypothetical PES also has an element 
of poverty reduction within its design; that is the targeting of poor coastal 
communities to provide marine environmental services. More targeted PES schemes 
are indeed possible but are not investigated here as this trade-off between efficacy 
and poverty alleviation are considered likely for most marine PES.   
The payments were described be conditional upon all fishers within this community, 
not fishing in these designated areas or using illegal gear. The payments would be 
made on a monthly basis, and all payments would be cancelled if fishing continued 
within the designated areas and illegal gears continued to be used. During this time 
additional investment will be made into the development of alternative occupations 
which will increase the availabilities of alternative activities in the area. The 
presentation of payments being conditional on all fisher compliance was considered 
appropriate given the discussion in Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis. Under such fluid 
marine resources, all (or at least a high proportion of) fishers will need to comply in 
order to deliver the necessary environmental services. Moreover, it is likely that a 
reduction in the number of fishers – in the longer term – will also be required hence 
an investment by CARE into the development of additional occupations in the area.  
Payments would be made to the individual but through some village association such 
as the BMU or VLC. This was seen as the most reasonable distribution mechanism 
given the large possible number of fishers and the role that these BMU and/or VLC 
would have in monitoring and enforcement. Given the current legislation in place, as 
discussed in Section 5.4.3 closures and exclusion of others can be put in place through 
these BMUs and Marine Park Authority (in collaboration with the VLCs within the 
park). Enforcement within this scenario only speaks to the removal of payments and 
cessation of PES scheme and does not include sanctions such as confiscation of gear 
and/or boats.  
The scheme was designed to originally run for 4 to 5 years as this was considered a 
reasonable timeframe to enable sufficient recovery of the marine resources and 
implementation of long-term sustainable practices and the expected time in which 
fishers would be able to recover sufficient earnings to no longer require a cover 
payment for loss of earnings. As described in Chapter 3 of this thesis marine PES can 
be used as a transitory instrument to enable the immediate losses of fishers when 
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restrictions to improve marine environmental services require short-term losses to 
said fishermen. However, these can also run along sustainable management plans 
which can protect the marine environmental services and provide sufficient catch 
once fisheries have recovered to a sustainable level.  
It is anticipated that males and females could respond differently to the proposed 
marine PES. For example, at first glance the marine PES scenario presents very 
different outcomes for male and female fishers. For example, marine PES will call for 
a complete ban on tandilo fishing for women. However, tandilo represents only one 
type of fishing in which women are involved, women also commonly practice 
gleaning and octopus fishing which under the proposed marine PES scheme will still 
be viable. Moreover, the implications for within the male fisher group shows a similar 
pattern, for example some men will be required to stop fishing all together using their 
current practice, and although they can still fish using legal methods, transferring 
across to these fisheries is not generally as easy as one might imagine and barriers 
exist. Alternative activities to be invested to might include fish farming, livestock 
rearing and small business development, activities which have been previously tested 
within the area and represent good gender balances. Moreover, fishers expect to 
receive compensation for their own individual opportunity costs under this scenario. 
For this reason the scenarios presented to the male and female fishers are not as 
dissimilar as one might originally think. 
The second distinct CE analysis – and the basis for the results presented within 
Chapter 7 of this thesis – presented a much less prescribed scenario. The notion 
behind this chapter was to determine those attribute of PES design which would 
influence participation and so variations across the number of restrictions within a 
marine PES scheme were presented. More information the various scenarios 
presented are available within the relevant chapter, Chapter 7.  
5.7 Collaborators 
This PhD was in part conducted in collaboration with CARE and WWF Tanzania. 
CARE is an international aid organisation focusing on tackling the underlying causes 
of poverty and targeting vulnerable groups with a particular emphasis on women. 
CARE acknowledges the need to address environmental problems in order to 
improve the lives of the rural poor. In 2011 the organisation worked in 84 countries, 
supported over 1000 poverty related programmes reaching more than 122 million.  
CARE is a confederation composed of twelve national Members, each an autonomous 
non-governmental organisation in its own right.  CARE Secretariat which is based in 
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Geneva, Switzerland coordinates and supports the work of the CARE national 
Members and Country Offices worldwide16. Work was conducted alongside staff 
based in the East African Regional Management Unit.  
WWF is one of the world’s leading international non-governmental conservation 
organisations. WWF focuses on issues relating to the conservation, research and the 
restoration of the environment. WWF works in 100 countries and supports over 1,300 
conservation and environmental projects globally17. WWF has an local office base in 
Mtwara.  
In 2010, CARE, in collaboration with WWF, commissioned a study to investigate the 
possibility of introducing a marine PES scheme to reduce community dependence on 
and exploitation of coastal fisheries along the coast in the Mtwara Region, both inside 
and outside of the marine park boundaries.  
Financial assistance was provided by CARE. Logistical support was provided by 
WWF Mtwara.  
Additional data collected alongside the results presented within this thesis were used 
to write a feasibility report for marine PES in the region. Results of the report were 
presented to CARE, WWF, Tanzanian fisheries officers and Marine Park officials at a 
National workshop in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. A final report was submitted to the 
East African Regional Management Unit, CARE.  
                                                      
16 For more information on CARE please see: http://www.care-international.org 
17 For more information on WWF please see: http://worldwildlife.org 
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Table 5.10  Ostrom’s design principles1 for successful CPR management and level conditions satisfied within Mtwara region 
Ostrom Condition Condition 
currently 
satisfied 
Possible 
resolution 
Steps required to establish necessary condition in Mtwara area 
1. Clearly defined boundaries (effective 
exclusion of external unentitled parties). 
No Yes Under present regime resources are effectively open access to local and nearby communities both inside 
and out of park boundaries, fishing by more distant migrant fishers also occurs.  
Within MBREMP the Marine Park authority can exclude fishers from specific areas, and enforce closures 
and community access rights. In fact the mandate states that non-park villages are not permitted to fish 
within park boundaries. This will require joint monitoring and improved relations between communities 
and park authorities. Requires conflict resolution, support and communication between communities and 
Park.  
Under current Tanzanian laws, BMUs have right to define community areas and enforce restrictions to 
outsiders (as well as community members). Exclusion therefore possible with capacity building. Outside 
of the Park a greater sense of ownership over neighbouring reefs is required. Communities have rights to 
exclude users under the BMU. At present no laws are in place to allow expulsion of non-village fishers 
and there is no BMU in place. Will require legal recognition of tenure under BMU legislation however to 
date no BMU is in place and management is realised or practiced. 
2. Rules regarding the appropriation and 
provision of common resources are 
adapted to local conditions. 
No Yes Within initial park proposal community consultations took place in order to define no-go areas as well as 
potential park programmes including benefits to be delivered at local level. Park has not delivered on its 
promises, at least not to the scale expected and additional restrictions have compromised ability of fishers 
to continue fishing as the once did. This has led to increased conflict and low levels of trust within the 
park and increased suspicion of governing bodies outside. Outside of the park no BMU agreements have 
been established with the District Fisheries Office.  
New programmes should be co-designed and co-management. BMUs and VCLs can enable consultations 
and joint-decision making between village representative and government officials. Co-design is possible 
but will require time and effort to rebuild previous relationships.  
 
 
                                                      
1 Ostrom, Elinor (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.  
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Ostrom Condition Condition 
currently 
satisfied 
Possible 
resolution 
Steps required to establish necessary condition in Mtwara area 
3. Collective-choice arrangements allow 
most resource appropriators to 
participate in the decision-making 
process. 
No Yes Within the MBREMP communities VLCs mediate between Marine Park and communities. Villages outside 
of the park rely on BMUs to communicate with the Fisheries Division. Within the park VLCs have broken 
down and many members of the communities are unaware of their members or exist. Outside of the park 
the premise of BMUs are known about but few exist furthermore conflict due to confiscation of gear 
exacerbate relations between fishers and fisheries officials. Reestablishment of trust and conflict resolution 
is required. 
WWF is working with fishers within the park to create fishers forums and give them a stronger voice in 
decision-making. Resolutions possible are with capacity building. Further capacity building needed to 
better involve fishers and women in decision-making process 
4. Effective monitoring by monitors who 
are part of or accountable to the 
appropriators. 
No Yes Resources are limited and community involvement and compliance low. Within legislation BMUs are 
mandated with assisting the Fisheries division with data collection and monitoring. However as 
previously mentioned few effective BMUs exist. 
Reestablishment of VLCs within parks and BMUs outside as well as greater involvement of individual 
fishers in monitoring required. Creation of fisher forums inside and outside of park.  
5. There is a scale of graduated sanctions 
for resource appropriators who violate 
community rules. 
No/Some Yes Within MBREMP no community rules exist regarding marine resource use. Communities express wish for 
greater enforcement on illegal fishers but unable to act. Outside of park graded sanctions on illegal fishing 
exist, where third offence results in confiscation of gear. Actual practice of this debatable.  
Capacity building and conflict resolution are required. Strengthening of fishers’ position to monitor and 
report (anonymously or not), as well as enforce gear restrictions is required. Again conflict resolution and 
communication strategies between Marine Park and communities required. 
6. Mechanisms of conflict resolution are 
cheap and of easy access. 
 
Unknown Yes At present no conflict mechanisms are in place. Fishers report conflicts mainly with illegal fishers and 
other village members but are unable to resolve. Again strengthening of relations between villagers and 
enforcement officers as well as improving communications between villages is required. Fisher forums, 
which outreach to other villages is recommended.  
Capacity building and community acceptance will reduce costs. 
7. The self-determination of the 
community is recognised by higher-
level authorities. 
No Yes Limited communication exists. Communication structures between village level entities and government 
departments is practically non-existent.  
Again communication mechanisms and conflict resolution required.  
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Ostrom Condition Condition 
currently 
satisfied 
Possible 
resolution 
Steps required to establish necessary condition in Mtwara area 
8. In the case of larger common-pool 
resources: organization in the form of 
multiple layers of nested enterprises, 
with small local CPRs at the base level. 
Some Yes At base level fishing cooperatives currently exist both within and outside of MBREMP. Fisher forums run 
one level higher. However, connection of these with higher authorities is low. Capacity building required.  
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Chapter 6 
Determinants of fishers’ willingness to adopt a marine 
Payments for Environmental Service scheme 
6.1 Overview 
We analyse the role of social capital in the willingness to adopt marine PES broken 
down by gender. We find that the various attributes of social capital influence the 
sexes’ willingness to participate differently. More specifically, women showed a more 
profound reluctance to upset pre-existing social networks. The variable ‘presence 
within a reciprocal fishing dependency network’ was again seen to be significant 
negative determinant for women. The only social capital variable which was seen to 
significantly influenced men was trust; men with more pronounced trust overall were 
more likely to participate in the proposed marine PES.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 provides a brief introduction to the topic. 
Section 6.3 presents an overview of fisher characteristics, poverty and the implications 
of these for marine PES schemes. Included is a discussion on the current treatment of 
women within fishery policy development and resource conservation interventions. 
Section 6.4 introduces the case study and Section 6.5 the methods. Descriptive results 
are displayed in Section 6.6. Section 6.7 lays out the econometric strategy and findings 
are presented in Section 6.8. Section 6.9 provides a discussion of the results and final 
conclusions are drawn in Section 6.10.  
6.2 Introduction 
The fisheries and aquaculture sector is estimated to provide direct employment and 
revenue to as many as 200 million people globally (FAO, 2012). In the developing 
world, small scale artisanal fisheries are important sources of employment, financial 
revenue for many, including some of the poorest and most vulnerable sectors of 
society (Béné, 2009; Johnson et al., 2013; Olale et al., 2010; Walmsey et al., 2006). Yet 
these small-scale fisheries are one of the major activities affecting coastal ecosystem 
health. Intense poverty and a lack of viable alternatives drive ever-increasing pressure 
on the artisanal fishing sector, which, unfortunately show few signs of abating.  
Growing coastal populations, intense poverty, tenacious overfishing and the increased 
use of destructive fishing practices degrade coastal ecosystems and weaken their 
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capacity to provide beneficial environmental services both now and in the future both 
to these fishers and others (Berkes et al., 2001; Defeo and Castilla, 2005; Halpern et al., 
2012). Small-scale fisheries are a key factor affecting coastal and coral reef health and 
most unregulated coastal artisanal fisheries are now considered overfished or 
collapsed (Defeo and Castilla, 2005; Hawkins and Roberts, 2004). 
In as little as two decades, due to increasing recruitment and the widespread adoption 
of motorisation, small-scale fisheries have grown significantly, exerting increasing 
pressure on a finite resource base and the ecosystem. This has not, however, led to 
labour displacement; quite the contrary, these technical developments appear to have 
increased fishing days, and promoted greater employment within the sector (Mathew, 
2001). Since 1970 it is estimated that the sector has witnessed a doubling in the number 
of fishers (FAO, 2005). Between 2005 and 2010, employment within the fisheries sector 
continued to grow at a rate faster than traditional agriculture and indeed that of the 
world’s population, 2.1% annually vs. 0.5% and 1.2% respectively (FAO, 2012). This 
overfishing has resulted in a growing use of destructive fishing, the removal of large 
ecologically important species and the consecutive targeting of smaller species, and 
ultimately affects the resilience and services of this important ecosystem (Edinger et al., 
1998; Pauly et al., 2002; Pikitch et al., 2004). 
Unfortunately, the economic values provided by many of these environmental assets 
and services are not captured by these artisanal fishers; consequently these individuals 
lack many of the incentives to sustainably manage these marine environments for their 
production (Engel et al., 2008; Nelson et al., 2010). In order, to correct this market 
failure, recent conservation initiatives have looked towards new instruments: market-
based instruments. These tools require that those benefiting from the environmental 
services compensate those who provide them, and are thus hailed with the ability to 
address those market failures which result in the under provision of vital 
environmental services (Engel et al., 2008; Wunder, 2005). And as a result, these 
initiatives continue to attract growing attention in policy, non profit, private and 
financial arenas (Engel et al., 2008; Mandel et al., 2009). 
It is highly probable given the collective action nature of marine resources that marine 
PES schemes will rely on contracts made with ‘fishing communities’, whether that be 
fishing fleets, a specific fishery, or an artisanal community. Under democratic rules, 
participation will rely on the support of a majority of fishers. The premise that PES 
schemes are voluntary implies that potential actors will simply refuse to participate, or 
withdraw, if benefits are insufficient (Pagiola et al., 2008; Wunder and Albán, 2008). 
However, this decision to adopt a marine PES scheme will in fact be influenced by 
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several considerations, and not merely by the financial rewards offered (Allison and 
Ellis, 2001; Sesabo and Tol, 2005). 
In order for PES programmes to benefit the coastal and marine environment in 
question, these fishing communities, and the fishers within them to which we refer, 
must not only be eligible and able to participate – whereby they possess all the 
requirements which enable them to enrol – they must also be willing to participate 
(Pagiola et al., 2005; Tschakert, 2007). Moreover, marine PES, while voluntary at a 
community level, may be obligatory at an individual level; therefore there will be a 
subsection of non-willing participants who will ultimately face a welfare loss.  
In order to design more successful development-conservation programmes, there is a 
need to better understand the factors motivating adoption behaviour; chiefly how 
these relate to the decision to adopt new livelihood schemes, such as marine PES and 
PES more generally, as well as identifying those who consider participation a welfare 
loss. However to date, few attempts have been made to understand the key attributes 
which drive participation within PES (Kosoy et al., 2008), and none within the marine 
context.  
This chapter investigates the association between fisher attributes, including 
perceptions of risk and vulnerability (e.g. income diversification and social capital), 
and stated willingness to participate in a hypothetical marine PES scheme, based in a 
low-income coastal community in southern Tanzania. The marine PES scheme is 
presented as a voluntary scheme whereby payments are contingent on compliance by 
all fishers currently extracting the resource. As such, the hypothetical scheme further 
presents some interesting insights for marine PES in promoting collective action as 
well constraints at the individual level. The paper serves to highlight the importance of 
non-monetary attributes that may play a role in the decision to adopt any novel PES 
scheme, and which without a proper understanding of PES schemes, marine or not, 
run the risk of further marginalising vulnerable and key target groups.  
The paper is set out as follows. In the following section, 6.3, we provide further detail 
on the key characteristics of adoption as discussed in Chapter 5, including gender roles 
and household coping mechanisms as they relate more specifically to fishing 
communities. Section 6.4 presents the case study and Section 6.5, the survey design and 
implementation. Descriptive results are displayed in Section 6.6. Section 6.7 sets out the 
econometric strategy and Section 6.8 the subsequent findings. A discussion of these 
results follows in Section 6.9 and conclusions are presented in Section 6.10.  
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6.3 Fisher characteristics, poverty and implications for marine PES 
6.3.1 Previous determinants of conservation success in fishing communities 
Over the years much has been reported within the marine resource management 
literature relating to success of marine policy interactions and the promotion of 
support for these tools, i.e. with respect to MPAs. Socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics of fishers have been shown to be important determinants in the 
acceptance and positive perception of marine resource management (Baticados 2004; 
Cinner & Pollnac 2004; McClanahan et al. 2009; Pomeroy et al. 2005; Sesabo et al. 2006). 
More positive views on restrictions have frequently been associated with age, 
expenditure and education, as well as more complex factors such as past experiences, 
existing values, attitudes and social norms (Aldon et al. 2011; Gelcich et al. 2005; 
McClanahan et al. 2009).  
With respect to marine PES adoption, the literature remains silent. This being said, 
Chapter 4 identifies those characteristics important in adoption decisions more 
generally as well as, where possible, how it relates to fisher participation and exit 
decisions within marine management plans. In addition to the more general 
determinants examined in Chapter 4, there are a number of additional key features 
associated with fishers and their communities which may be important in the design 
any marine PES, and may have serious inferences in a fisher’s decision to adoption. 
These are highlighted below.   
6.3.2 Mechanisms to cope with insecure supply and high variability in catch 
Small scale artisanal fisheries are defined by high levels of variability, some predictable 
and seasonal, others not. Few land-based occupations risk the loss of all productive 
capital, as well as participants’ lives, every time they go to work (Béné et al., 2010). In 
general, these groups experience high exposure to natural, physical, health-related, 
climate induced and economic shocks and disasters (Mills et al. 2011; Béné 2009). 
Moreover, mobile prey and weather conditions result in high day-to-day variation of 
scheduling, catch and income (Pollnac, 1991), and fishers frequently experience 
economic reversals (FAO, 2001).  
In response to these uncertainties of supply, fishing communities have developed 
numerous adaptations to smooth consumption and manage risk. Livelihood strategies 
such as income diversification and embedding oneself within social institutions based 
on trust, reciprocity and agreed norms play an important role in traditional artisanal 
fishing communities (Coate and Ravallion, 1993; McGoodwin, 2001). Fishing 
households often diversify into other economic sectors in order to spread risk and 
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improve one’s ability to withstand shocks and resource variability (Allison and Ellis, 
2001). Collaboration has been embedded in numerous forms of local associations and 
groups which allow actors to learn and diversify into new areas with greater security 
(Pretty, 2008). Collective care mechanisms have emerged which anticipate and 
minimise risks, such as kin, neighbourhood and community income redistribution 
mechanisms (Kurien and Paul, 2001; McGoodwin, 2001). In addition; fish buyers, 
familiar with the environmental constraints, provide loans with flexible repayment 
rates (Pollnac, 1991), and similarly, shopkeepers may extend credit in times of low 
catch.  
The implications of these risk-mitigating strategies are examined further in Section 
4.3.3 of this thesis.   
6.3.3 Gender disparity in fisheries 
Another attribute important in fishing communities, but largely overlooked, is gender. 
Gender is defined as ‘socially determined ideas and practices of what it is to be female 
of male’ (Baden and Reeves, 2000). Within fishing communities larger gender 
disparities exist (Bennett, 2005). Differences are seen in fishing strategies, motives and 
capabilities, as well as the ability of women to participate and benefit from new fishery 
development interventions (Allison and Ellis, 2001; De Silva, 2011; The World Bank et 
al., 2009). In reality, policy changes promoting commercialisation have further 
displaced women from established fishery roles (Porter and Mbezi, 2010).  
For a long time the fishery sector has been perceived as a ‘male only’ domain and 
continues to be seen as so (Sze Choo et al., 2008). However, as can be seen this is a 
gross simplification of a very complex environment.  
Underrepresented and largely ignored within the fisheries literature, women comprise 
approximately half of the fisheries and aquaculture workforce (FAO and World Fish 
Center, 2008; Johnson et al., 2013). The Big Numbers Project19 revealed that for nine 
explored case study countries, 47% of the entire sector’s labour force was women; this 
figure was as high as 73% and 72% in Nigeria and India respectively. More commonly 
than not, these women are amongst the poorest and most vulnerable; on the whole it is 
men who traditionally dominate the more lucrative and/or industrial fishery sectors20 
(Porter and Mbezi, 2010). Overall, women form a disproportionally large group among 
                                                      
19The Big Numbers Project was a joint activity of FAO, World Bank and WorldFish Center which aimed to 
provide disaggregated information on small and large-scale fisheries both at the global and country level 
(FAO&World Fish Center, 2008).  
20 Men more commonly fish with boats, particularly larger crew-manned industrial boats and are able to 
access the larger fish out at sea 
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the poor and vulnerable (Harrison, 2000). As much as 70% of the world’s poor and 65% 
of the world’s illiterate are female (IFAD, 2001; ILA, 1996; UNDP, 1995), and the vast 
majority of these women live in rural areas (UNDP, 2006).  
FAO (2012) estimates that, overall, women account for at least 15% of the sector’s 
primary workforce. Much of the fishing done by women within developing countries 
is for household subsistence needs and does not contribute to production figures. As 
such, the role women play within the fisheries remains largely invisible. For example, 
in many coastal countries women’s near-shore and intertidal gleaning contributions go 
unnoticed and unreported in fishery statistics and policy documents (FAO and World 
Fish Center, 2008; Weeratunge et al., 2010). In fact, it is estimated that catch extracted 
by females account for approximately one-quarter of the total seafood harvested 
globally (Aguilar and Castaneda, 2001).  
Women’s contributions to artisanal fisheries, as well as the goods and income derived 
from these, affect not only the livelihoods of these women but also their households 
and wider communities. The gleaning of shellfish, urchins and clams from intertidal 
areas by women can represent the only sources of protein for vulnerable household 
members, including women and children; larger fish caught by the males are often sold 
on for cash income (Porter and Mbezi, 2010; Walmsey et al., 2006; Weeratunge et al., 
2010). Evidence also suggests that in many fishing communities, it is the income from 
the women’s activities which provide the bulk of a household’s upkeep. In many 
fishing societies, male and female budgets are kept separate and a fisherman’s income 
is his to spend (Bennett, 2005). In fact, women’s income has been shown to have 
independent effects upon children’s education, health and nutrition from that of men’s. 
Moreover, the marginal effect of female income on child nutrition is a staggering four 
to eight times as high as that attributed to male income (Edmund, 2008). Nathan and 
Apu (1998) go as far as to report husbands reducing their contribution to household 
expenditures once they noted their wives and other female household members 
earning further income from new activities. Porter and Mbezi (2010) found that in two 
fishing communities along the Tanzanian coast the vast majority of fishing households 
were effectively female-headed households, dependent almost entirely on the wife’s 
own subsistence activities, including fishing.  
Lacking a voice within management decisions, women can further be displaced from 
established fishery roles if these fisheries become more commercialised and lucrative 
over time. For example, on Songo Songo Island, Tanzania, women have collected 
octopus from the intertidal areas for many years. However, as the price of octopus 
increased alongside an increasing scarcity in stock, men began to invade the fishery; 
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using boats to access deeper water, men now have the advantage, further depleting 
stock as well as preventing the stock from entering the shallower areas accessed by 
women (Porter and Mbezi, 2010). In general, fisheries are managed as open access or 
CPR. Successful management of CPR is based within local institutions and long-
standing local rules and social norms (Ostrom, 1990). However, new patterns of 
income generation within these community property regimes (e.g. improved markets 
and/or efficiency of extraction) can frequently redefine the rules of resource access and 
control. This can result in new patterns of benefit distribution within both households 
and communities. In particular, the privatisation of previously communal areas 
through government and conservation policies can directly impact the livelihoods of 
women, placing previously accessible land into private ownership (Carney, 1993). 
Rural women rarely have legal or – in the case of many coastal areas – defacto control 
over natural resources; it is reported that women own less than 2% of titled land. As a 
result, women are often pushed further into the margins (OECD, 2001).  
Social and cultural norms, educational opportunities and household commitments 
mean that women and men respond differently to development opportunities 
(Pandolfelli et al., 2008). Not only are women often ignored in fishery policy 
interventions, but what is worse, developments themselves can widen inequities and 
deprive women the established roles that once existed and were provided for them. 
Understanding these differences is paramount in moving towards fair representation 
of women within fisheries development policies and empowering women within 
coastal communities. Determining those factors which enable and promote female 
participation within novel policy tools, such as market-generating interventions which 
enviably any PES schemes will be, is paramount.  
There are a number of prominent reasons why gender should be explored further 
within marine resource management and conservation initiatives, including marine 
PES schemes. These include: 1) women make up a large proportion of marine resource 
users; 2) possible omission and further marginalisation of poor community members 
with little voice; 3) omission and further marginalisation of chief child-carer and 
household provider and 4) exclusion of those members who rely most highly on 
natural resources. Instruments and policies which ignore the role of gender in resource 
management will serve to exclude, threaten the livelihoods and further marginalise an 
already vulnerable group as well as the wider community. Enabling and promoting 
the participation of women will serve to advance empowerment, development and 
successful resource management within coastal communities.  
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6.4 The case study 
6.4.1 The Mtwara region 
Despite efforts by the Tanzanian Government and major donors, 50% of the country’s 
population live in poverty and average income is 16% below the national poverty line. 
Poverty levels continue to remain higher within rural areas (Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Affairs, 2010; Porter and Mbezi, 2010).  
Like many other coastal African countries, recent years have witnessed increasing 
pressures upon coastal resources including illegal fishing practices, habitat destruction 
and growing populations (Sesabo and Tol, 2005). High and increasing poverty is 
prevalent amongst fishers: average yearly income in most Tanzanian coastal villages 
does not exceed US$ 100 per person; fish supplies per person are declining and 
excessive exploitation of the fishery continues (Cinner, 2010; Olale et al., 2010; Sesabo 
et al., 2006).  
Located in the south of Tanzania, Mtwara region is considered among one of the 
country’s poorest and least developed regions. Thirty eight percent of the population 
live below the basic needs poverty line, with the coastal population considered 
amongst the poorest (Guerreiro et al., 2010; Malleret, 2004). Coastal villages in the area 
show a high dependence on marine resources, as high as 63 – 74% of households in 
some; furthermore 54% of households directly depended on or were involved in 
fishing (Malleret 2004). These figures are consistent with other studies across Tanzania 
and Kenya (Malleret and Simbua, 2004).  
In 1996, the number of registered fishers in the Mtwara region was estimated to be 
2050, approximately 10% of Tanzania’s total registered artisanal fleet; in 2010 this 
figure was more than double at 5,600 (Dadi 2010). This number is anticipated to be 
higher once non-registered male fishers and women are considered. With the rare 
exception, women fish using the gender-specific method ‘tandilo’ which involves 
dragging fine meshed nets (<1mm) along the shoreline at low or high tide. Tandilo was 
found to comprise 23% of all fishing methods within the surveyed groups (Malleret, 
2004).  
In 2010, CARE International, in collaboration with WWF, commissioned a study to 
investigate the possibility of a marine PES scheme to reduce community exploitation of 
fisheries for villages both within and outside of the marine park. As previously 
mentioned in Section 5.4.1 the Mnazi Bay area represents an important East African 
biodiversity hotspot and one of ecological importance for the surrounding marine 
areas, one of whose greatest threats comes from intensive and destructive fisheries 
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(WWF, 2004). The proposed PES design offers compensation in the form of cash to 
cover initial opportunity costs alongside training in alternative occupations for the 
longer term. Compensation is offered to mitigate the, at present hypothetical, closure 
of core marine zones within both the larger marine park and outside area. These core 
marine zones are identified relative to their biological significance, as determined in 
prior consultation reports21.  
More details on the case study, local demographics and the proposed marine PES 
programme can be found in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
6.4.2 Mtwara’s fishing women 
Women comprise just over half of Tanzania’s total population (52%). On nearly all 
measures of health, education and economic status these women score lower than their 
men counterparts (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, 2010; Porter and Mbezi, 
2010). Overall, Tanzanian women are fairly inconspicuous within the formal fishing 
sector; men dominate the activity overall and occupy the more profitable sectors. 
However, within certain parts of the sector women play a significant role (Jiddawi and 
Öhman, 2002; Malleret, 2004).  
The study focuses on six coastal villages located within Mtwara’s two coastal districts: 
Mtwara Urban and Mtwara Rural. The study site is described in greater detail in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis. Within the coastal communities of Mtwara women are highly 
involved in tandilo fishing and gleaning activities. Recent household surveys by 
Malleret (2004) found tandilo fishing accounted for 23% of all fishing methods within 
coastal villages.  
While men engage in many different types of fishing, women generally only partake in 
‘tandilo’. In the past ‘tandilo’ fishing involved catching small fish ‘dagaa’ from shore 
and timing depended on low and high tides. Tandilo fishing is normally conducted 
within intertidal areas close to shore, using mosquito nests sewn together. Three to six 
women drag a net parallel to the beach catching small fry fish (known locally as dagaa) 
and juvenile fish of other species. Women typically spend 2 to 4 hours fishing in this 
way during low or high tides, depending on the area. Daily catch rates are estimated at 
approximately 2-17 kg per woman (Jiddawi and Öhman, 2002; Malleret, 2004). Fishing 
is generally conducted for two weeks in each month. Women also involve themselves 
in gleaning molluscs from the shore as well as collecting sea cucumber and octopus 
during spring tides (Malleret, 2004).  
                                                      
21 As described in Chapter 5. For more information see Samoilys (2010) and Yahya (2010) 
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Tandilo fishing is one of the more difficult fishing issues with which the marine park 
and fisheries officials have to deal with. This fishing method, which uses small 
meshing to catch small fish, is particularly destructive to the intertidal environment 
both via trampling of substrate and the catching of juveniles. Not perceived as 
damaging by the local communities, the majority of the catch (61%) is below half the 
maximum adult size (Jiddawi and Öhman, 2002).  However, it can represent one of the 
only sources of income for these fishing women (Malleret, 2004).   
6.5 Survey design and implementation 
In order to analyse the determinants of willingness to participate in the potential 
marine PES programme, we use primary data from a household and stated preference 
survey conducted with 661 fishers located in Mtwara’s two coastal districts. In 
particular we also look at the effect of risk mitigation strategies on shaping decisions to 
adopt the proposed PES scheme. 
Questionnaire design followed the principles laid out by Bateman et al. (2002). Surveys 
collected data on: individual and household demographics; household assets; attitudes 
relating to fishing, the environment and conservation; fishing practices and income; 
diversification strategies of the individual and household, and social capital 
characteristics. A scenario was presented relating to the implementation of a possible 
PES programme. The survey provided information on the current situation as well the 
new scenario.  Under the new scenario, specific core areas important as breeding and 
nursing sites in the locality of the surveyed villages would be closed (as described in 
Section 5.4 of Chapter 5 & Figure 5.3) and all illegal fishing would be terminated. The 
scenario further introduced the concept of a cash compensation scheme over a 4-year 
period with a further investment into alternative livelihoods. The level of cash 
compensation, although not offered as an initial bid at this stage, was presented as a 
value equivalent to current opportunity costs of participation. Information on 
implementing and regulating bodies was also provided. This was the combination of 
the on-ground NGOs (in this case WWF) and marine park authority within the Park 
and the on-ground NGO and BMU for those villages outside the park. Upon 
description of the new fishing scenario, fishers were given a choice as to whether they 
would be willing to participate in the marine PES scheme described. Those 
respondents who stated a willingness to participate were then asked for the required 
level of compensation, although these details are not included for the purpose of this 
analysis. The scenario was presented as on Section 5.6 of this thesis, page 134. The full 
survey is documented in Annex B1.  
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Male and female fishers are analysed separately, given both their differing production 
functions and also in interest of investigating those varying attributes in prompting 
participation across male and female fishers. It is important to note that while we are 
interested in reporting the differences between men and women, we are not attributing 
these inherently to “gender” per se but wish to say something about how those 
differences in opportunities, possibilities and livelihood strategies afforded to these 
women over their male counterparts can influence participation. Ultimately, whether it 
is a “gender” choice or a consideration of their livelihood options, the goal is to 
identify those attributes associated with participation.  
We consider the presence of alternative occupations and social capital variables as a 
proxy for risk mitigation. Income diversification is measured as the number of 
alternative income generating activities at the individual level. These are further 
separated into agricultural and natural resource dependent and non natural resource 
dependent. Occupational diversity is also measured as number of alternative income 
and non-income occupations at the individual level as well as at the household level. 
We dissect social capital using four distinct indicators: known trust in others22; 
membership within a non-fishing group; and involvement within two social networks 
(bilateral dependency with others for fishing activities and bilateral reliance with 
others during times of fishing hardship23). Data pertaining to social inclusion was also 
collected within the surveys, however this was dropped from all analysis due to 
limited variation within the results: nearly all interviewees reported no involvement 
within decision-making at the village or resource use level.  
The survey was implemented in the two coastal districts of the Mtwara Region 
described previously: Mtwara Urban and Mtwara Rural. Village selection was based 
on the prior work of Samoilys (2010) and Yahya (2010) which identified representative 
and appropriate villages based upon dependency on fishing as well as the depleting 
health of coastal resources24. Six coastal villages were selected: three within the marine 
park (Mngoji, Mkubiru and Msimbati) and three outside (Mikindani, Naumbu and 
Pemba). Focus groups and personal interviews with key informants identified relevant 
parties and shaped the design of the questionnaire.   
                                                      
22 Not to be confused with ‘Generalised trust’ which measures an individuals expectation of others 
trustworthiness where decisions are based upon more general information about social groups and 
situations. Herein we address specific ‘thick’ trust whereby responses are based upon more first-hand 
knowledge of representative groups (Naef and Schupp, 2009; Newton, 2007) 
23 Bilateral dependency and reliance comprises three potential relationships: dependence upon other; 
depended on by other; or a combination of both.  
24 Further information as to selection can be found in Section 5.4.4 of this thesis.  
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Within these villages a sample of fishermen and fisherwomen were selected for 
personal structured interview. Initially, a random sampling technique was adopted: 
fishers were randomly selected from lists provided by local village leaders. However, 
the unpredictable nature of the fishers and their timetables resulted in fewer 
questionnaires than desired. This led to a more non-probabilistic method being 
utilised; additional fishers were identified and approached within villages and at 
landing sites. Piloting of surveys was conducted in the month of March and final 
questionnaires were collected from April through to June 2010. Of a total of 661 fishers 
interviewed across all six villages, 101 fished outside of the core zones and were 
therefore not eligible for inclusion within the PES programme and dropped from final 
analysis; a further 20 were also excluded because they were incomplete. The results 
below are based on the final usable sample of 540 fishers. In total 234 male and 306 
female usable fisher surveys were collected.   
6.6 Descriptive Results 
Table 6.1 displays key demographic characteristics for the final sample of 540 fishers, 
and is further broken down to the village level and by gender. Patterns are fairly 
consistent across villages.  
Average fisher age is 35 years and average village household sizes range from 4.5 – 5.6. 
In all villages, education levels were low: on average almost 40% claimed no schooling 
while the remaining majority held only some degree of primary education, only 2% 
claimed to have attended secondary education.  
No significant differences were found between the mean demographic characteristics 
as broken down for male and female except fishing income. The largest disparity can 
be seen in male fisher earnings: Pemba averaged a fishing income of nearly US$ 7.5 per 
day for those days spent fishing giving an overall daily wage of approximately US$ 
5.4. Fishing income within the male subgroup was found to be higher for those villages 
located outside of the marine park. This is possibly due to the higher incidence of 
deep-sea fishing in these villages, in particular Pemba village. As expected female 
fishing earnings were significantly lower than their male counterparts (t=-7.746, 
p<0.001).  
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Table 6.1 Mean demographic characteristics of sample respondents 
  In   Out  All In Out 
 Mkub Mngj Msim Mkdn Naum Pemb    
No.  151 73 74 46 117 79 540 297 243 
Male/Female 56/95 27/46 28/46 33/13 53/64 37/42 234/306 111/186 123/120 
Female (%) 62.9 63.0 62.2 28.6 54.7 55.2 56.7 62.6 49.4 
          
Age 35.2 35.5 36.2 44.2 33.9 30.6 35.3 35.6 34.7 
Male/Female 34.9/35.5 36.4/35.0 33.8/37.8 44.0/50.3 33.2/34.6 31.6/29.7 35.0/35.5 35.0/36.0 35.1/34.4 
HH_size 4.7 5.6 5.3 5.2 5.2 4.5 5.0 5.1 5.0 
Male/Female 4.5/4.8 5.4/5.7 4.8/5.7 5.4/4.8 5.5/4.9 4.4/4.5 5.0/5.1 4.8/5.3 5.1/4.8 
Education          
None 25.2 34.3 52.1 26.1 47.4 50.0 38.6 33.9 44.4 
Male/Female 26.8/24.2 37.0/32.6 46.4/54.5 30.3/15.4 50.0/45.3 47.2/52.4 39.2/37.9 34.2/33.2 43.8/45.0 
Primary 70.2 64.4 48.0 73.9 50.0 48.7 59.2 63.5 53.9 
Male/Female 62.5/74.7 59.3/67.4 53.6/45.5 69.7/84.6 48.1/51.6 52.8/45.2 57.3/60.9 59.5/66.3 55.4/52.3 
Secondary 3.3 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.3 1.7 2.0 1.2 
Male/Female 7.1/1.1 3.7/0.0   0.0/3.1 0.0/2.4 2.2/1.3 4.5/0.5 0.0/2.5 
Other 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.7 0.4 
Male/Female 3.6/0.0    1.9/0.0  1.3/0.0 1.8/0.0 0.8/0.0 
          
Fish income  1.67 0.99 0.97 2.23 1.55 3.08 1.72*** 1.33 2.17 
Male/Female 2.65/1.02 1.61/0.66 1.11/0.90 2.72/0.89 1.96/1.22 5.37/1.11 2.66/1.00 2.06/0.90 3.17/1.14 
Where: In=villages located in park, Out=villages located outside of park; Mkub=Mkubiru, Mngi=Mngoji, 
Msim=Msimbati, Mkdn=Mikindani, Naum=Naumbu, Pemb=Pemba 
Social capital and occupational diversification indicators also varied between villages 
and between men and women, a summary of which is presented in Table 6.2. From the 
table it can be also seen that women have a significantly higher number of alternative 
occupations than men, income generating or not (t=2.481, p<0.05 and t=19.000, p<0.001 
respectively). However, male fisher households appeared to have significantly higher 
income generating alternatives than female fishers (t=-2.605, p<0.01).  
Average trust levels were consistently high, averaging 3.9 out of a possible 5. Average 
trust was not seen to be significantly different for those fishers inside and outside of 
the park (t=-0.431). However, trust in authority was significantly higher for those 
located within the park at the 5% level (t=-1.913, p<0.05). Average trust in fishers from 
ones own village and other villages showed a reverse relationship; fishers within the 
park were significantly less trusting of fishers from within their village as well as from 
other villages (t=2.045, p<0.05 & t=3.967, p<0.001 respectively). Overall group 
membership outside of the fishing sector was fairly low, approximately 10% of 
interviewees. Reciprocal support networks averaged approximately 1.4 and 1.0 for 
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dependence to carry out fishing activities and reliance in times of bad fishing 
respectively. Fishers had, on average, one alternative income-generating source.  
Table 6.2 Mean social capital and occupational characteristics of sample respondents  
  In   Out  All In Out 
 Mkub Mngj Msim Mkdn Naum Pemb    
Social Capital       
Ave Trust  3.97 3.91 3.88 3.78 3.97 3.90 3.92*** 3.93 3.91 
Male/Female 4.00/3.95 3.72/4.02 3.58/4.07 3.68/4.05 3.73/4.16 3.69/4.08 3.87/4.04 3.81/4.00 3.92/4.11 
Trust in 
Authority 
 
4.27 
 
4.30 
 
4.23 
 
3.88 
 
4.15 
 
4.12 
 
4.19*** 
 
4.26 
 
4.09 
Male/Female 3.94/4.46 3.85/4.57 3.50/4.67 3.47/4.92 3.42/4.75 3.46/4.68 3.62/4.62 3.81/4.53 3.45/4.75 
Trust fishers 
from village 
 
4.42 
 
4.32 
 
4.12 
 
4.45 
 
4.49 
 
4.47 
 
4.39*** 
 
4.32 
 
4.48 
Male/Female 4.71/4.24 4.41/4.27 4.21/4.07 4.65/4.00 4.66/4.34 4.71/4.27 4.60/4.23 4.51/4.20 4.67/4.29 
Trust fishers 
other village  
 
2.69 
 
2.91 
 
2.43 
 
3.17 
 
3.26 
 
3.33 
 
2.93*** 
 
2.67 
 
3.26 
Male/Female 3.33/2.35 3.45/2.52 2.40/2.44 3.86/1.61 4.13/2.52 4.29/2.26 3.65/2.37 3.12/2.40 4.11/2.32 
Group 
membership 
 
0.17 
 
0.15 
 
0.12 
 
0.15 
 
0.02 
 
0.00 
 
0.10 
 
0.15 
 
0.04 
Male/Female 0.21/0.15 0.11/0.17 0.14/0.11 0.12/0.23 0.02/0.02  0.10/0.10 0.17/0.15 0.04/0.03 
Dependent 
on other for 
fishing 
 
 
1.41 
 
 
1.25 
 
 
2.53 
 
 
1.22 
 
 
1.10 
 
 
1.27 
 
 
1.44*** 
 
 
1.65 
 
 
1.19 
Male/Female 0.70/1.83 0.59/1.63 0.82/3.57 0.82/2.23 0.87/1.30 1.08/1.43 0.82/1.91 0.70/2.21 0.92/1.45 
Rely on 
other in bad 
times 
 
 
1.19 
 
 
1.21 
 
 
1.00 
 
 
0.72 
 
 
0.79 
 
 
0.68 
 
 
0.96** 
 
 
1.14 
 
 
0.74 
Male/Female 0.82/1.40 0.78/1.46 0.61/1.24 0.48/1.31 1.02/0.59 0.78/0.60 0.78/1.10 0.76/1.38 0.80/0.68 
          
Presence of alternative activities       
Alt income 0.89 0.73 0.54 0.72 0.64 0.77 0.73** 0.76 0.70 
Male/Female 1.14/0.74 0.56/0.83 0.43/0.61 0.61/1.00 0.45/0.80 0.32/1.17 0.63/0.81 82.0/73.1 0.46/0.94 
Alt HH inc 1.28 1.08 0.66 1.07 1.05 1.00 1.06*** 1.08 1.03 
Male/Female 1.96/0.88 1.07/1.09 0.86/0.54 1.03/1.15 1.08/1.03 0.73/1.24 1.20/0.95 1.47/0.85 0.96/1.11 
Nonfarm inc 0.89 0.62 0.54 0.85 0.91 0.87 0.80** 0.74 0.88 
Male/Female 1.48/0.56 0.56/0.65 0.68/0.46 0.82/0.92 0.85/0.95 0.62/1.10 0.91/0.73 1.05/0.55 0.77/0.99 
Alt activity 2.24 1.82 1.95 1.50 1.69 1.90 1.91*** 2.06 1.72 
Male/Female 1.55/2.64 1.00/2.30 1.14/2.43 0.85/3.15 0.91/2.34 0.73/2.93 1.06/2.56 1.32/2.51 0.84/2.63 
Alt HH act 2.62 2.30 2.20 1.96 2.16 2.41 2.34*** 2.45 2.20 
Male/Female 2.41/2.75 1.78/2.65 1.68/2.52 1.52/3.08 1.60/2.63 1.76/2.98 1.83/2.72 2.07/2.67 1.63/2.79 
Where: In=villages located in park, Out=villages located outside of park; Mkub=Mkubiru, Mngi=Mngoji, 
Msim=Msimbati, Mkdn=Mikindani, Naum=Naumbu, Pemb=Pemba *Represent results t-tests comparing 
means of male and female subpopulations. (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, (**) at the 5% level and 
(***) at the 1% level. 
Comparison mean t-testing indicated significant differences between the genders for 
proxies of risk mitigation: social capital and occupational diversity attributes. 
Significance levels for mean comparison t-test results are indicated within Table 6.2. Of 
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the social capital characteristics only group membership was found to be similar for 
both men and women. Average trust levels were significantly higher in women for 
both average trust and trust in authority (t=6.033, p<0.001 & t=12.539, p<0.001 
respectively). However, men displayed higher average ratings for trust in fishers from 
within their village as well as from other villages (t=-4.642, p<0.001 & t=-9.062, p<0.001 
respectively). Women were also seen to have a significantly higher number of network 
linkages for dependency for fishing activities (dependent on others for fishing) and 
reliance in times of fishing hardship (rely on other in bad times), (t=8.018, p<0.001 and 
t=3.178, p<0.005 respectively). This is possibly due to the fact that tandilo fishing 
generally relies on three to six women dragging mosquito nets along the tidal zone. 
Within this framework it is also likely that these women support each other in times of 
trouble.  
Willingness to participate in the proposed scheme is indicated in Table 6.3. Willingness 
to enrol varies both across villages and across gender within villages. Overall 60% of 
surveyed fishers were willing to enter into the hypothetical scheme. Willingness to 
participate varied across villages, with those outside of the park seemingly less willing 
to participate overall; only half of surveyed fishers located outside of the park were 
willing to consider enrolment vs. almost 70% within park boundaries. A t-test showed 
this willingness to participate to be significantly different at the 1% level (t=-4.824, 
p<0.001). Females were also significantly more likely to participate over men, this was 
significant to the 1% level (t=5.334, p<0.001). Again women within the park showed a 
slightly higher likelihood of enrolling, however, this difference was much smaller than 
was seen in their male counterparts, 71% vs. 68%; this difference was not significant 
(t=-0.6422, p=0.5212).  
Table 6.3 Willingness to participate in proposed PES scheme 
  In   Out     
 Mkub Mngj Msim Mkdni Naum Pemb All In Out 
Willing to 
participate in PES 
scheme 
74.8 54.8 71.6 47.8 47.0 43.0 60.0 69.0 49.0 
 
Male/Female 75.0/74.7 48.2/58.7 64.3/76.1 36.4/76.9 30.2/71.9 27.0/57.1 47.4/69.6 65.8/71.0 30.9/67.5 
 
6.7 Econometric strategy 
The decision to participate in the PES scheme can be modelled as a dichotomous choice 
- a binary response – and the data collected indicates the observed choice but not the 
unobserved measure of ‘relative attractiveness’ of available options. Thus we utilise a 
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y =
⇢
1 if y⇤ = U(x = 1)  U(x = 0)   0
0 if y⇤ = U(x = 1)  U(x = 0) < 0
probit model where y is the binary dependent variable indicating fishers’ decision to 
participate and y* is a latent variable measuring fisher’s utility from their choice. X is a 
vector of explanatory variables affecting utility and ε is the error term with an assumed 
normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ2.  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
The probability of adoption is expressed in (3) where vector x is a vector of regressors 
including all demographic characteristics, z is a vector of regressors for all attitudinal 
characteristics and k is the vector of regressors representing income diversification and 
social capital characteristics. [x x k] denotes the vector containing the interaction term 
between demographic regressor location (Inpark) and social capital regressor average 
trust (Avetrust) and ε is the usual error term. 
  (3) 
The first model analyses the associations between proxy risk mitigating variables and 
participation decision. In Model 2 we add variables for individual characteristics. In 
Model 3 we add assets (fishing and non fishing specific) and our final model, Model 4, 
individual perceptions and attitudes are included. Given the different relationship 
with local authorities and park enforcement for those living inside and outside of the 
park we insert an interaction term for village location and average trust (Models 4a & 
4b). To take account of unobservable differences in variance between villages all 
models are clustered at the village level within the analysis. The variables (X), as 
determined in Chapter 4, are summarised in Table 6.4. We further attempt to control 
for any possible endogeneity that might arise through an additional village effects 
model which controls for unobserved heterogeneity at the village level25 (results of this 
model, Model 5, are displayed in Annex B3).  
 
 
                                                      
25 Although second to an instrument (instruments are notoriously difficult to identify within cross-
sectional data), screening of the data identified no viable instruments to control for potential endogeneity 
of social capital variables.  
Pr[Yi = 1] =  (x
0
i↵+ z
0
i  + k
0
i  + [x⇥ k]0i  + ✏)
y⇤ = X  + ⇤ ⇤ ⇠ N(0,⇥2)
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Table 6.4 Variable list and descriptive statistics of independent variables 
Variables Definition Mean s.d. min Max 
Male Dummy for gender: male =1; female =0 0.4 0.5 0 1 
Inpark Dummy for location: village found inside park 
borders =1; village located outside =0 
0.6 0.5 0 1 
Age Age of respondent (in years) 35.3 12.7 16.0 82.0 
Education Dummy for respondent’s level of education: 1= 
attended secondary or above; 0 otherwise 
0.0 0.1 0 1 
Hhsize Number of members in household 5.0 2.2 1 22.0 
Fish_income Continuous variable for respondent’s daily 
income from fishing (US $), calculated as function 
of fishing income for days fished*annual fishing 
effort divided by actual days in year.  
1.7 2.6 0 29.9 
Own_boat Dummy for those fisher’s who owned own boat: 
1=own boat; 0=don’t own boat 
0.2 0.4 0 1.0 
Dhow  Dummy for fishing from dhow (a larger boat able 
to access outer reef): 1=fishes from dhow; 0=fishes 
from other or no boat 
0.2 0.4 0 1.0 
Legal Dummy for those fishing using legal methods: 
1=fish legally; 0=fish illegally 
0.3 0.5 0 1.0 
MSL Material score index created from respondent 
household’s assets. Index is calculated from 
presence of assets: ‘high’ quality of housing (roof 
and walls), ownership of transport vehicles and 
household appliances. Higher values indicate a 
higher asset wealth. 
5.9 1.5 3 11.0 
Land_area Continuous variable for area of land owned 1.8 2.4 0 30.0 
      
Attitudes      
Perceive_ben Likert scale 1-5 for perceived change in number of 
fish caught in last 5 yrs: 1=a large decrease; 5=a 
large increase  
2.2 1.3 1 5.0 
Better_off Likert scale 1-5 for perceived change in standard 
of living in last 5 yrs: 1=a large decrease  
2.1 1.2 1 5.0 
Cons_benefit Likert scale 1-5 for attitude relating to potential 
benefit of marine conservation: 1=a large 
detriment; 5=a large benefit. Proxy for believes in 
conservation as beneficial 
3.0 1.5 1 5.0 
Happy_child Likert scale 1-5 for attitude relating to feelings if 
son/daughter became fisher: 1=very unhappy; 
5=very happy. Proxy for satisfaction with current 
fishing situation 
3.0 1.5 1 5.0 
 
Social capital and income diversification 
Alt_inc Count variable for presence of alternative income 0.7 0.9 0 3.0 
Alt_farm_inc Dummy for presence of alternative cash activity 
from farming 
0.2 0.4 0 1.0 
Alt_nonfarm_inc Count variable for presence of alternative non 
farm income  
0.8 0.9 0 5.0 
Alt_activity Count variable for presence of alternative activity 1.9 1.2 0 4.0 
Alt_hh_activity Count variable for presence of alternative activity 
in household 
2.3 1.1 0 10.0 
Grp_mem Dummy for respondent member of non-fishing 
group: 1=member; 0 = otherwise. Includes groups 
such as village community banking, church 
associations, livestock rearing groups.  
0.1 0.3 0 1.0 
Social_inclusion Dummy for active participation in community 
decision making 
0.0 0.1 0 1 
Social_incl_marine Dummy for active participation in decisions 
about community marine resource use 
0.0 0.1 0 1 
Dep_work Count variable for number of dependency 
networks respondent is located within for fishing 
related activity corrected for village average, i.e. 
number of people respondent depends on and/or 
is depended upon by others to conduct fishing 
activity 
1.0 1.1 0 4.1 
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Table 6.4 Variable list and descriptive statistics of independent variables (cont.) 
Variables Definition Mean s.d. min Max 
 
Social capital and income diversification (cont) 
Dep_work_give Count variable for number of networks whereby 
respondent gives assistance to others for fishing 
activities corrected for village average 
1.0 1.3 0 4.9 
Dep_work_rec Count variable for number of networks whereby 
respondent receives assistance from others for 
fishing activities corrected for village average 
1.0 1.2 0 4.1 
Rely_hardtime Count variable for number of networks 
respondent is located within for consumption 
smoothing corrected for village average, i.e. 
number of people respondent can turn to and/or 
is turned to during times of fishing hardship 
1.0 1.2 0 7.6 
Avetrust Respondent’s average level of trust. Average 
value of all trust variables. Continuous variable 1-
5: 1 = no trust; 5 = fully trust 
3.9 0.6 1.6 5.0 
Avetrust_Auth Respondent’s average level of trust in authority. 
Average value of all trust variables for 
authoritative figures (includes trust in community 
leaders, local officials, fish enforcement officers) 
Continuous variable 1-5: 1 = no trust; 5 = fully 
trust 
4.2 1.0 1.5 5.0 
Trust_ fishers_vill Respondent’s average level of trust in other 
fishers in village. Continuous variable 1-5: 1 = no 
trust; 5 = fully trust 
4.4 0.9 1.0 5.0 
Trust_fishers_ 
nonvill 
Respondent’s average level of trust in other 
fishers from other villages. Continuous variable 1-
5: 1 = no trust; 5 = fully trust 
2.9 1.6 1.0 5.0 
      
Interaction terms      
Trust*Inpark Interaction term between avetrust and Inpark 2.2 2.0 0 5.0 
TrustAuth*Inpark Interaction term between avetrust_Auth and 
Inpark 
2.4 2.2 0 5.0 
TrustVill*Inpark Interaction term between avetrust_fishers_vill 
and Inpark 
2.4 2.3 0 5.0 
TrustOther*Inpark Interaction term between avetrust_fishers_nonvill 
and Inpark 
1.5 1.7 0 5.0 
 
We use Model 4 in final analysis of the results over the village fixed effects model 
(Model 5, Annex B3) for the following reasons. Firstly, the results across the models are 
consistent and the fixed effects model showed no great variation in parameter 
estimates from the simpler ‘Inpark’ model (Model 4). Secondly, the ease with which 
these two models can be interpreted varies dramatically, in particular the 
interpretation of the interaction term in a non-linear model26. Thirdly, PES schemes will 
need to function within marine parks as well as outside, hence in interests of analysis 
and policy relevance the authors are more interested in the differences between those 
                                                      
26 Unlike in linear models the magnitude and sign of the interacted variables are not equal to the marginal 
effect of the interaction term in a non-linear model (Ai and Norton, 2003). In a non-linear model the 
interaction effect requires computing the cross derivative as the magnitude of this effect depends on all 
covariates within the model. Moreover the interaction effect can have different signs for different 
observations. For a more detailed discussion please see Ai and Norton (2003). For this reason we analyse 
the interaction effect using the approach described in Norton et al. (2004). This methodology is compatible 
with the presence of only one interaction term within the model.  
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villages located within and outside of the park verses the individual villages 
themselves. Lastly, in order to quantify the implications of the model on the decision to 
participate we compute the marginal effects, estimated at the sample means, for Model 
4.  
Male and female results are not pooled and modelled separately due to differing 
production functions and confirmed by the results of a Chow test (Annex B4). Female 
model specification is modified slightly allowing for differences in fishing type which 
show no variation within the female specification and are thus dropped from the 
analysis, e.g. all females fish from shore and so no ‘dhow’ heterogeneity is seen using 
tandilo an illegal method.  
6.8 Regression results 
The regression results are reported in Table 6.5 separated out for gender. A Chow test 
confirms the division of male and female models as appropriate (chi2 = 39.43, 
p<0.0000). The outputs from all models, specific to gender, are broadly consistent; 
results remain robust throughout. The analyses suggest that the various determinants 
differ in their influence on men and women. As can be seen in Table 6.5 and 6.6, the 
results show that different variables are influencing the choice of participation across 
the gender divide. A chow test, shown in Annex B4, indicate these determinants have 
significantly different effects across a number of variables. Characteristics, as 
previously identified in Chapter 4, are discussed below.  
6.8.1 Individual characteristics  
Age and household size showed no association with participation choice across either 
gender in the preferred models (Models 4, Table 6.5 and 6.6). Unlike in previous 
studies, older fishers were no less likely to adopt the proposed intervention.  
Of the socio-demographic variables, interestingly, only education is associated with 
higher likelihood of participation for women at a significant level, albeit only at the 
10% level. Women who reported higher levels of education were more likely to be 
willing to adopt the proposed scheme. Education was not seen to correlate with 
adoption decisions for male fishing counterparts and the implications of education was 
significant between sexes (Annex B4: Chow test). 
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Table 6.5 Estimation results: Male fishers willingness to participate 
Variables Model 1 
SC  
Model 2    
+ demo  
Model 3       
+assets 
Model 4       
+attitudes 
Model 4 
marginal 
effects 
 Model 4a  
In Park 
 Model 4b      
Out Park 
Alt_inc 0.177*     
(0.099) 
0.191* 
(0.070) 
0.206*** 
(0.079) 
0.239*** 
(0.037) 
0.095 
(0.015 
0.234*** 
(0.052) 
0.143* 
(0.080) 
Grp_memb 0.178       
(0.285) 
-0.132 
(0.220) 
-0.088  
(0.197) 
0.034    
(0.213) 
0.013 
(0.085) 
-0.186 
(0.345) 
0.100 
(0.145) 
Dep_work -0.007       
(0.072) 
0.062 
(0.049) 
0.129** 
(0.055) 
0.030    
(0.057) 
0.012 
(0.023) 
-0.177 
(0.386) 
-0.022 
(0.070) 
Rely_hardtime -0.102**          
(0.047) 
-0.081* 
(0.048) 
-0.067* 
(0.039) 
-0.074   
(0.047) 
-0.029 
(0.018) 
-0.075 
(0.206) 
-0.049** 
(0.019) 
Avetrust 0.261***        
(0.046) 
0.381*** 
(0.070) 
0.402*** 
(0.044) 
0.247*** 
(0.056) 
0.098 
(0.022) 
0.119 
(0.208) 
0.373*** 
(0.086) 
Trust*Inpark  -0.188*** 
(0.050) 
-0.194* 
(0.116) 
-0.126   
(0.172) 
-0.038† 
(0.021) 
- - 
Inpark  1.626*** 
(0.275) 
1.688*** 
(0.116) 
1.056    
(0.660)  
0.402 
(0.229) 
- - 
Age  -0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.008  
(0.007) 
-0.008   
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.013* 
(0.001) 
-0.011 
(0.014) 
Education  -0.171 
(0.171) 
-0.141  
(0.199) 
-0.168   
(0.160) 
-0.067 
(0.064) 
-0.545*** 
(0.056) 
0.121 
(0.191) 
HHsize  0.056 
(0.044) 
0.084** 
(0.041) 
0.069    
(0.054) 
0.027 
(0.022) 
-0.041* 
(0.023) 
0.187*** 
(0.032) 
MSL   0.033   
(0.036) 
0.071    
(0.046) 
0.028 
(0.018) 
-0.009 
(0.113) 
0.119** 
(0.056) 
Land_area   -0.017  
(0.015) 
-0.029* 
(0.016) 
-0.012 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.033) 
-0.045*** 
(0.014) 
Fish_income   0.042   
(0.043) 
0.086*  
(0.047) 
0.034 
(0.018) 
0.060 
(0.119) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
Own_boat   -0.329  
(0.235) 
-0.416** 
(0.472) 
-0.165 
(0.070) 
-0.495 
(0.393) 
-0.011** 
(0.237) 
Dhow    -0.265**  
(0.107) 
-0.321*** 
(0.121) 
-0.127 
(0.048) 
-0.314 
(0.212) 
-0.497*** 
(0.064) 
Legal   -0.140  
(0.237) 
-0.193   
(0.203) 
-0.077 
(0.080) 
-0.160 
(0.552) 
-0.398* 
(0.220) 
Perceived_change    -0.285** 
(0.131) 
-0.113 
(0.052) 
-0.717*** 
(0.177) 
-0.035*** 
(0.009) 
Better_off    -0.119  
(0.117) 
-0.047 
(0.046) 
0.204*** 
(0.059) 
-0.325** 
(0.158) 
Cons_benefit    0.187*** 
(0.052) 
0.074 
(0.021) 
0.254** 
(0.119) 
0.186*** 
(0.063) 
Happy_child    -0.153** 
(0.077) 
0.061 
(0.031) 
-0.303 
(0.187) 
-0.175*** 
(0.030) 
_cons -1.084***          
(0.376) 
-1.784***         
(0.417) 
-2.335*** 
(0.701) 
-0.736  
(1.001) 
   
N 232 231 223 223  103 120 
LogLikelihood -154.336 -138.761 -129.092 -116.439  -46.341 -58.200 
PseudoR2 0.0384 0.1320 0.1634 0.2454  0.2906 0.2119 
Robust standard errors. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively, Standard errors 
displayed in brackets. Village fixed effects model displayed and contrasted in Annex B3; †as reported by 
inteff function in STATA.  
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Table 6.6 Estimation results: Female fishers willingness to participate 
Variables Model 1f   
SC  
Model 2f    
+demo  
Model 3f       
+assets 
Model 4f       
+attitudes 
Model 4f 
marginal 
effects 
Alt_inc 0.204*** 
(0.192) 
0.221*** 
(0.058) 
0.215*** 
(0.053) 
0.245*** 
(0.045) 
0.080    
(0.023) 
Grp_memb 0.638*** 
(0.216) 
0.758*** 
(0.282) 
0.695** 
(0.321) 
0.672*** 
(0.253) 
0.178     
(0.063) 
Dep_work -0.152*** 
(0.033) 
-0.163*** 
(0.032) 
-0.172*** 
(0.046) 
-0.203*** 
(0.045) 
-0.066    
(0.015) 
Rely_hardtime 0.066 
(0.108) 
0.054 
(0.114) 
0.079 
(0.115) 
0.044 
(0.099) 
0.014    
(0.032) 
Avetrust -0.002 
(0.192) 
0.126 
(0.353) 
0.202 
(0.281) 
0.241 
(0.180) 
0.077    
(0.056) 
Trust*Inpark  -0.213 
(0.389) 
-0.171 
(0.327) 
-0.299 
(0.317) 
0.086†   
(0.032) 
Inpark  0.944 
(1.500) 
0.676 
(1.401) 
1.136 
(1.182) 
-0.380    
(0.375) 
Age  -0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-2.0e-04 
(0.003) 
-6.6e-05 
(0.001) 
Education  0.161 
(0.122) 
0.268*** 
(0.104) 
0.328* 
(0.177) 
0.107    
(0.062) 
HHsize  -0.007 
(0.021) 
0.007 
(0.021) 
-0.016 
(0.019) 
-0.005    
(0.006) 
MSL   -0.104 
(0.066) 
-0.087 
(0.066) 
-0.027   
(0.023) 
Land_area   -0.020 
(0.052) 
-0.033 
(0.044) 
-0.011    
(0.015) 
Fish_income   0.555* 
(0.303) 
-0.192 
(0.320) 
-0.063   
(0.106) 
Perceived_change    -0.081 
(0.156) 
-0.027   
(0.023) 
Better_off    -0.234*** 
(0.054) 
-0.077    
(0.019) 
Cons_benefit    0.184** 
(0.074) 
0.060    
(0.023) 
Happy_child    -0.209*** 
(0.054) 
-0.068    
(0.019) 
_cons  -0.086 
(1.421) 
0.375 
(1.577) 
-0.890 
(1.271) 
-0.890    
(1.271) 
N  296 286 286   
LogLikelihood  -170.859 -162.984 -147.787  
PseudoR2  0.0560 0.0724 0.1589  
Robust standard errors. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively, Standard errors 
displayed in brackets. Village fixed effects displayed in Annex B3; †as reported by inteff function in 
STATA.  
Determinants of male willingness to participate were more closely associated with 
fishing income and investment into the sector, for example: owning a boat. Working on 
a dhow or owning one’s own boat was strongly associated with non-adoption. In fact, 
these variables displayed two of the highest partial effects. Within the model, boat 
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ownership was associated with a 16.5% higher probability of rejection, working on a 
dhow showed a similar effect with a slightly lower probability of 12.7%. However, 
interestingly enough, fisher type (here analysed as fisher’s using legal or illegal gear) 
showed no significant association. 
Interestingly, one’s MSL score displayed no significant relationship with participation 
choice in the preferred model; the p-value fell a little outside of the 10% level for male 
participants. This said, within the male village fixed effects model (Model 5A, Annex 
B3) MSL score displayed a positive association at the 10% level, whereby male fishers 
showing higher asset scores indicated a stronger likelihood of adoption. A t-test shows 
no such relationship was seen for female fishers (Annex B4: Chow test). 
Surprisingly land size showed a negative relationship with adoption decisions in male 
fishers, i.e. male fishers with larger landholdings were less likely to adopt the marine 
PES. However, no such association was seen for female fishers and a chow test (Annex 
B4: Chow test) was unable to determine a significant difference between the two.  
6.8.2 Individual environmental beliefs and attitudes 
Attitudes displayed a strong association with participation likelihood, and appeared to 
show some variation in influence across the sexes, although we are unable to 
statistically prove this (Annex B4: Chow test). Viewing conservation as beneficial was a 
significant positive determinant for both sexes and the only consistent attitudinal 
predictor across the two models at the 1% level. Fishers of both sexes were also 
associated with a lower likelihood of signing up if they expressed happiness for their 
child to follow in their fishing footsteps, this association was more strongly significant 
for women at the 1% level than men (at the 10% level). Women were also less likely to 
be willing to participate in the proposed scheme if they had perceived an improvement 
in the standard of their living over the last five years. In a similar vein, male fishers 
who reported a positive change in the number of fish caught over the last 5 years were 
associated with a lower likelihood of participation. 
6.8.3 Individual perceptions of risk and vulnerability 
  
6.8.3.1 Income diversification 
With respect to social capital and occupational diversity, only one variable was shown 
to be a consistent predictor across gender: those with alternative income activities were 
consistently associated with a higher likelihood of participation in the proposed PES 
scheme (Table 6.5 and 6.6, Model 4). This result was seen for both sexes.  
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The marginal effect of having an additional alternative income was 0.095 and 0.080 for 
male and females respectively. Or in other words, holding all other variables at the 
mean, the presence of an additional income activity was associated with a 9.5 
percentage point increase in probability of adoption for men and an 8.0 percentage 
point increase in women. Having one alternative income source (Alt_inc=1) vs. none 
(Alt_inc=0), holding all other variables at the mean, resulted in a predicted probability 
of 50.3% vs. 40.8% for males and 75.2% vs. 66.9% for females.  
As discussed previously, the literature suggests that some alternative occupations are 
more favourable over others to spread risk, and as such, different income activities 
could have differential effects upon participation choice. In order to investigate this, 
we reran the analyses for alternative model specifications substituting individual 
alternative income activities (Alt_inc) with individual farm income (Alt_farm_inc) and 
non-farm income (Alt_nonfarm_inc) separately27. Replacing Alt_inc in Model 4 (Tables 
6.5 and 6.6) with these variables gave no significantly different outputs, and both 
income types were strongly and positively correlated with participation. Again 
substituting Alt_inc in Model 4 (Tables 6.5 and 6.6) with Alt_activity also gives similar 
results within the model28.  
6.8.3.2 Group participation 
Membership within a non-fishing group (Grp_memb) displayed a very different 
association with participation choice for men and women.  
For female fishers, this attribute emerges as one of the most influential, with a marginal 
effect of 0.178 (Table 6.6, Model 4); or in other words, the presence of a female fisher 
within a non-fishing group increases her probability of participating in the PES scheme 
by 17.8%.  
Group membership, however, was not seen to be significant for men; a chow test 
indicated coefficients for males and females to be significantly different at 10% level 
(Annex B4: Chow test). This differential result suggests that membership within 
groups and their associated activities have a greater influence on female willingness to 
participate.  
 
 
                                                      
27 Model results are not presented within this paper but are available from authors upon request 
28 Again model results are not presented within this paper but are available from authors upon request 
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6.8.3.3 Dependency networks 
Much like membership in a non-fishing group, presence within a fishing dependency 
network indicated a significant relationship with adoption for women but not men. 
However, and of particular note, while the presence of alternative income sources and 
group membership indicate positive associations for these females, presence within a 
fishing dependency network showed a very different relationship.  
Women who were associated with fishing dependency networks (Dep_work) appeared 
to limit their engagement in the proposed PES. There was, however, no significant 
variation in mean dependency networks across the wealth quartiles (ANOVA T=-
0.607, P=0.544). Significant at the 1% level, involvement within fishing dependency 
networks was associated with a reduced likelihood of signing up by a marginal effect 
of -0.066. In contrast, for men this relationship was not seen to be significant and a 
chow test showed coefficients to be significantly different at the 1% level (Annex B4: 
Chow test).  
To analyse this result further, separate analyses were conducted29 in order to look at 
each side of the fishing dependency network: that is, we separately analysed all those 
who are depended upon by others to conduct fishing activities and all those who 
depend on others30. The relationship towards participation was not seen to change. 
However, it proved extremely difficult to disentangle which aspect of this network was 
holding people back from participation. This is perhaps because few interviewees were 
seen to have only one-directional networks, whereby they were seen to only depend on 
others to conduct fishing or only were only depended on. In fact, only 2% of female 
fishers reported receiving assistance only and 1% giving assistance only.  
6.8.3.4 Trust and location 
Given the different experiences of those villages within the park and those outside 
relating to enforcement and local authorities, an interaction term between trust and 
location was examined (Trust*Inpark). Looking at the male model (Models 4a & 4b, 
Table 6.5), the inclusion of the interaction term is further warranted after analysis of 
subpopulation models for in and out of park (see Models 4a & 4b, Table 6.5) which 
display a significant association for the trust variable for those outside of the park31. 
Average trust enters as significant and positive for those male fishers located outside of 
                                                      
29 Analysis not shown here but available from the authors on request 
30 Two additional models were run: Dep_work was substituted with Dep_work_give or Dep_work_rec 
31 While the addition of an interaction term does little to improve the model fit, the extra term absorbs 
much of the variation in the data, as we would expect from the subpopulation models estimated earlier.  
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the park boundaries, but shows no significant association for those located within. In 
the pooled model, the interaction term enters negatively but is not significant. As a 
result, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that the impact of trust is significantly 
different for those inside the park. However, that the association is significant for those 
outside of the park merits the inclusion of the interaction term. Plotting the predicted 
probabilities shows the marginal effect of trust on those within and outside of the park. 
Graphs are displayed in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1 Fitted probabilities for willingness to participate against average trust 
(avetrust) for subgroups inside (subheading 1) and outside of park 
(subheading 0) 
 
Overall, average trust was the only social capital variable found to be associated with 
male participation, and yet was one of only two to not be significantly associated with 
adoption in female fishers. However, we are unable to say with confidence that the 
coefficients were significantly different (Annex B4: Chow test). One might wonder if 
the difference seen between the sexes with respect to trust might be associated with 
their very different production functions and the regulation they face. Given the very 
different production functions faced by both male fishers and female fishers it was not 
possible to control directly for this. However, if trust were to be associated with 
regulation (vs. gender) one might anticipate those male fishers who utilise illegal 
fishing gear to be less trusting. However, this was not seen to be the case. Moreover, a 
t-test on illegal fishers showed females to have significantly higher levels of trust than 
their illegal male fisher counterparts (t= -2.5537, p<0.006). 
Within the male models, average trust (Avetrust) is seen to be a significant positive 
determinant for those located outside of the park. Although at first glance the 
coefficient for the location variable Inpark appears insignificant in Table 6.5 Model 4, 
the impact of location must be interpreted as the sum of the main effect and the 
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interaction term. This impact is therefore found to be statistically significant (p=0.06)32. 
Hence location also displays an association with adoption decision.  
As such, location now (Inpark) appears to exert a large significant influence on 
participation within the model, however again the inclusion of the interaction term 
(Trust*Inpark) means interpretation is not as simple as looking at this main marginal 
effect (0.402, Table 6.5, Model 4 marginal effects). In practice, the marginal effect is 
calculated as 0.22833 at the sample mean; those living within the park were 22.8% more 
likely to participate all other things held constant. 
Individual trust categories are further analysed for male fishers in order to better 
interpret possible patterns. Regressions were rerun substituting Trust in authority 
(Avetrust_Auth); Trust in other fishers from village (Trust_fishers_vill) & Trust in 
fishers from other villages (Trust_fishers_nonvill) as defined in Table 6.4. Summary 
results are displayed in Table 6.7 below. Full model specifications are in Annex B5. 
Table 6.7 Estimation results for varying measures of trust: Male fishers 
Variables Model 4 
Average 
Trust  
Model 6     
Trust in 
Authority 
Model 7      
Trust in 
fishers 
from 
village 
Model 8          
Trust in 
fishers from 
other 
villages 
Model 6b  
Trust in 
Authority 
marginal 
effects 
Alt_inc 0.239*** 
(0.037) 
0.243*** 
(0.047) 
0.288*** 
(0.034) 
0.359***        
(0.094) 
0.097         
(0.019) 
Grp_memb 0.034       
(0.213) 
0.048      
(0.213) 
0.092       
(0.231) 
0.123              
(0.231) 
0.019         
(0.085) 
Dep_work 0.030      
(0.057) 
0.048      
(0.060) 
-0.007      
(0.068) 
-0.021            
(0.084) 
0.019         
(0.024) 
Rely_hardtime -0.074     
(0.047) 
-0.080*    
(0.045) 
-0.082*   
(0.047) 
-0.083*           
(0.048) 
-0.032        
(0.018) 
Trust# Variable 0.247*** 
(0.056) 
0.103*    
(0.058) 
0.376*** 
(0.143) 
0.110             
(0.166) 
0.041         
(0.023) 
Interaction term for 
trust*InPark 
-0.126     
(0.172) 
-0.104     
(0.116) 
-0.251     
(0.219) 
-0.155            
(0.184) 
-0.041        
(0.046) 
InPark 1.056      
(0.660)  
0.955**    
(0.439) 
1.706      
(1.039) 
1.131**          
(0.574) 
0.337         
(0.156) 
      
_cons -0.736  
(1.001) 
-0.182 
(0.940) 
-1.436 
(0.938)  
-0.085 
(1.271) 
 
N 223 223 221 199   
LogLikelihood -116.439 -116.754 -113.812  -99.938  
PseudoR2 0.2454 0.2433 0.2561 0.2748  
Robust standard errors. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1% level respectively, Standard errors 
displayed in brackets #Trust variable represents ‘Trust in Authority’; ‘Trust in fishers from village’ & 
‘Trust in fishers from other villages’ in models 5, 6 & 7 respectively as well as for subsequent interaction 
terms.  
                                                      
32 Calculated from chi2 of Inpark+Trust*Inpark=0 in STATA 
33 Calculated from margins function in STATA.  
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As is seen in Table 6.7 the respective trust variable has a positive effect on willingness 
to participate, irrelevant of location, for Models 4, 6 & 7.  Trust in authority and trust in 
other fishers from village show a positive association with participation and can be 
interpreted in a similar manner as average trust (Avetrust).  
Interestingly, however, trust in fishers from other villages shows no significant 
association with participation choice, in fact p is seen to be >0.5; whilst location retains 
significance.  
6.9 Discussion 
Many of the findings herein align with adoption literature discussed in the previous 
chapter and the subsequent stated hypotheses. However, what is apparent from the 
results presented is that these can be very different for male and female participants. In 
addition, results suggest that variables commonly associated with risk mitigation 
strategies, such as income diversity and social capital, may have implications for PES 
participation. Again, these may vary for both male and female fishers. At present there 
is little segregation within the adoption literature as to gender variation. 
6.9.1 Determinants of fisher adoption  
6.9.1.1 Individual characteristics and attitudes 
The results of this paper suggest that men and women appear subject to different 
motivations when considering participation in the proposed marine PES scheme. 
Education, which is commonly shown as a positive determinant of adoption and 
participation choice in conservation agriculture as well as PES schemes, was only seen 
to influence females’ participation herein. Male participation was seen to be more 
closely related to socioeconomic variables such as fishing income and investment into 
the sector. For example, working on a dhow or owning one’s own boat were strongly 
associated with non-adoption, and displayed two of the highest marginal effects of all 
male attributes.  
Of the individual characteristics, only age and household size revealed no associations 
across both sexes. Although we hypothesised decreasing participation with respect to 
increasing age and household size, the adoption literature remains unclear as to their 
role as determinants with many studies finding significant positive and negative 
influences and some reporting none at all (Chen et al., 2009; Knowler and Bradshaw, 
2007; Mercer, 2004). In keeping with the literature, individual attitudes displayed 
strong associations with PES adoption, again with some variation between male and 
female fishers.   
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6.9.1.2 Individual perceptions of risk and vulnerability 
Only one variable, occupational diversity was seen to positively influence both male 
and female fishers. The presence of an alternative income activity (Alt_inc) within a 
fisher’s portfolio was a consistent determinant of participation, and is in line with 
current thinking (Chen et al., 2009; Deressa et al., 2009; Zbinden and Lee, 2005). 
Possibly, experience with alternative occupations, particularly income generating 
occupations, provide fishers with alternative skills and experience which allow them to 
more easily and more comfortably branch away from fishing. In addition to the 
possibility of gained experience, those with alternative activities would likely gain 
more from the PES scheme as in addition to payments, these individuals can increase 
monetary and time investments into these alternative activities; this may be 
particularly true of income generating activities. In a similar vein, those who are aware 
that they rely solely on fishing activities may be more risk adverse towards new fishing 
conservation schemes; more often than not these interventions promoted increased 
restrictions as well as a reduction in fishing effort. However, one might wonder if the 
presence of alternative livelihoods is merely encompassing the preferences of those less 
frequent, part-time fishers, hence those more willing to exit the fishery or reduce effort. 
If this were the case, one would expect fishing income (calculated as a function of daily 
income and annual fishing effort) to be negatively correlated with willingness to 
participate. However, fishing income shows a positive correlation with willingness to 
participate, albeit it at the 10% level for male fishers only, implying that the presence of 
alternative occupations has an effect on participation independent of ‘fisher effort’. 
Results for alternative income sources not differentiated for type are consistent with 
results when variables are differentiated for farm, non-farm and business incomes. 
This implies that, although some activities may be more fruitful than others, in respect 
to PES participation it is the occurrence and perhaps experience of other successful 
alternatives, rather than the alternative itself which aids participation.  
This is where the similarities end. With respect to social capital, where men appear 
swayed by improved trust, a woman’s choice is associated more by her current 
networks and group participation. And in fact for women these two characteristics 
may be in conflict.  
For male fishers, trust was seen to be the only significant social capital variable 
predicting participation; trust can buffer the risk fishers perceive in participating 
(Mariola, 2012). For fishers to engage with a PES, they often have to admit that fishing 
efforts are too high and or are destructive in nature, and that they are a contributing 
factor. As a result fishers can open themselves up to increased scrutiny; imposition of 
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new regulations; and increased institutional oversight and a possible loss of autonomy 
related to operations (Breetz et al., 2005; Langpap, 2004; Mariola, 2012). Quite simply, 
the higher a fisher’s trust the more he believes the PES scheme will function over the 
long-term through trust in the information provided about the scheme, faith that 
undesirable effects will be mitigated and belief in the payment itself (Kabii and 
Horwitz, 2006). In rural Mexico, Kerr et al. (2012) also found low levels of trust in 
village authorities to reduce participation rates in pro-social community tasks only in 
those instances where funds were channelled through said authorities. Interestingly, 
though, the influence of trust varied across location and gender.  
The association of trust with participation was seen to vary between villages located 
inside and outside of the park, displaying a much smaller marginal effect for those 
inside of the park.  
One possible reason for this difference within the park may result from the more 
intense regulation and enforcement which they face; this additional enforcement serves 
to reduce the relative value from fishing (Robinson et al., 2012). Although legally, 
fishing laws and regulations are identical within the marine park and outside, fishers 
within the park have more contact with patrol officers and experience more intense 
regulation. Therefore, although trust may be a strong predictor of participation under 
more typical circumstances, for those fishers residing within the marine park 
boundaries other institutional and regulatory issues override this. For these fishers 
within the park, reversing park implementation is not an option; Having experienced 
‘more severe’ restrictions since the park’s gazetting in 2000 these fishers may feel like 
cooperation is the only option, more so if they believe more severe enforcement and 
restrictions in the future.  On the other hand, for those fishers outside of the park who 
experience lower rates of enforcement may wish to prevent additional forms of 
regulation, whether they be enforced by governments or other institutions; more so 
when trust in these institutions and others is low.  
Moreover, female fishers with higher levels of trust displayed no more likelihood of 
PES adoption. Initially this may seem counter intuitive, yet trust also expresses belief 
about future actions and can represent a ‘leap of faith’ (Padmanabhan, 2008). Fishers 
may be uncertain as to how restrictions will change and ultimately increase in the 
future. To some degree, female uncertainty is lower: tandilo fishing will be fully 
restricted under the predefined PES.  
Indeed, similar results were seen for trust measures in authority and village fishers. 
That trust in authority displayed a significant and positive relationship again seems 
intuitive and is aligned with the literature: lack of trust in regulating bodies has been 
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shown to prevent adoption of environmental initiatives all together (Moore et al., 2008; 
Parker et al., 2009). More specifically, a number of studies found mistrust WQT 
regulators to reduce initial adoption in the PES-like schemes (Breetz et al., 2005; 
Mariola, 2012). With respect to protected areas, local residents with higher degrees of 
trust for protected area officials displayed less opposition to protected area 
implementation and exercised higher levels of compliance (Stern, 2008).  
However, trust in other fishers from village also indicated a positive association. One 
might wonder if this is simply an underlying trust, more generally, which is being 
caught here, however trust in other fishers from villages and average trust overall 
show little correlation. Moreover, trust in fishers from other villagers did not display a 
significant association with participation. Given the required participation and 
compliance of such fishers within a possible marine PES scheme, this is an interesting 
result. Fishers may also be considering the actions of others in their decision to 
participate, a reasonable consideration given that the ‘cheating’ of others will affect 
PES outcomes and success. However, this trust seems limited to those closer, more 
immediate fishers. Perhaps simply, these fishers do not consider these more distant 
players when thinking about the PES implementation.  Indeed, Polman and Slangen 
(2008) also find that more generalised trust had no significant effect on participation 
choice. Or alternatively, they may believe enforcement will play a key role. However, 
this later reasoning seems hard to believe given the current enforcement success rates 
and high levels of illegal fishing.  
If one were to look at location alone, the marginal effect would seem large (e.g. 
whether a village is located within the park or outside). In fact this variable shows the 
largest marginal influence at 0.228. While an interaction term was entered in order to 
tease out any influence on varying interactions with enforcement officials and 
authority relating to the park, it is likely that the presence of the park itself is also 
having additional influence on willingness to participate. Indeed, those outside may be 
more resistant to new restrictions of any kind, whether it be a PES scheme or not, 
whereas those within have become more desensitised to change.  
For women, the picture was a little less straightforward. While a male fisher within 
these communities was swayed by improving trust, a female’s choice was more closely 
associated with her current networks and group participation. And, these two 
characteristics were, in fact, in conflict. Whereas the results from alternative income 
generating activities and group membership confirmed current thinking in promoting 
adoption decisions (Chen et al., 2009; Deressa et al., 2009; Knowler and Bradshaw, 
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2007), presence within a dependency network actually correlated with a reduced 
likelihood of participation.  
Group membership, along with education and alternative income generating activities 
were shown to have positive and significant association with participation in female 
fishers. The presence of these as positive predictors of willingness of participation may 
indicate that those women with a greater experience and/or confidence in working 
with others, and overall, may more readily engage in novel activities. Indeed, previous 
work has also shown that membership makes women more self-confident, assertive 
and vocal in gatherings, including within mixed contexts (Agarwal, 1997; Giri and 
Darnhofer, 2010; Pokharel et al., 2009), and that women may benefit disproportionally 
to their male counterparts from membership (Godquin and Quisumbing, 2008). 
However, it should be noted that while previous works confirm such thinking, 
interpretation must be done with caution; it is also possible that more confident and 
assertive females involve themselves in groups in the first instance. The data herein, 
and a lack of any instrument, does not enable separation of the two effects.  
However, rather unexpectedly, one social capital variable was shown to have a 
negative association with female adoption; incidence within a fishing dependent 
network could hold her back. This reciprocal dependency relationship appears to lock 
women fishers in to their current status quo and dissuade participation in the PES 
scheme. This could be due to a number of factors.  
One line of thinking is that fishers often become indebted to local businessmen who 
loan equipment and/or bail fishers out in times of hardship and these are difficult to 
exit. However, being located within a network which provided aid in times of bad 
fishing (Rely_hardtime) showed no significant relationship with participation, nor was 
this relationship seen to be significant for male fishers, who are more often those 
fishers indebted to businessmen.  
Women are often involved in many complex networks and alliances to enable them 
better access to these resources (Bennett et al., 2004). Evidence from across a wide 
range of countries suggests that females of low-income groups are often those with the 
strongest social and kin ties (Molyneux, 2002). These women whom rely on strong 
networks and acts of reciprocity may be less eager to shift the balance and experiment 
with new initiative, due to reluctance to disturb these existing safety nets; the benefits 
of the reciprocal relationships could extend further than fishing alone.  
Indeed, these networks may form an underlying base for insurance and self-protection 
mechanisms, as have been demonstrated in some Ethiopian farming systems (Di Falco 
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et al. 2010). Alternatively, female fishers may place a value on these networks beyond 
what is captured herein. Again, that a similar relationship was not seen for those 
relationships which provided assistance during bouts of bad fishing (Rely_hardship) 
implies some intrinsic value beyond an insurance mechanism against economic loss, 
but associated more with the fishing network.  
As such, these traditional reciprocal sharing or assistance norms, while beneficial in 
many ways, under some circumstances can be injurious to household development (Di 
Falco and Bulte, 2011). It is worth noting here that under the local conditions found 
within the study, we assume a PES scheme to be a financial improvement to 
individuals, freeing up time and opportunity to explore alternatives. However this 
may not always be the case or at least not perceived as so.  
This said, we anticipate that this result is applicable to not only to PES schemes, but 
also other conservation schemes and development activities. More qualitative and 
quantitative work is needed to verify this.  
Understanding how women value these alliances will be important in determining 
how to induce female participation, or indeed how to design programmes which do 
not erode these networks.  
6.9.2 Limitations 
Given the cross-sectional nature of our data we are unable to tease out any causal 
relationships and can only point to associations within the data.  
Although variables were selected with careful consideration of the literature, social 
capital by its very nature is difficult to measure and possible issues of endogeneity and 
omitted variables must be acknowledge. Further difficulties in identifying any relevant 
instruments also prevented demonstration of causal links and means the existence of 
endogeneity bias cannot be completely ruled out. Where possible, methods such as 
clustering for village and robustness checks against village fixed-effects models were 
employed to reduce endogeneity bias.  
The cross-sectional nature of the data also fails to address any possible dynamic 
relationships within these PES schemes, for example changes in income, those potential 
of actors who initially take up the scheme but drop out at a later date or indeed those 
who initially hold back but enrol at a later date; this later group may be of significant 
interest given a perhaps less risky association with an established programme. That 
surveys were conducted during the months of April through June also means that 
results may be a seasonal snapshot only.  
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Further limitations worth mentioning are those associated with all stated preference 
studies. The hypothetical nature of the participation calls into question whether 
respondents are answering the question honestly given that there are no real life 
repercussions. As with all other such stated preference methods, the validity of the 
results rely on having an accurate, meaningful and understandable scenario, and 
perhaps to a greater degree a believable vehicle with adequate sanctions (Bateman et 
al., 2002). Careful design and piloting was undertaken to reduce all hypothetical bias 
and lead the authors to believe the results to be a good representation of reality.  
Efforts were also made in order to gather data from a representative sample. In the first 
instance a random sampling method was adopted, however given the difficulty in 
locating pre-determined fishers a non-probabilistic method became necessary. Non-
probabilistic sampling methods can lead to self-selection and sampling bias. However, 
previous studies in the area and in Tanzania more generally indicate a good 
representative sample overall and a lower likelihood of sampling bias.  
Despite the limitations associated with our data, this study highlights possible linkages 
and barriers that various forms of social capital may play in PES uptake. However, one 
must note that this work is a starting platform from which other research is needed; it 
will be important to repeat the current analysis over a time series, allowing use of 
instrumental variable to reduce the possibility of endogeneity, examining those 
dynamic issues and move beyond a hypothetical context. 
6.9.3 Policy Implications 
The results presented here have interesting implications for the development of marine 
PES schemes, possibly of PES schemes more generally, and in particular those 
underlying conditions required to facilitate their development in the first place.  
Overall, social capital variables showed a positive association with participation, 
although these varied between male and female fishers. Building trust and group 
participation can be seen as important prerequisites to any PES scheme. Furthermore, 
diversification of livelihoods – a common feature of many natural resource 
conservation schemes – should not be overlooked in PES design. In fact, PES should 
actively support their presence, particularly when a PES scheme calls for a reduction in 
fishing effort or indeed any natural resource harvesting. It is also important that PES 
interventions do not overlook past lessons from previous income diversification 
interventions. As in other marine conservation interventions the presence of alternative 
occupations may promote long-term success (Pomeroy et al. 2001). What is more, PES 
can call for conditionality when running alongside livelihood diversification which 
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previous conservation initiatives have been unable to do. For example, a PES scheme 
will automatically set a level of allowable exploitation or set aside which previous 
conservation and development schemes investing into alternatives were unable to 
regulate.  
However, not all forms of social capital emerged as conducive with the PES scheme. As 
such PES programmes need to fully understand how networks and more specifically 
‘reciprocal dependency relationships’ can influence willingness to participate. 
Particularly as such reciprocal relationships have been shown to play greater 
importance within poorer households and communities as well as for women (Dercon, 
2002; Molyneux, 2002; Wakefield and Poland, 2005). The implications of this can have 
serious consequences if PES schemes do indeed wish to improve the livelihoods of 
those poorer more marginalised groups.  
That different attributes, including social capital variables, were seemingly more or less 
important for male and female fishers as discussed above is significant, yet within the 
adoption literature there has been a focus on pooled data. Why is this important, one 
might ask? For two reasons, the first is clear-cut, PES should not under-represent or 
further marginalise women; determining which attributes may motivate participation, 
and indeed those barriers which can prevent it such as those networks based on 
reciprocity, is a necessary step in avoiding this.  
Moreover, males and females are known to hold differing views towards natural 
resources and income. Women’s participation in natural resource management 
continues to be regarded as pivotal to the sustainable use and management of 
resources (Mwangi et al., 2011; Resurreccion, 2006). Evidence even suggests that 
women hold values which make them more likely to promote environmental 
protection (Agarwal, 2000; Agrawal et al., 2006; Westermann et al., 2005) as well as 
invest in household development (Edmund, 2008). Despite this, policy design 
continues to overlook barriers to female participation, particularly within the fishery 
sector where women remain invisible due to their low income-generating power 
(Bennett, 2005; Harper et al., 2013). In some instances, targeting women may represent 
a win-win scenario.  
Indeed in our case study, women were significantly more likely to sign up for the 
marine PES scheme than their male counterparts, even though implementation of said 
PES would result in a total ban on tandilo fishing. This form of fishing also represents 
one of the more destructive types, removing many juveniles and destroying substrate 
through repeated trampling.  
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Moreover, these female fishers are perhaps more ready and happy to replace fishing 
with another income generating activity; for these women it may be less about the 
tradition of fishing per se. Here, working with women fishers could represent a win-
win: high environmental returns with low resistance.  
However, women’s fishing activities also tend to fit within a wider household 
portfolio, unlike men who are often the ‘full time’ fishers. And PES instruments will 
need to acknowledge and work around the part-time nature of female fishing activities 
and further household time constraints faced by women will more likely induce 
participation. Identification of appropriate alternatives to fishing need to be 
investigated, and these, as shown by Peterson & Stead (2011), can further have a 
gender component.  
Targeting women will rely on studies which identify their motivations and constraints, 
and in designing policies which do not erode pre-existing relationships and which are 
in line with their needs.  
Studies need to further identify additional determinants of female participation as well 
as the possible effects social networks may plan in female adoption decisions. The fact 
that an association is seen within this paper indicates that further investigation is 
warranted, both in how these can influence adoption and also in what implications the 
implementation of PES may have on these pre-existing networks. Furthermore, it 
would interesting to examine other elements of social capital not discussed here and in 
particular if presence within other networks display similar or even opposite patterns. 
Another key issue for women within PES schemes which should not be overlooked is 
the ability of women to keep control of resources; this is particularly important in a 
marine setting where defacto and common property rules are common.  
More generally, it is a mistake to assume all women within communities are equal. To 
say all women share the same desires and/or needs is a gross oversimplification. 
Female participants may more closely align their needs with those of their kin than 
other women in general. Indeed, those women involved in the design and 
management of said schemes may reinforce the exclusion of others (Cornwall, 2003). 
Identifying what, if any, common determinants exist can perhaps help identify those 
females who continue to be disregarded. Non-fishing women also exist within coastal 
communities – perhaps to a greater degree than men – and these can represent poorer 
women within society, i.e. those relying on subsistence farming alone and without any 
form of individual income. These women will automatically be omitted from 
participating, the implications of which are unknown. Women also hold other related 
roles within the sector, as traders or processors. Although not directly addressed with 
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a marine PES scheme, these women will also be affected by changes in production or 
reconfigurations within the sector.  
However, studies should not be limited to the study of women alone. Fishing 
communities have rich social structures and female empowerment cannot be achieved 
solely through female-targeted development interventions. Understanding the social 
structure of male-female relationships, rules, roles and rights is paramount to PES 
design. Indeed as women increase their incomes, how will husbands react? Past 
studies have shown that fisher husbands may even reduce contributions (Nathan and 
Apu, 1998).  Furthermore, by ‘privatising’ CPR, PES schemes need to be aware of the 
consequences, particularly on the female and poorer members of society. In the past, 
interventions which privatise and bring income-benefits have served to further 
marginalise those lacking a voice or the power to control resources. As PES 
fundamentally serve to ‘pay’ resource-users for improved environmental management, 
schemes very much need to scrutinise what consequences may arise and how to 
mitigate these. PES must learn from these past mistakes in order not to repeat them in 
the future.  
6.10 Conclusions 
PES schemes continue to attract interest from policy makers, conservation 
practitioners, development practitioner and communities alike. What makes them so 
attractive to so many is their potential to pursue objectives beyond conservation, in 
particular that of regional development and poverty alleviation. However, this is 
primarily based on the assumption that those who cannot realise benefits from a given 
PES will simply refuse to participate. Unfortunately, and as is always the case, it is 
never this simple. The assumption that future benefits are sufficient is a gross 
oversimplification which must be treated with caution.  
Firstly the targeting of the ‘poor’ resource owners can be difficult as they may not 
necessarily be the most efficient providers. But beyond this, when a ‘poor’ supplier is 
targeted, invisible barriers may prevent his enrolment. Perceptions of any future gain 
will run alongside attitudes, thoughts of risk, as well as social norms. The decision to 
adopt a new scheme may be considered more risky than the status quo, no matter how 
destitute the original option. Moreover, these attributes can vary between the sexes; 
men and women may carry out very different production activities and have varying 
stimuli and obstacles but both will inevitably be affected by the application of a PES 
scheme.  
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PES schemes have much to learn from past work on engendering development 
interventions; PES must attempt to understand gender roles, rights and opportunities 
in its design in order to promote sustainable, equitable and fair interventions. In this 
ever-changing environment, the physical and social setting of changing climate and 
modernisation continue to exacerbate gender inequality and inequality more generally. 
PES schemes must promote equity, reduce marginalisation and promote mechanisms 
which protect against the threats to the livelihoods of all, including vulnerable women.  
This paper focuses on a possible marine PES scheme, and so we must ask: how does 
this mechanism translate to PES schemes more generally? This said marine PES 
programmes have much in common with terrestrial ones and we believe the results are 
relevant to the wider field of PES in general. While social capital and income 
diversification are important within fishing villages (Allison & Ellis 2001; Visser 2004), 
they are a significant characteristic in many lower income areas (Barrett 2001; Ellis 
2000). As such we believe these results are more broadly applicable.  
We conclude by noting that more research on the significance of risk mitigations 
strategies and safety nets with respect to participation in PES schemes is warranted, as 
well as more broadly, in other development schemes. And although it is beyond this 
study to determine the underlying reason for associations between dependency 
networks and participation, it is important to note the potential affect such networks 
can have in a female’s adoption choice.  
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Chapter 7 
Investigating fishers’ preferences for the design of marine 
Payments for Environmental Services schemes 
7.1 Overview 
We determine the effects of various management restrictions on adoption rates of 
marine Payments for Environmental Services schemes. Choice experiments are used in 
order to determine how fisher participation rates change under different marine PES 
programme designs. Various designs, with differing restriction rates, show different 
rates of adoption. However, fishers show a high utility loss associated with any move 
away from the current management situation, irrespective of restriction levels. This 
indicates that PES scheme costs may be high and creating an enabling environment 
could be important to reducing perceived losses, as could investment into conditional 
in-kind compensation mechanisms. The chapter also shows choice experiments to be a 
useful tool in marine PES design.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.2 presents a summary of the importance of 
appropriate instrument design within the marine conservation setting. A review on 
fisher preferences for management options is presented in Section 7.3. Section 7.4 
presents the study area, after which Section 7.5 introduces the methodological 
background and the choice model, discusses the use of choice modelling within 
fisheries management and goes on to describe the choice experiment in more detail. 
Results are presented in Section 7.6. A discussion of the findings and their policy 
implications is found in Section 7.7. Conclusions are given in Section 7.8.  
7.2 Introduction 
In the past decade PES have attracted increasing interest as an innovative conservation 
instrument. PES seek to address market failures whereby environmental services are 
not attributed their true value, and increase investment into resource conservation. 
More specifically, PES attempt to capture those economic benefits derived from 
environmental services, such as clean water, and channel them back to the ecosystem 
managers who frequently benefit less from resource conservation than alternative land 
uses (Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2005).  
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PES are defined as a voluntary agreement between a service provider and a service 
buyer (Wunder 2005). Inducing participation is central to the success of PES as a policy 
instrument: potential service providers must voluntarily agree to enrol in any 
programme design (Newton et al. 2012).  
Studies relating to PES participation have increased in the past few years. These have 
mainly been limited to the study of design factors which improve cost-efficiency 
(Petheram & Campbell 2010), as well as the implications project design can have on 
equality across stakeholder participation (e.g. Zilberman et al. 2008). More recently, the 
literature has looked towards addressing the need to understand potential providers’ 
willingness to participate in PES (Gong et al. 2010; Ma et al. 2010; Newton et al. 2012; 
Petheram & Campbell 2010; Zbinden & Lee 2005). However, these studies have mostly 
concentrated on describing endogenous individual and household determinants 
influencing adoption or non-adoption of PES schemes by service providers. While such 
information can be useful in targeting households and/or communities for PES 
interventions, these factors are often inflexible and of limited service to policy makers 
(Ruto & Garrod 2009).  
In practice, very few studies have considered those elements of programme design 
which induce service provider participation. The influence that design factors exert 
over a scheme’s attractiveness have recently received attention within the context of 
AES (Ruto & Garrod 2009). AES have much in common with PES in that they are 
voluntary, incentive-based, conditional and pay for delivery of a desired 
landscape/land use (Dobbs & Pretty 2008; Ferraro 2008). These recent studies have 
shown that AES design can indeed influence participation of service sellers. Ruto & 
Garrod (2009) show that schemes which were designed to be more flexible and offered 
shorter contracts required lower financial incentives to induce participation. Similarly, 
Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010) found that those programmes which allowed the 
maintenance of agricultural activity and did not impose stringent restrictions on farm 
management were also adopted at lower contract prices. Although not directly relating 
to AES per se, Qin et al. (2011) found that farmers in China were highly concerned with 
property rights. The provision of priority rights for contract renewal significantly 
increased farmers’ marginal willingness to pay for of existing forestland contracts.  
To a greater extent, policy design can be extremely important in achieving adequate 
acceptance and compliance within the fishery sector and will be particularly important 
in rural and low-income areas where monitoring and enforcement efforts are often low 
and/or extremely complex (Christie 2004; Lundquist & Granek 2005; McClanahan et al. 
2005). Combined local fishery and conservation goals can be achieved through the 
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merging of diverse management measures. Closed areas and gear modifications jointly 
will be needed to address wider scale issues of overfishing (Worm et al., 2009). 
However compliance, particularly in poor and rural settings, will hinge on community 
acceptance of any conservation modifications. Previous interventions, principally 
designed with little consensus from local fishers, have largely failed because they were 
unable to inspire compliance (Ferse et al., 2010; Pomeroy et al., 2001) or cover the 
opportunity costs of these low-income communities with few alternatives 
(Mohammed, 2012). For this reason, understanding how local fishers’ value 
management restrictions is of the utmost importance. 
Within this paper we concentrate on how the design of PES instruments can influence 
participation within a marine setting, a topic which, to date, remains largely 
unaddressed by the PES literature both terrestrially and within the marine context. 
This paper uses choice experiments (CE) to investigate some aspects of marine PES 
design. To date there is little application of CE within fisheries management (Wattage 
et al., 2011), more specifically, how restriction infrastructures may lower or induce 
participation by local environmental providers. In doing so this paper highlights the 
importance of community participation and input at the earliest stages of PES design. 
CE is also shown as a useful tool in assessing service provider trade-offs, and 
ultimately for marine management design.  
7.2 Fishers and management schemes 
Within small-scale artisanal fisheries, marine management has generally favoured 
regulatory solutions. Of these, the most prolific are MPAs (Agardy et al., 2003). Total 
prohibition of fishing is ultimately the most effective management option for 
environmental rehabilitation and conservation; evidence of environmental benefits 
from regulated MPAs is clear (Agardy, 2000). However, MPAs may not be the most 
economical, nor the more socially just. MPAs can be inefficient and ineffectual, and can 
further pose unrealistic and unjustifiable burdens on local low-income fishing 
communities (Cinner et al. 2009a). In reality, MPA success has been mixed: site-
selection can favour less accessible and less degraded areas; resource use often leaks 
into surrounding areas; and designated areas are often too small in area to protect the 
wider seascape (Cinner 2010; Graham et al. 2008; Lele et al. 2010).  
Restrictions on environmentally damaging fishing gears can form another type of 
conservation intervention; certain fishing gears have a higher propensity over others to 
negatively impact the marine environment (Akpalu, 2010). The use of more destructive 
gear types can: increase physical damage to the substrate; capture a high proportion of 
juvenile fish; target species important to reef resilience and deter others from fishing 
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sustainably (Akpalu 2010; Cinner 2010). As such, gear restrictions can be a further 
effective fisheries management tool and often receive higher support from local fishers 
(Cinner et al. 2009a). However, the management of artisanal fishers, including the gear 
they use can be difficult due to their loose, and often poor, organisation (McClanahan 
& Mangi 2004).  
Moving towards more sustainable fisheries often requires a reduction in effort or a 
switch in methods; both of which pose short-term costs on vulnerable fishers. PES have 
the potential to complement existing marine management instruments through the 
provision of short-term incentives. Where local costs are high in the initial stages of 
restriction measures – whether they be a spatial or gear restriction – PES can assist in 
compensation for loss of catch, for example. PES should not be viewed as an 
instrument working in isolation but one that supports current management tools.  
Whilst PES may be able to address some of the immediate issues of compensation, they 
will still need to consider local situations and preferences in order to be successful. 
Fishers have been documented to hold varying preferences for conservation 
management restrictions (Cinner et al. 2009a; McClanahan & Mangi 2004). Stakeholder 
involvement in the early stages of marine conservation development and 
implementation has been identified as one characteristic of successful approaches 
(Leslie, 2005; Lundquist and Granek, 2005). Careful consideration of the receptivity of 
these communities and fishers to design and implementation of conservation 
interventions is essential for long-term success (Christie, 2004).  
Analysis of fisher trade-offs will have numerous benefits. Identification of trade-offs, 
and resulting design will improve adoption of conservation instrument by local actors. 
Furthermore, if one assumes that fishers show preferences for the PES design34 which 
has the lowest utility cost to them overall, this may lead to more cost-effective PES 
design.  
7.3 Study area: Mtwara region, Tanzania 
Tanzania’s coastline supports approximately 25% of the country’s 43 million strong 
population of which a high proportion rely on coastal fisheries as a source of food and 
income. Most marine extraction activities are conducted within the shallow near shore 
waters (Gustavson et al. 2009; Silva 2006).  As population and fisher numbers continue 
to increase, these coastal resources come under increasing pressure; Tanzanian marine 
                                                      
34 PES design is considered herein to include various levels of restrictions faced by fishers. This will 
include facets of MPA restriction such as area under closure as well as further restrictions placed on gear. 
In reality MPA design will be an integral part of PES design, whereby PES refers to the addition of a 
compensation mechanism to restricted extraction and/or access.  
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fisheries have suffered a significant decline in biodiversity and productivity in the past 
three decades (Silva 2006).  
In response to growing concerns about dwindling coastal resources and food security, 
the Tanzanian Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism established the Marine 
Reserves Park Unit (MRPU). The MRPU’s mandate is to establish and ensure 
sustainable conservation of areas of outstanding marine ecological importance, and to 
manage them in partnership with the coastal communities. Management activities 
include patrolling of enforced no-take zones and gear restrictions; these are supported 
through the enactment of village and district by-laws (Silva 2006).  However, the 
MRPU has met some community resistance due to local perceptions of loss, 
particularly through tighter enforcement of gear restrictions.  
The study area located within the Mtwara region of southern Tanzania show a similar 
pattern to national figures. Within the study area, Malleret (2004) describes a high 
dependence on marine resources within coastal villages; in some as many as 63-74% of 
households report high dependence. Fisher numbers also continue to increase: 
registered fisher numbers within the region have more than doubled since 1996 (Dadi 
2010).  
7.4 Methodology: choice experiments 
7.4.1 The choice experiment 
Fishers’ preferences for various PES management options were elicited using a CE 
(Bateman et al. 2002; Louviere et al. 2000).  
CE is a survey-based stated preference (SP) technique comprising several choice sets 
which each contain a set of mutually exclusive hypothetical alternatives. Respondents 
are asked to choose their preferred option – the one which will give them the highest 
(anticipated) utility. Each alternative is defined by a set of attributes which take on one 
or more levels and, as such, the choices are implicit trade-offs between attribute levels 
(Louviere et al., 2000).  
Unlike the more commonly used contingent valuation method (CV), CE enables 
environmental changes to be described and valued in terms of a specific set of 
characteristics. Furthermore, with the inclusion of a cost or payment, marginal utility 
estimates can easily be converted into willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to 
accept (WTA) estimates for changes in these attribute levels. In this way, information 
can be gathered on (a) those attributes which are significant determinants of the ‘good’; 
(b) the relative importance of individual attributes; (c) an individual’s marginal rates of 
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substitution between attributes; and (d) the associated utility cost or benefit of each of 
the different combinations of attributes (Louviere et al., 2000; Wattage et al., 2005). 
SP approaches have received much debate regarding their merits and limitations 
within the academic literature. Much of this criticism centres on the technique’s 
hypothetical nature. This hypothetical bias arises when people overstate their WTP for 
a good due to the absence of real economic commitments (Mitchell and Carson, 1993; 
Neill et al., 1994). This hypothetical bias has been shown to be higher for those 
respondents who are less knowledgeable, for unfamiliar changes and for voluntary 
payments vehicles, such as WTA rather than WTP formats (Atkinson & Mourato 2008). 
In addition, CE have been criticised for increasing the cognitive burden placed on the 
respondent; the presented attribute-based scenarios may be more complex and there is 
a limit on the amount of information respondents can meaningfully handle while 
making a decision. This in turn can give rise to further problems of: learning and 
fatigue effects leading to apparently irrational choices; increased random errors 
associated with complexity of task; and satisficing rather than utility-maximising 
behaviour (Hanley et al. 2001).  
As with other SP methods, CE success depends critically on having an accurate, 
meaningful and understandable scenario; hence careful survey design is essential. The 
additional information that CE can glean about respondent’s preferences has led to 
many viewing CE as having an advantage over CV. Indeed, over the last decade CE 
has been increasingly used to value the effects of changes in environmental attributes, 
and more recently different characteristics of policy design (Hanley et al. 2003; Ruto & 
Garrod 2009). 
7.4.2 CE and fisheries management 
To date there has been little application of CE within fisheries management (Wattage et 
al., 2011). Of notable exception are the works of Wattage et al. (2011; 2005) and Aas et 
al. (2000). Wattage et al. (2011) uses a CE approach to determine the economic value 
held by the Irish public for the conservation of deep-sea corals using MPA variant 
management options. Wattage et al. (2005) demonstrated the applicability of CE in the 
evaluation of three over-riding management options and its ability to offer meaningful 
information to the management process. Furthermore, Aas et al. (2000) showed CE to 
be particularly useful in the evaluation of various fishery management options for 
harvest regulation within a Norwegian recreational fishery. However, despite a 
growing use in the industrial fishing arena, CE has been little used within low-income 
rural settings terrestrially and indeed coastally (Glenk et al., 2006).  
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7.4.3 CE design 
In implementing a CE all recommendations available for SP approaches are relevant to 
choice model experiments. Questionnaire design followed the principles laid out by 
Bateman et al. (2002). Surveys collected data on: individual and household 
demographics; household assets; attitudes relating to fishing, the environment and 
conservation; and fishing practices, income and livelihood diversification strategies.  
The CE revolves around fishers’ preferences for various PES management restrictions. 
After reading a scenario relating to the implementation of a prospective PES 
programme, respondents were presented with a series of choice sets illustrating 
possible PES programme options and asked to choose their most preferred. The 
hypothetical options were presented as possible governmental and marine park 
authority PES conservation programmes35. The following sections describe the key 
elements of the CE: the selection of attributes and levels of the possible PES scheme, 
the scenario, the experimental choice card design and the data collection.   
7.4.3.1 Attribute and levels selection 
The first step in implementing the CE is the determination of realistic attributes and 
attribute levels to be used within CE scenarios (Bennett & Blamey 2001; Hanley et al. 
2001; Mogas et al. 2006).  
The selection of relevant attributes and attribute levels was based on information 
gathered from peer-group meetings and semi-structured interviews, current 
management options, as well as management options that an implementing 
organisation was able to influence through policy design. Peer-group meetings and 
interviews were conducted within each of the six fishing communities chosen for 
research and were further sub-divided for fisher-types. Appropriate marine 
management attributes were thus selected based upon importance to fishers as 
identified in community focus groups and interviews as well as to fit relevant locally 
applicable management options. In order to minimise issues of cognitive burden, 
particularly within communities unaccustomed to CE techniques, management 
scenarios were constrained to the two most relevant attributes: gear restrictions and 
area closures (i.e. the agreed practices of the PES scheme). Both management measures 
are considered to be credible and realistic for the areas in question; past governmental 
interventions have in fact involved net restrictions and marine zone closures. A third 
attribute relating to the compensation payment package (i.e. the incentive of the PES 
                                                      
35 Within Tanzanian marine parks fishing rights are controlled by the Marine Park Authority, however 
outside of marine park boundaries management is in the hands of the Tanzanian Government fisheries 
division.  
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scheme) was further included. The payments were described as weekly compensation 
payments for changes brought on by PES management design. The CE attributes and 
levels used are displayed in Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1  Attribute and attribute levels in choice model experiment  
PES scheme attribute Description  Attribute level 
Size of no-take area  Area as % of current fishing area in which fishing 
will no longer be permitted and declared MPA. 
0*, 10, 25, 50 
Size of permitted net 
meshing 
Net mesh size in inches permitted that fishers are 
permitted to use within fishing grounds. Mesh size 
is measured as size when mesh pulled at each 
corner. 
1, 3, 6 
Compensation 
payment 
Weekly payment in Tanzanian Shillings (TSh) made 
under PES scheme36.  
-1000, 0, 5000, 10,000, 
20,000 
Current legal attribute levels, e.g. the status quo, is displayed in red. *Fishing is currently permitted within 
the marine park (MBREMP) which is officially a multi-use park.  
Large differences were noted in the PES management attributes fishers preferred 
during the piloting stages. At some levels certain restrictions were considered highly 
beneficial to some fishers while highly detrimental to others, e.g. some fishers 
preferred smaller net meshing while others favoured larger nets. After piloting it 
became apparent that some fishers were willing to pay for ‘more attractive’ 
management options such as the legislation of small meshed nets. As such an 
additional negative compensation payment option (-1000 TSh) was included alongside 
positive compensatory payments (Table 7.1). This would assess if some fishers valued 
these losses highly enough to be willing to accept negative compensation, e.g. willing 
to pay for the instatement of 1” nets, which are currently illegal. 
7.4.3.2 The scenario 
The following hypothetical scenario was presented to fishers: 
“I want you to think about the current law and about further prohibitions in your fishing area, 
more specifically the introduction of additional no-take zones and the prohibition of certain 
gears. These changes come with compensation for these additional restrictions. 
I am going to show you three choice cards. Two cards will show you new fishing regulations 
and the third card shows you the current regulation in your fishing area. 
Each card has two attributes relating to the possible changes in law which can change:  
• The percentage of your current fishing area to be closed to fishing 
                                                      
36 Payments reported as US$ equivalent where US$ 1 is equal to 1450 TSh. 
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• The allowable net mesh size (in inches) 
The final attribute on these cards is a monetary value. This is the level of compensation per week 
you would receive if these restrictions were put in place. Please remember, the values shown in 
BLUE are payments you would receive. Values shown in RED are payments you would make 
each week to have the new restrictions put in place.  
Monitoring and enforcement would be a collaboration between the community and the Marine 
Park Authority/BMU. Payments would be made monthly and all payments would be 
withdrawn if the restrictions were not followed. 
Please consider carefully which of the scenarios on the cards you prefer, thinking about how 
each restriction would effect your fishing catch, the compensation you would receive and the 
trade-offs between the three.” 
7.4.3.3 Experimental choice card design 
A full-factorial design of attribute levels (i.e. 4 levels of no-take area size attribute * 3 
levels of mesh size attribute * 4 levels of payment attribute) produced 48 possible PES 
management scenarios. The management alternatives were then reduced to 16 using 
orthogonal design, generated using Kocur tables (Kocur et al. 1981). Attributes and 
attribute levels were piloted. After the first round of pre-testing, compensation 
payment attribute levels were found to be too low and suitably adjusted. Prior piloted 
CEs were dropped from subsequent analyses.  
In addition to the adjusted attribute levels, it was noted that the combination of small 
1” nets with a negative compensation payment (i.e. indicating fishers willing to pay for 
the implementation of this regulation) were not present within the 16 cards selected via 
orthogonal design (that is, negative payments were only included for 3” and 6” nets), 
although this was a management option which many fishers seemed to prefer during 
piloting as noted above. Therefore, two additional cards were included in the final CE 
design which combined the negative compensation value (-1000TSh) with small 
meshing 1” nets (and various degrees of closure: 0 & 10%). A total of 18 cards were 
therefore used in the final experiment37. 
Following an explanation of the hypothetical PES scheme (i.e. the scenario in Section 
7.5.3.2), respondents were presented with six choice sets. Each choice set contained 
three PES options: two (generic) alternatives 1 and 2 and the current status quo 
                                                      
37 It$should$be$noted$that$ through$the$addition$of$ two$extra$cards,$ the$ final$set$of$cards$presented$ is$not$
fully$orthogonal$in$design.$However,$when$analysis$is$undertaken$using$a$logit$regression$framework,$as$
in$ the$ present$ case,$ orthogonality$ although$ desirable$ is$ no$ longer$ essential$ for$ the$ method$ to$ work$
satisfactorily.$ Hence$ the$ inclusion$ of$ these$ additional$ cards$ should$ not$ have$ a$ marked$ impact$ in$ the$
parameter$estimates.  
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baseline (Option 3). Choice cards 1 and 2 were picked at random by the enumerator 
without replacement from a bag containing all 18 scenario cards. 
 A choice set example is illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
Figure 7.1 Example of choice set  
Attributes  Management 
Option 1 
 Management 
Option 2 
 Status Quo 
Closure  10  50  0 
% closed of current fishing 
grounds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Net  6  1  3 
mesh size in “  
 
 
 
 
 
Payment  
(TSh) 
 10,000  5,000  0 
 
The programmes presented possible size of marine area to be designated no-take zones 
and gear restrictions placed on allowable net sizes (i.e. size of mesh). Monetary 
compensation was offered as a weekly sum in local currency (Tanzanian Shillings: TSh) 
but is reported within the results as the US$ equivalent.  
Education levels among fishers were found to be low: 96.2% of fishers sampled 
claimed to have no formal education or attended school only at the primary level. In 
order to improve respondent’s understanding of management scenarios and improve 
familiarity with possible changes, visual aids were used to represent attributes and 
attribute levels (Figure 7.1). Visual aids have been shown to reduce task complexity 
and improve choice by increasing understanding within low-literacy respondents (Jae 
and DelVecchio, 2004).  
Fishers were also run through an example before starting the CE as further explanation 
and for enumerators to judge fisher comprehension.  
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7.4.3.4 Data collection 
Primary data was collected from six coastal villages located within the Mtwara region 
of southern Tanzania. Face-to-face interviews were administered with local fishers by 
trained local enumerators. Between April and July 2010, fisher surveys and the CE 
were conducted with village fishermen38.  
Initially fishers were targeted using random selection from lists provided by the local 
village leaders. However, it quickly became obvious that fishers’ unpredictability 
meant a less probabilistic sampling method was necessary. Initial pilot meeting 
identified some fishers to be sampled; further fishers were selected within villages and 
landing sites using a non-probabilistic opportunistic sampling method.  
7.5 Results 
7.5.1 Descriptive results 
After exclusion of incomplete questionnaires and initial pilots, the sample size was 317 
fishers.  
Table 7.2 displays the key demographics for the final sample as broken down for 
villages and overall. Average fisher age was 35 years and household size was 4.9. 
Education levels were low across all villages; in all villages fishers having attended 
secondary school was lower than 7% of the final sample. Table 7.3 indicates the mean 
fishing characteristics of sample respondents by village, as well as grouped for in and 
outside of the park. Villages appear to have apparent disparities between fishing and 
non-fishing income activities across villages. For example, average fishing income was 
as high as US$ 4.81 a day in Pemba but as low as US$ 1.31 in Mngoji. Furthermore, the 
number of fishers with other income sources also varied across villages, Mkubiru 
indicated 71% of fishers claimed non-fishing income revenues; in Pemba village this 
figure was only 26%. These results could highlight different levels of dependence on 
fishing as a livelihood. 
 
 
                                                      
38 Women were omitted from CEs. Primarily female fishers were excluded from CE due to the nature of 
the fisheries in which they participate. Although women would be able to participate within a marine PES 
with restrictions on net size, gear modification would be unviable for these women and it is likely that 
selection of scenarios would rely solely on inclusion of small meshed netting; tandilo fishing relies on 
extremely small meshing to catch ‘dagaa’ or local sardines. 
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Table 7.2 Mean demographic characteristics of sample respondents 
  In   Out  All In Out 
 Mkub Mngj Msim Mkdn Naum Pemb    
No.  75 39 62 33 58 50 317 176 141 
Age 35.5 37.3 32.9 43.0 33.6 33.5 35.3 35.0 35.7 
HH_size 4.6 5.4 4.3 5.5 5.5 4.4 4.9 4.7 5.1 
Education  
(% sample) 
         
None 25.3 18.0 38.7 36.4 27.6 24.0 28.4 28.4 28.4 
Primary 69.3 79.5 58.1 63.6 65.5 74.0 67.8 67.6 68.1 
Secondary or 
above 
5.3 2.6 3.2 0.0 6.9 2.0 3.8 4.0 3.5 
Where: In=villages located in park, Out=villages located outside of park; Mkub=Mkubiru, 
Mngi=Mngoji, Msim=Msimbati, Mkdn=Mikindani, Naum=Naumbu, Pemb=Pemba. 
 
Table 7.3 Mean fishing and alternative occupation characteristics of sample 
respondents 
  In   Out  All In Out 
 Mkub Mngj Msim Mkdn Naum Pemb    
Fishing income 
as daily wage:  
2.43 1.57 1.31 2.64 1.91 4.81 2.44 1.87 3.10 
Weekly fishing 
income 
17.05 11.01 9.20 18.57 13.41 33.79 17.11 13.12 21.77 
% with non-
fishing income 
source 
0.71 0.51 0.32 0.33 0.41 0.26 0.44 0.53 0.34 
Average area of 
cultivated land 
1.97 3.27 2.83 2.64 1.18 0.90 2.05 2.56 1.42 
% currently 
employing illegal 
gears 
0.34 0.10 0.18 0.34 0.05 0.02 0.14 0.19 0.09 
% who in past 
employed illegal 
gears 
0.52 0.82 0.59 0.48 0.71 0.68 0.63 0.61 0.35 
Where: In=villages located in park, Out=villages located outside of park; Mkub=Mkubiru, 
Mngi=Mngoji, Msim=Msimbati, Mkdn=Mikindani, Naum=Naumbu, Pemb=Pemba. 
7.5.2 Econometric modelling 
The CE approach enables consumer preferences to be modelled in terms of the utility 
derived from the attributes of a good rather than the overall good per se. Statistical 
analyses of the decision results from (repeated) CE choices can be used to derive the 
marginal values of a characteristic or the WTP for a more desirable combination of 
attributes. 
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Several methods have been suggested for CE estimation. For fractional factorial 
designs with three or more choices, a multinomial logit model is most commonly used 
(Heiss 2002). The conditional logit model (CLM) is an appropriate extension of the 
multinomial logit for those circumstances when the choice between alternatives is 
modelled as a function of the attributes of the alternative portfolios as well as the 
characteristics of the respondent making the choice (McFadden, 1974). The CLM 
estimates the probability that individual i chooses alternative j as a function of the 
attributes as they vary between alternatives and unknown parameters as described by 
McFadden (1974): 
         (1) 
A relatively simple approach, the CLM assumes homogenous preferences across 
respondents and independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA39).  More specifically, 
the CLM:  (1) can represent systematic but not random taste variations (e.g. those that 
can be linked to observed respondent characteristics but those which cannot be 
explicitly modelled); (2) displays restrictive substitution patterns (e.g. assumes all pairs 
of alternatives are equally similar or dissimilar); and (3) is able to model situations 
where unobservable influences are independent but unable where correlation is 
generated between alternatives (Hoyos 2010; Hensher et al. 2005).   
However, such assumptions frequently do not hold true. In order to accommodate 
such possible IIA violations within the CE, a nested logit model (NLM) can be utilised. 
It avoids the need to rely on IIA by modelling choices in a hierarchical nested structure. 
This device allows error terms across choices within each ‘nest’ to be correlated with 
one another, although choices across ‘nests’ are still assumed to be uncorrelated (Heiss, 
2002). Error terms are assumed to follow a Type B Gumbel extreme value distribution 
as shown in equation (2) (as opposed to the conventional extreme value distribution 
assumed for the CLM model). The degree of correlation between the error terms is 
captured by the parameter ρ. Indeed, the CLM can be regarded as a special case of this 
model when the parameter ρ takes a value of one.  
f e e e eJ J( ... ) exp{ [exp( ) ... exp( )]}1
1
1
1= − − + + −− −ρ ρ ρ           (2) 
                                                      
39 IIA states that the ratio/likelihood of choosing any two choice options will be unaffected by the 
attributes or availability of the other options present, that is that the ratio of probabilities of any two 
options is independent of the choice set (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). Put more simply, all pairs of 
alternatives are equally similar or dissimilar (Hensher et al. 2005). 
Prni =
exni P
j e
xnj 
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In a two tier choice structure, the probability of choosing a particular alternative k out 
of the n second stage options, conditional on having selected a particular alternative j 
out of the m first stage options, can be expressed as indicated in equation (3). The 
logarithm of the denominator of this expression is known as the inclusive value (I), 
because it summarises the information about the alternatives included in this lower 
nest. Inserting this inclusive value as an explanatory variable in the first stage of the 
decision tree yields the expression for the unconditional probability of choosing option 
j out of the m first stage options, given in equation (4). 
jkI
Xikjkb
n
ikXnb
ikXjkbjkP
|exp
)|exp(
)exp(
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        (4) 
The model can be estimated by maximising the log-likelihood function is as stated in 
equation (5), where y is an indicator variable which takes a value of one when person i 
chooses option k (and thus, by implication, option j). 
∑∑=
i k
jPjkPikyL )]()|(log[log      (5) 
Like the CLM, the NLM only uses information on the first best option identified in 
each choice set. 
Data is analysed in the first instance using the CLM as well using a NLM where 
appropriate. Models are estimated using STATA 11 software. All variables used within 
econometric analysis are listed in Table 7.4. Attributes closure and payment entered the 
models as continuous variables as described in Table 7.4. A large dichotomy was seen 
in preference for small meshing between fishers so ‘Size of permitted net meshing’ 
(Table 7.1) was entered as two dummy variables: ‘Netsmall’ where minimum legal 
meshing was 1” and as ‘Netlarge’ where minimum legal meshing was 6”, these were 
contrasted to the baseline of 3” mesh size as this is the current legal status quo.  
A modelling constant (here the ASC) is included in the model. The role of the ASC is to 
account for any unobserved variation in choices that cannot be explained by either the 
attributes or socioeconomic determinants. 
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Table 7.4 Variable list and descriptive statistics of independent variables 
Variables Definition Mean 
 
SD min max 
Closure Continuous variable for % marine area 
designated no-take zone and closed to 
fishers relative to current fishing grounds: 
0; 10; 25 & 50% closure. 
13.5 17.9 0 50.0 
Netsmall Dummy for net with 1” mesh size 0.2 0.4 0 1.0 
Netbase Dummy for net with 3” mesh size, current 
Tanzanian legal mesh size  
0.7 0.5 0 1.0 
Netlarge Dummy for net with 6” mesh size 0.2 0.4 0 1.0 
Payment US Weekly payment offered as compensation 
for implementation of new management 
scenario. Payment transformed into US $: -
0.690; 3.448; 6.897; 13.793.   
3.7 5.1 -0.69 13.8 
ASC Dummy for Alternative Specific Constant/ 
choosing of status quo 
0.3 0.5 0 1.0 
Demographics      
Age Age of respondent (years) 35.0 12.7 16 82.0 
Edu Count variable for respondent’s level of 
education: 2= attended secondary or above; 
1= attended primary; 0 = no education 
0.7 0.5 0 2.0 
Inc Continuous variable for respondent’s 
annual income from fishing (US $) 
862.7 1,215.4 0 10,925.0 
Inpark Dummy for location: village found inside 
park borders =1; village located outside =0 
0.6 0.5 0 1.0 
Illegal Dummy for those fishing having used 
illegal fishing methods: 1=fish illegally; 
0=fish legally 
0.2 0.4 0 1.0 
Land Continuous variable for area of land owned 
in ha; used as proxy for reliance on fishing 
whereby those with larger holding are 
assumed to have lower reliance of fishing  
2.1 5.7 0 60.0 
 
7.5.3 Econometric results 
317 fishers completed the choice task and accompanying survey. Of these, 221 
respondents (70.0%) made at least one choice which was a deviation from the status 
quo (i.e. alternative A or B in the choice set). 96 fishers chose the status quo in all six 
choices. Of these 96, 68 respondents perceived the status quo to be their preferred 
option, the main reasoning being a dislike of any form of marine closure. The 
remaining 28 respondents (8.8% of the final sample) were considered to be protests and 
dropped from the final analysis. Protest votes arise when respondents do not state 
their true preferences which can lead to bias in the final utility estimates. Protests were 
considered those respondents who selected the status quo in all choice sets, made at 
least one irrational choice and provided no follow up explanation for choices made.  
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Respondents!
New marine conservation 
management plan!
Option 1! Option 2!
Current marine 
management plan!
Option 3: status 
quo!
7.5.3.1 The base model 
The main estimation strategy relies on the NLM. While the conditional logit assumes 
uncorrelated errors, the nested logit specifies the error structure more flexibly and 
allows some correlation within parent-levels. A log likelihood test indicated the IIA 
hypothesis could be rejected (p-value 0.088); as such the NLM is favoured over the 
simpler CLM model.  
In order to apply the NLM framework to the present data, it must be possible to 
maintain that the choice problem can be recast as a hierarchical nested structure. An 
examination of the choice sets presented suggests an obvious interpretation of this 
kind, where respondents are hypothesised to choose their preferred management 
option using a two-stage process. In the first instance, respondents are expected to 
choose between supporting or not-supporting a new ‘improved’ management scheme. 
If a change to the current marine management is chosen, respondents then choose 
between new management Option 1 and 2. The choice path is illustrated in Figure 7.2. 
In this way, the NLM assumes greater similarity between the new presented PES 
management options than between these and the status quo (ASC). In contrast, in a 
CLM choice path, the first level decision is omitted and respondents choose amongst 
all three management options equally. Analysis revealed broadly consistent results 
across both models, with slight adjustments in attribute coefficients.  
The base model results (i.e. model containing attributes only) are reported in column 1 
of Table 7.5. Column 2 reports the results of the CLM for comparison. 
Figure 7.2. Illustration of the nested logit model choice path 
 
 
 
First level 
Second level 
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Table 7.5 Model estimates for base specification  
 Base model: nested  Base model: conditional 
 Coeff  SD  Coeff  SD 
Closure -0.010 *** 0.003  -0.013 *** 0.003 
Net_small 0.075  0.109  0.112  0.127 
Net_large -0.573 *** 0.126  -0.700 *** 0.119 
Payment_US 0.061 *** 0.009  0.072 *** 0.007 
ASC 0.780 *** 0.144  0.957 *** 0.107 
        
Log-L -1623.7652  -1625.2184 
Adj-Pseudo R2   0.1308 
Waldchi  62.05  250.69 
Prob >chi 0.0000  0.0000 
    
N (choices) 5106  5106 
N(cases) 1702   
LR test for IIA P>chi2 0.088   
Robust standard errors have been used. (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, (**) at the 5% 
level and (***) at the 1% level.  
 
The results reveal that the varying attribute levels influenced willingness to adopt PES 
schemes. Size of marine closure and having 6” net meshing were negatively associated 
with willingness to enrol in marine PES (-0.013, p<0.01 and -0.700, p<0,01 respectively). 
The magnitude of payment offered by the scheme was also a significant determinant 
and, as expected, showed a positive relationship with willingness to enrol (0.072, 
p<0.01). The possibility of a PES management scheme which allowed the use of 
extremely small mesh sizes did not appear to significantly influence fisher’s choice. 
The results indicate fishers show a preference for PES schemes which have smaller no-
take areas and that allow the medium mesh size (3”). However, increasing payment 
associated with PES scheme will enable greater restrictions to be placed upon the 
conservation area, such as larger no-take zones and mesh sizes. The trade-offs between 
these attributes are discussed later in the paper.  
The ASC was also seen to enter positively and significantly, that is after controlling for 
all attributes respondents were still more likely to pick the status quo. This indicates a 
general preference overall for the status quo, and an overall reluctance to engage with 
management changes.  
7.5.3.2 Implicit prices 
Inclusion of the payment term within the model enables estimation of the marginal 
rate of substitution (MRS) between attributes and compensation levels, and indicates 
the monetary utility loss associated with each management restriction.  
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Implicit prices are expressed in Table 7.6. As the NLM assumes a linear utility function, 
implicit prices (IP) are expressed as the ratio of the attribute of interest’s coefficient and 
that of monetary value (Bennett & Blamey 2001). 
       (6) 
As can be seen from Table 7.6, when all other variables were held constant, closure of 
an additional 10% of seascape would require an additional US $1.60 a week in 
compensation. Interestingly, additional net mesh restrictions appear to represent a 
higher utility cost in comparison. In order to gain acceptance of increased mesh 
restrictions of 3” to 6” minimum size, weekly compensation of almost US$ 10 per fisher 
is required; and a 1” increase requires US$ 3.20. 
Deviation away from the status quo indicated the highest loss to fishers and indicated 
an implicit price of US$ 12.7240.  
Table 7.6 Implicit prices: WTA  
 Base model: nested Base model: conditional 
Closure (US$/10% additional closure) 1.583 1.808 
Net_small (3” decrease to 1”net)41  
(US$/1” reduction in length of mesh) 
-1.222 
-0.611 
-1.543 
0.772 
Net_large (3” increase to 6” net)  
(US$/1” additional length of mesh)  
9.351 
3.117 
9.674 
3.225 
ASC 12.721 13.239 
 
7.5.3.3 Economic surplus 
The economic surplus associated with the implementation of each new alternative 
management option in contrast to the current status quo can be calculated using 
equation (7) (Bennett & Blamey 2001)42. 
 
                                                      
40 Calculated from equation (6) where ASC=0.7797918/0.0612984 = 12.72 
41 Deviation to small meshing is also displayed although it should be noted that within the base model this 
variable was seen to be a non-significant determinant. 
42 The ASC parameter is often ignored in CE welfare measures however conceptually the ASC effect is a 
component of the indirect utility function and should be included. The ASC can account for unobserved 
attributes which are known to the individual but not the researcher as well as a ‘pure’ preference for the 
current situation (Boxall et al. 2009; Bennett & Blamey 2001).  
IP =   non-marketed attribute
 monetary attribute
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    (7) 
When: 
 
 
Table 7.7 displays the economic surplus of all possible combinations of management 
strategies associated with the various PES management scenarios.  
As expected the greatest utility loss is associated with those management options with 
the greatest restrictions. Only one management strategy indicated a lower loss, this 
was via the introduction of smaller meshing and with no closure; however again it 
should be noted that a deviation from the current 3” meshing to 1” was not a 
significant determinant. Interestingly, fishers perceived restricting net meshing to 6” 
would lower their utility slightly more so than a closure as large as half their current 
fishing grounds, although overall the two were broadly equal in utility loss (a utility 
loss of 22.1 vs. 20.6).  
Table 7.7  Economic surplus under differing management options: US$ -/week 
Mesh size 
 (“) 
Size of closure 
(% closure current fishing grounds) 
 0 10 25 50 
1 -11.499 -13.082 -15.457 -19.414 
3 - -14.304 -16.678 -20.635 
6 -22.072 -23.655 -26.029 -29.987 
 
7.5.3.4 Trade-offs between restriction types 
In order to understand any trade-offs being made between the two restriction types, a 
further analysis was conducted. Trade-offs are calculated using a similar deviation as 
for implicit pricing whereby the willingness to trade-off between any pairs of attributes 
is the ratio of these attributes as shown below. 
      (8) 
Economic surplus =  (1/ monetary)(VA   V0)
VA = Alternative =  1ClosureA +  2NetA
V0 = StatusQuo = ASC +  1Closure0 +  2Net0
Trade o↵ =
 non-marketed attribute a
 non-marketed attribute b
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Results are presented in Table 7.8. From the data, it appears that fishers approximately 
equate a twenty percent closure as similar in utility loss to that of a 1” increase in 
allowable mesh size from the current 3” net.  
Table 7.8 Trade-offs analysis 
 Base model: nested 
Closure/Net_large:  
(10% additional closure)/ 1” additional length of mesh) 
0.508 
Net_large/Closure:  
(1” additional length of mesh)/ (10% additional closure) 
1.969 
 
7.5.3.5 Predicted probabilities: accepting PES design 
Predicted rates of adoption are estimated for a number of various PES management 
scenarios from the base model and displayed in the following tables43. Tables 7.9a-c 
indicate the predicted probabilities of various PES management designs. Table 7.9a 
and 7.9b display those management designs with only one restriction from the current 
status quo under the minimum and maximum payment option. Table 7.9c shows the 
predicted probabilities associated with mixed restrictions under the highest payment.  
As can be seen in Tables 7.9a-c uptake of schemes shows high variability dependent 
upon attribute levels and payments offered. Offering weekly compensation values of 
5,000 TSh (US$ 3.5) (Table 7.9a) appeared too low to promote reasonable adoption of 
the PES schemes investigated; only approximately half of the population would be 
willing to sign on for the PES design with the lowest restriction of a 10% closure. 
Raising the weekly compensation payment from US$ 3.5 to US$ 13.8 increased 
predicted adoption to 70% (Table 7.9b) under this least restrictive scenario.  
However, even with such a minimal restriction, 30% of the sample respondents were 
unwilling to participate. This value rises to approximately 55% for the two harsher 
restrictions of a 50% closure or a restriction on net mesh size of  <6” independently, 
even when the highest compensation value was offered (Table 7.9b). One might expect 
that these relatively low predicted probabilities are due to a high utility cost associated 
with any move away from the status quo (ASC).  
 
                                                      
43 Predicted probabilities are produced using the CLM due to its relative ease of calculation and because 
results are consistent across both CLM and NLM.  
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Tables 7.9a-c Acceptance probabilities under differing PES management scenarios. 
Table 7.9a Management scenarios with one restriction and minimum payment 
Attributes PES restrictions 
 10% closure 
only/min 
payment 
25% closure 
only/min 
payment 
50% closure 
only/min 
payment 
Zero 
closure/increase 
to 6” mesh/min 
payment 
Closure  
(% total area) 
10 25 50 0 
Mesh Size 
 (“) 
3 3 3 6 
Payment 5,000 TSh 
(US$ 3.45) 
5,000 TSh 
(US$ 3.45) 
5,000 TSh 
(US$ 3.45) 
5,000 TSh 
(US$ 3.45) 
Predicted probability of 
adoption 
53.0 
 
48.1 
 
40.0 
 
38.9 
 
 
Table 7.9b Management scenarios with one restriction and maximum payment 
Attributes PES restrictions 
 10% closure 
only/max 
payment 
25% closure 
only/max 
payment 
50% closure 
only/max 
payment 
Zero 
closure/increase 
from 3 to 6” 
mesh/max 
payment 
Closure  
(% total area) 
10 25 50 0 
Mesh Size  
(“) 
3 3 3 6 
Payment 20,000 TSh 
(US$ 13.79) 
20,000 TSh 
(US$ 13.79) 
20,000 TSh 
(US$ 13.79) 
20,000 TSh 
(US$ 13.79) 
Predicted probability of 
adoption 
70.4 
 
66.2 
 
58.5 
 
56.4 
 
 
Table 7.9c Management scenarios with joint restrictions and maximum payment 
Attributes PES restrictions 
 10% closure/ 
increase from 3 to 
6” mesh/max 
payment 
25% closure/ 
increase from 3 to 
6” mesh/max 
payment 
50% closure/ 
increase from 3 to 
6” mesh/max 
payment 
Closure 
(% total area) 
10 25 50 
Mesh Size  
(“) 
6 6 6 
Payment 20,000 TSh 
(US$ 13.79) 
20,000 TSh 
(US$ 13.79) 
20,000 TSh 
(US$ 13.79) 
Predicted probability of adoption 54.2 
 
49.3 
 
41.2 
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Again, the predicted probabilities associated with those PES schemes utilising a 
mixture of restrictions are also low, despite the higher compensation offered (Table 
7.9c). Unfortunately the high utility associated with an increase to 6” in net mesh size 
may override any major trade-off benefits being seen. For example, implementing a 
10% closure alongside the 6” mesh restriction reduces the adoption rate by only 2.2%. 
While this is a good outcome for the implementation of a mixed PES scheme, adoption 
rate is still very low due to the resistance against increased net restrictions and again 
the initial move away from the status quo.  
7.5.3.6 Robustness check 
A selection of socio-demographics variables as described in Table 7.4 were added in an 
extension to the original model in order to test the robustness of the model findings. 
Results are shown in Table 7.10. With inclusion of socio-demographic variables, results 
remain broadly consistent; all significant attributes retain significance albeit to a lesser 
extent. 
Small mesh size 1” (Netsmall) enters the model as positive and significant at the 10% 
level, indicating a preference for smaller nets within management scenarios by some 
fishers. An interaction term between age and Netsmall  (Age_netsm) further suggests that 
younger men prefer this option. Income interacted with a dummy for the larger 6” nets 
(Inc_netlg) indicates that higher earners are more likely to prefer PES management 
scenarios which increase mesh net restrictions to 6”.  
The ASC drops out as significant once socio-demographics are entered. Income enters 
as a significant positive determinant of a preference for the status quo and 
management options which include a movement to larger net meshing.  
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Table 7.10 Robustness check: model extension with socio-demographic controls  
 Base model: nested  Base model: conditional 
 Coeff  SD  Coeff  SD 
Closure -0.018 ** 0.008  -0.024 ** 0.009 
Netsmall 0.611 * 0.359  0.792 * 0.456 
Netlarge -0.626 * 0.323  -0.774 * 0.406 
Payment_US 0.066 *** 0.022  0.083 *** 0.026 
ASC 0.304  0.354  0.563  0.369 
        
Age_close 2.5e-04  1.5e-04  2.7e-04  2.0e-04 
Age_netsm -0.017 ** 0.008  -0.022 ** 0.010 
Age_netlg 0.003  0.007  0.002  0.009 
Age_pay -1.7e-04  4.6e-04  -1.4e-04  5.7e-04 
Age_ASC 0.007  0.008  0.005  0.008 
        
Edu_close -8.6e-04  0.004  3.4e-04  0.005 
Edu_netsm -0.091  0.186  -0.094  0.238 
Edu_netlg -0.271  0.178  -0.317  0.225 
Edu_pay 0.005  0.012  0.007  0.014 
Edu_ASC -0.025  0.189  -0.006  0.202 
        
Inc_close 1.5e-06  2.2e-06  9.8e-07  2.6e-06 
Inc_netsm 1.2e-04  1.0e-04  1.7e-04  1.3e-04 
Inc_netlg 2.3e-04 *** 8.6e-05  2.9e-04 *** 1.0e-04 
Inc_pay -9.3e-06  7.4e-06  -1.3e-05  8.3e-06 
Inc_ASC 2.8e-04 *** 8.0e-05  3.0e-04 *** 9.0e-05 
    
Log-L -1531.6516  -1543.9215 
Adj-Pseudo R2   0.1458 
Waldchi  78.89  305.27 
Prob >chi 0.0000  0.0000 
    
N (choices) 4803  4803 
N (cases) 1637   
    
LR test for IIA P>chi2 0.0203   
Robust standard errors have been used. (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, (**) at the 5% 
level and (***) at the 1% level. 
 
7.5.3.7 Independence from previous analysis 
The format of the questionnaire was such that the CE followed on from questions 
relating to the scenario presented in Chapter 6, i.e. the willingness to participate in a 
marine PES scheme with designated closures and rules relating to gear use. While all 
attempts were made by enumerators to define these two marine PES participation 
decisions as distinct it must be noted that fisher decisions could still have been 
influenced by beliefs of where closures could occur; the CE related only to specific 
percentage restrictions as yet undefined in space. In order to test if the results were 
influenced by such predetermined ideas based upon closure location the model was 
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run again this time including average trust (Avetrust as defined in Chapter 6). Average 
trust was found to be a positive and significant determinant for men within the 
previous scenario and so is expected to be so again if fishers are linking the two 
scenarios. When interacted with each restriction type and ASC variable within the 
model no Avetrust interaction emerged as significant. We are therefore confident that 
fishers were treating the two experiments as separate. Results for this analysis can be 
found in Annex B6. 
7.5.3.8 ASC model 
Excluding those responses considered protests, the status quo was seen to be the 
preferred choice in just over half of the choice sets (55.1%). However, 221 respondents 
deviated away from the status quo (the ASC) in at least one choice set within the CE. 
This suggests that the status quo was the dominant choice in a number of the sets 
presented. This is expected as the sets were randomly chosen each time and great 
variation within fisher’s preferences led to few other cards being predominantly 
chosen.  
Table 7.11 ASC model specification  
 Base model: nested  Base model: conditional 
 Coeff  SD  Coeff  SD 
Closure -0.015 *** 0.005  -0.016 *** 0.003 
Net_small 0.084  0.140  0.093  0.137 
Net_large -0.759 *** 0.147  -0.788 *** 0.133 
Payment_US 0.074 *** 0.104  0.077 *** 0.008 
ASC 0.907 ** 0.407  0.946 ** 0.389 
ASC_inpark -1.529 *** 0.199  -1.535 *** 0.198 
ASC_illegal 0.489 ** 0.198  0.491 ** 0.198 
ASC_earnings 0.228 * 0.117  0.228 * 0.117 
ASC_land -0.014  0.024  -0.014  0.024 
        
Log-L -1403.9111  -1403.976 
Adj-Pseudo R2   0.2018 
Waldchi  230.73  258.10 
Prob >chi 0.0000  0.0000 
    
N (choices) 4803  4803 
N(cases) 1601   
LR test for IIA P>chi2 0.7186   
Robust standard errors have been used. (*) denotes significance at the 10% level, (**) at the 5% 
level and (***) at the 1% level. 
 
Sixty-eight respondents picked the status quo in all 6 choice sets, 21.5% of the final 
sample. Given this fairly large selection of the status quo, a further model was run to 
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determine those characteristics most likely to influence this choice. The ASC model is 
displayed in Table 7.11. All attributes retain significance within this final model. 
Coefficients remain fairly consistent in both magnitude and direction. When interacted 
with the ASC dummy, those who used illegal gear (Illegal) and fishing earnings 
(earnings) entered the model positively and significantly. Land owned (Land), taken as 
a proxy for dependence upon fishing whereby larger land holdings allowed further 
diversification, showed no significant influence on choice of status quo. Location, i.e. 
those living within the park, (Inpark) was seen as a negative determinant in ASC 
choice, e.g. those living outside of the park showed a higher reluctance to move away 
from the status quo.  
7.6 Discussion 
Design of PES restriction options was seen to influence scheme adoption rates by local 
fishers. Similar results have been shown in studies in terrestrial PES-like AES 
(Espinosa-Goded et al. 2010; Ruto & Garrod 2009). Fishers indicated heterogeneous 
preferences for various marine PES restrictions, indicated by the different utilities 
associated with the two attributes investigated. Results were comparable across both 
the NLM and simpler CLM for all regressions.  
7.6.1 Trade-offs and participation 
As expected, increasing restrictions negatively influenced adoption of PES schemes, 
and higher compensation payments increased adoption. PES programmes were 
associated with a high utility loss by fishers; the PES management scenario with the 
lowest restriction (a closure of 10%) reduced fisher utility by US$ 14.3 per week (Table 
7.7): 83.6% of mean weekly earnings. A closure of 25% to current fishing grounds was 
associated with a slightly higher utility loss of US$ 16.7 a week, almost the average 
weekly earnings of fishers in the area (US$ 17.1). Furthermore, restricting legal net 
meshing to a minimum of 6” from 3” had an associated weekly utility loss of US$ 30.0, 
nearly twice the mean fisher weekly earnings.   
Perhaps more interesting than these absolute values are the trade-offs and respective 
utilities associated with the management restrictions in question. Often marine 
closures are met with local resistance and gear restrictions can be more readily 
acceptable (Christie 2004; Cinner et al. 2009a; McClanahan & Mangi 2004). However 
within the communities surveyed here, it appears that gear restrictions, more 
specifically the utility loss associated with net restrictions may be met with greater 
opposition. Fishers equated a restriction of an additional inch on mesh size as 
approximately similar to a closure of 20%. Accounting for the ASC value, the loss 
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associated with the prohibition of fishing with meshing less than 6” (weekly 
compensation of US$ 22.1) was broadly consistent with, if only a little larger, than the 
compensation associated with a 50% closure (US$ 20.6). However, a 50% closure might 
appear as a much more extreme intervention from a management perspective.  
It should be noted that the net restriction presented herein is a very specific gear 
restriction, and may have met with such resistance due to local circumstances. Within 
the Mtwara area, seizure of inappropriate gear is commonplace and carries with it the 
confiscation of accompanying catch and boat. In recent years, Tanzania implemented a 
law which outlawed the use of any nets with mesh sizes smaller than the 3” used as a 
baseline within this study (Dadi 2010). From local focus groups and follow up survey 
questions, many local fishers felt that even the use of these baseline nets were 
ineffective at catching adequate fish as overall fish sizes within the coastal areas are 
small. In addition the most commonly used boat, a non-motorised canoe, did not 
enable access to the more productive and deeper water areas where fish are larger and 
more abundant. Indeed, as seen in Table 7.10 higher earners were more likely to prefer 
those PES interventions which restricted net meshing to 6”, perhaps due to the 
improved ability of larger boats to access deeper waters where larger fish can be 
caught.  
In addition, the lower unit utility losses relating to marine closures could be explained 
due to a perception that these closures are harder to enforce, hence easier to ignore. 
Within the area, marine park officials have attempted to monitor possible closed areas 
with little effect. Moreover, fishers may, quite rightly, believe that their activities can be 
displaced to new fishing areas outside of the restricted zones, hence decreasing the 
utility loss associated with this management restriction.  
7.6.2 Resistance to change 
Another interesting, although perhaps not unexpected, finding was the high utility loss 
associated with any deviation away from the status quo. When calculating the 
predicted rates of adoption, increasing the level of attribute restrictions resulted in only 
a mild decrease in adoption rates compared to the initial PES implementation in the 
first place. For example, increasing the closure restriction from 10% to 25% was 
associated with a drop in adoption of only 4.9% when offered 5,000 TSh per week (US$ 
3.5) and 4.2% under a weekly compensation package of 20,000 TSh (US$ 13.8). Yet, 
approximately one third and one half respectively were unlikely to adopt a PES with 
minimum restrictions in the first instance under the same payment schemes (70.4, 
Table 7.9b; 53.0, Table 7.9a). Moreover, results indicated that fishers would be willing 
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to pay as much as US$ 12.7 (74% of fishers’ average weekly income) to retain the 
current management practices, once all attributes had been controlled for44.  
As many as 21.4% of the final sample chose the status quo in all choice sets. Status quo 
bias is well documented within the CE decision making literature (Boxall et al., 2009; 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). When faced with choices between new alternatives 
and the status quo, individuals unduly choose the current situation. This decision to 
remain with the status quo can be motivated by protest beliefs, an inaction to choose, 
an inability to engage with the more complex experimental design of CE or a genuine 
preference for the current situation (Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2009). An attempt to limit 
the incidence of these former three groups was made through the use of a simple and 
relevant attribute design within the CE. In addition, those respondents who picked the 
status quo in all six choice sets and did not provide appropriate follow up reasoning 
were omitted from the final analysis. However, a status quo bias was still noted within 
the data. Unlike much of the proceeding work in CE and environmental goods, the 
research herein relates to an initial loss by fishers and not an obvious utility 
improvement (e.g. loss of fishing grounds and a reduced ability to catch fish), although 
hopefully with some environmental improvement in the not so distant future. The 
literature indicates that changes which are considered detrimental (e.g. losses) loom 
larger on a respondent’s mind than any improvements or gains (Kahneman et al., 
1991). For this reason, fishers may have shown greater hesitation to participate.  
On further analysis it was seen that certain groups were more likely to choose the 
status quo. Those individuals living outside of the marine park, where current 
enforcement is weaker and communities have less experience with enforcement 
bodies, were less likely to choose adoption of an alternative management scenario. In 
addition, those fishers who had illegal gear  (e.g. nets with mesh <3”) were more likely 
to stick with the status quo, even once net attributes had been controlled for. Again, 
within this sub population, it seems reasonable to expect resistance to change. Illegal 
fishers are likely to be more dubious of local authorities and the increased restrictions, 
having had more negative interactions with relevant authorities and perhaps viewing 
them as less legitimate (Crawford et al. 2004). Fisher perceptions of legitimacy have 
been shown to be important determinants in compliance behaviour (Hønneland, 2000). 
Moreover, illegal fishers already function under the base requirements perhaps making 
adoption of required gear more difficult and costly.  
                                                      
44 While this is an interesting result it is perhaps worth treating this value with caution. Fishers who 
experience high poverty are likely unable to pay such a value. However what this value does indicate is a 
high level of resistance to increased restrictions and interventions within the region.  
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It was also noted that fishing income was a positive determinant for selection of the 
status quo. This is an interesting finding. Indeed in many WTP studies, income 
signifies a budget constraint and is used as a validity test within case studies (Schläpfer 
2006; Mitchell & Carson 1993). However, in this circumstance it is a compensation 
value (a WTA) which is being analysed and income is not a constraint. Indeed, one 
might expect that those fishers who earn less would be willing to accept less as 
compensation. Here the selection to remain with the status quo by those who earn 
more is interesting if perhaps not totally unexpected. Bigger earners, more likely boat 
owners with high investment into the sector, are likely to be fairly happy with the 
current perceived situation and reluctant to induce any changes or impose new risks 
which may impact upon this. Similar findings have been seen with respect to fisher 
resistance to change practices (e.g. exit a fishery). Pradhan and Leung (2004) found that 
potential annual fishery earnings was a significant positive determinant in fisher’s 
reluctance to exit fisheries. The same study also indicated those vessel owners who 
fished using their own boats (e.g. not absentee owners) were more likely to remain. 
Similar results relating to ownership were seen by Ikiara and Odink (2000). 
Furthermore, it could simply be a case that the weekly compensation rates offered 
within the CE were simply too low for higher earner to make adoption worthwhile. 
Furthermore, when socio-demographic variables were entered into the model the 
dummy for retention of the status quo was no longer seen to be significant. An 
interaction term between fishing income and the ASC was seen to be a strong 
significant positive determinant of status quo choice. This provides further support 
that those higher earners were more likely to stick with the status quo.  
7.6.3 Implications for marine PES 
Perhaps two of the more interesting findings are as follows. Firstly, although various 
attribute levels influence management adoption, hence acceptance, it is possible that 
within those coastal areas creating an environment whereby change is not met with 
apprehension and hostility could be equally as important, if not more so. Deviation 
away from the status quo carried with it a high initial utility cost, comparable and 
greater than those associated with the restrictions themselves. In such cases, efforts to 
support local communities, build trust and ease transition to new management 
practices may be more fruitful and cost-effective, if albeit a little more time consuming 
at the on-set.  
Secondly, overall the cost of a PES scheme may be too high. The hypothetical PES 
scheme which offered the lowest compensation of US$ 3.5 per week to fishers for a 
restriction of 10% closure is estimated to be adopted by only 50% of the target 
population. Moreover, a PES offering a much higher weekly compensation of 20,000 
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TSh or US$ 13.8 (over ¾ the value of fishers’ average weekly income) for the same 
minimal restriction failed to entice as much as a third of the population. While this may 
not seem like much, it must be noted that compensation is based on a weekly payment 
and must be aggregated for an entire fishing community.  
This said, the CE methodology can provide information on the most cost-effective 
intervention for marine PES. For example, herein the perceived utility losses associated 
with different restrictions are expressed. However, the value of these restrictions for 
environmental service generation will vary. For example, a closure may require a 
lower payment but give equal effectiveness in terms of environmental service delivery, 
or vice versa. Where the science is in place, such methodologies can provide valuable 
and complementary information.  
Furthermore, results indicated that income is a positive determinant for opting out of 
PES management change. If weekly compensation rates cannot entice higher earners, 
who undoubtedly are often the highest extractors of the resource, PES schemes are 
unlikely to accomplish conservation goals (Engel et al. 2008; Wunder 2007). Indeed, 
within coastal communities fishing incomes can vary widely with some fishers barely 
catching enough for subsistence, let alone commercial activities, while other can be 
considered well off by local standards. Payments may be required to reflect all of these 
population groups, perhaps via differentiated payments. However, differentiated 
payments bring with them increased opportunity costs and can induce conflict 
between parties (Jack et al., 2008). Alternatively non-cash incentive structure could be 
structured and introduced to induce participation. For example, access to storage 
facilities may enable fishers to better negotiate prices and would increase profits 
relatively for all fishers involved, so long as access is not monopolised.  
7.6.4 Limitations and future research 
In order to reduce the cognitive burden associated with CE, design was limited to two 
attributes, closure and allowable mesh size, with four and three levels respectively. 
However, this design limited the ability to report on trade-offs and design of 
appropriate restriction levels. For example, the restriction on small meshing was seen 
as insignificant. Therefore for gear management restriction was limited to only current 
and large meshing and limited the management scenarios available.  
In addition, that utility loss from a 50% closure of current fishing areas equated to that 
of an 3” increase in mesh size may generate concern that respondents were unaware of 
what they were being asked. However, as previously mentioned, it is not unreasonable 
that fishers might value these smaller meshed nets so highly given local circumstances.  
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Despite these limitations, the findings herein could be the valuable subject of on-going 
investigation. Future studies may aim to move beyond this case study and replicate 
research. In addition, there is scope for more detailed work on those further attributes 
fishers may respond to, in terms of both restrictive strategies as well as what non-
monetary incentives that may induce participation e.g. access to improved markets and 
storage facilities to name a few. 
It will also be useful to identify if those attributes identified herein, as well as 
additional attributes so far not addressed, continue to be significant determinants over 
a wider sample of artisanal fisher communities. What similarities lie within case 
studies as well as those site-specific qualities?  
Given the large utility loss associated with a movement away from the status quo, it 
would also be informative to identify whether this is a common feature within fishing 
communities. Indeed, as previously noted, reluctance to exit fisheries by fishers has 
been identified within recent studies (Cinner et al. 2009b; Ikiara & Odink 2000; 
Pradhan & Leung 2004; Teh et al. 2008). This inertia to change may also transcend into 
less extreme novel management strategies. On the other hand, the relatively large 
utility loss recorded herein could relate to site conditions; at least in part, local 
conditions are anticipated to have played some role in the magnitude of this perceived 
loss. For example, those communities located outside of the marine park were more 
likely to stick with the status quo, perhaps due to a greater mistrust of or a reluctance 
to engage with new and less known regulating bodies. Further studies should identify 
those circumstances which have culminated to produce this effect as well as those 
fishers more likely to perceive a loss, as well as those PES interventions which will 
mitigate this loss.  
7.7 Conclusions 
Overall the study finds CE to be a useful policy tool in identifying fishers’ preferences 
for various management options. CE enables explicit analysis of trade-offs, as well as 
and their appropriate levels. CE can assist in evaluating which management 
alternatives may be of least-cost as well as locally accepted and effective in their 
conservation goal. This will be key in the concurrent design of appropriate 
conservation and development tools and in particular cost-effective PES. The CE 
methodology can also identify those groups less willing to engage in such novel 
schemes, as well as identifying those aspects of instrument design which may 
disincentivise participation; in doing so CE can help recognise whether the restrictions 
are inappropriate if there is a reluctance for change overall.  
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The research shows that fishers are currently reluctant to move away from the status 
quo, and that associated costs in promoting this transition will be high. Mechanisms 
which reduce this initial transition cost are called for, as are conditional non-monetary 
incentives which can allow fishers to sustain their welfare at a lower cost.  
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Chapter 8 
Synthesis and Conclusions  
8.1 Purpose of thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to learn more about the feasibility of the PES instrument 
within a marine and coastal context, with a particular interest in if and how these 
mechanisms would translate to the small-scale artisanal fisheries.  
The research focuses on both sides of a PES market: supply and demand. In the first 
part of the thesis we investigate the main challenges and barriers to marine PES 
programmes, and those issues which need to be addresses in order to improve buyer 
confidence in the instrument. Opportunities for marine PES to improve current 
environmental and social performance are explored.  
In the second part of this thesis we identify determinants which may promote or 
discourage fisher participation within marine PES schemes. The thesis concentrates on 
identifying those determinants, such as social capital and gender, which may be 
important in low-income households and vulnerable groups. In addition, the thesis 
investigates the role that instrument design can play in the rate of adoption of marine 
PES by fishers. Results are based on primary data collected from our case study, a 
survey of six artisanal fishing villages from the Mtwara Region in southern Tanzania.  
The thesis is the first to address the feasibility of PES in the marine and coastal 
environment, and more specifically within small-scale artisanal fisheries. It is the first 
to tackle issues of participation, revealing preferences for design and barriers to 
participation, as well as more overarching issues in implementation.  
The thesis uses both qualitative and quantitative data to answer these questions, and is 
one of the first to use CE within small-scale fisheries and expert elicitation within the 
field of PES.  
8.2 Synthesis of findings 
The past decade has seen a flurry of interest in PES from a wide audience; these 
include scholars, policy makers and conservation and development practitioners alike 
(Tacconi 2012; Van Hecken & Bastiaensen 2010) and more recently, interest from the 
marine conservation community (Lau 2012; Mohammed 2012; Murray et al. 2011). The 
common perception is that PES can address some of the failings of more indirect 
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instruments, such as ICDPs and CBM. The premise that better off service buyers 
compensate environmental service suppliers touts dual benefits: a source of 
sustainable finance for conservation (Ferraro & Kiss 2002) and the ability to promote 
development needs alongside conservation (Wunder & Albán 2008). However, few 
PES programmes have been carefully documented and empirical results are scant 
(Engel et al. 2008).  
Moreover, how such schemes will translate to the marine environment remains to be 
seen and is confined to discussion and policy pieces (e.g. Lau 2012; Mohammed 2012; 
Pagiola 2008). Artisanal fishing communities represent some of the world’s most 
vulnerable socio-economic groups (Béné et al. 2010), and it is debatable what 
implications PES can have within these fragile coastal and marine environments. 
8.2.1 Examining the issues in marine Payments for Environmental Services through 
expert elicitation 
While previous chapters have dealt with supply-side dynamics, the final chapter in this 
thesis broadens the narrative to include additional issues associated with 
implementation, in particular securing demand. In the final research chapter, expert 
elicitation identified a number of opportunities and challenges for marine PES 
programmes.  
8.2.4.1  Demand 
Expert elicitation in Chapter 7 highlighted that demand remains a challenge for coastal 
and marine PES schemes, as it does more generally. Demand within marine PES is 
subject to many of the same issues experienced by terrestrial PES, largely relying on 
evidence of adequate environmental service delivery. Indeed, if marine PES wish to 
move away from government and donor schemes, dealing with these concerns is 
paramount.  
8.2.4.2  Cementing property rights 
Tenure, or the lack of it, was the most prominently cited barrier by experts. With ill-
defined property rights the norm in coastal and marine ecosystems, it is hardly 
surprising that issues of tenure feature as such a key concern. Multiple stakeholders 
and lack of seascape rights are a common feature of coastal areas. These factors 
complicate marine management globally, make effective conservation difficult and 
further cement perceptions of the marine environment as a problematic management 
issue. In actual fact, realising effective property rights within the marine context could 
have beneficial effects for marine conservation. Indeed, privatisation has been shown 
 214 
to have beneficial effects in industrial fisheries (Worm et al. 2009). Although these exact 
mechanisms are not directly transferable to smaller-scale operations, PES could assist a 
similar development in artisanal fishing areas. For example, marine PES can work 
alongside and promote the implementation of TURFs. Programmes which assist local 
communities to protect and enforce their local areas can inspire improved local 
governance and promote sustainable practices, removing those incentives to overfish 
associated with open-access conditions. Indeed, FAO (2008) state that the most critical 
reform in fisheries policy is the institution of secure marine property rights systems. 
Reforms will require investment in collective action, strengthened civil society and the 
empowerment of poorer fishing communities (FAO 2008). Perhaps in response, recent 
years have seen the generation of a number of new initiatives which transfer property 
rights to local communities (Lau 2012). Marine PES can promote additional interest 
and investment in order improve tenure for artisanal communities. As such, perhaps 
tenure should not be seen as a limitation. Instead PES should be seen as an opportunity 
to promote interest in tenure, and assist in dealing with a long serving and highly 
detrimental problem in the marine environment.  
8.2.4.3  Monitoring of ‘invisible’ services  
The nature of marine PES and the consequential lack of scientific understanding 
surrounding these environmental services continue to be strong concerns. Inspiring 
confidence in buyers may critically hinge on better comprehension of these issues and 
the environmental services themselves.  
Certain low-hanging fruit exist; environmental services with those more simple 
pathways, such as storm line protection and carbon sequestration, can promote 
investment into the sector. With a growing number of successful marine PES, will 
come a confidence which will enable experimentation with more adventurous marine 
PES. Furthermore, the last few years have seen an improved understanding of how 
certain marine management decisions impact on ecosystem functioning and significant 
advances in the understanding of marine ecosystems and consequent valuation of 
resources (Lau 2012; Barbier 2010; Barbier et al. 2008).  
Advances in marine ecosystem science and modelling will only serve to improve 
monitoring and assist in proving additionality. However, in the mean time marine PES 
can learn a lot from terrestrial systems where action-based payments are widespread 
(Wunder et al. 2008). Although marine ecosystems suffer amplified issues of cause and 
effect, sufficient understanding exists of how many management decisions can increase 
service flows (Lau 2012).  
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8.2.4.4  Enforcement 
Complex and difficult enforcement relates back to issues of tenure and to a greater 
degree multiple stakeholders. Issues of enforcement are not limited to marine PES. In 
actual fact, for most marine interventions enforcement is both costly and complex 
(Petter Johnsen & Eliasen 2011; Pomeroy 2001).   
Inspiring compliance is undoubtedly one of the more important attributes an 
instrument can do to lower enforcement costs as well as secure long-term success. If 
PES schemes are to work in coastal areas, they must induce compliance of some of the 
world’s poorest. In rural low-income areas, resource users make their decisions with 
strong bias towards the short-term. Previous interventions have suffered because costs 
are immediate whereas the benefits of conserving tend to occur over longer time 
frames, are indirect and diffuse (Kiss 2004).  
Marine PES programmes enable communities to gain tangible benefits on a more 
immediate timescale. In this way PES may be viewed as more legitimate than previous 
interventions (if of course contracts are executed with adequate consideration of local 
circumstance). In addition PES schemes which can assist in securing tenure, as 
discussed in Section 8.2.4.2, can promote local support and enable local enforcement. 
Providing a platform which enables communities to participate in enforcement has 
been shown to significantly improve marine management. At the local level 
community-based enforcement can be effective in significantly reducing unsustainable 
practices and can improve compliance (Crawford et al. 2004). Sommerville et al. 
(2010a) showed that fear of local institutions reduced the likely uptake of previous 
unsustainable practices. Moreover, moral obligation and social influences can play an 
important role in improving compliance behaviour (Kuperan & Sutinen 1998).     
However, with migrant fishers commonplace, enforcement will need to extend beyond 
promoting local compliance. Community-based enforcement will be less able to deal 
with the non-compliance of fishers from neighbouring villages, and poorly equipped to 
handle illegal fishers from further off. Crawford et al. (2004) show semi-formal village-
to-village interactions though village heads can be an effective strategy in dealing with 
non-complying fishers from neighbouring areas. However, they go on to state the need 
for more centralised and formal enforcement institutions in dealing with fishers from 
further afield or where village-to-village mediation may fail.  
As such marine PES will require additional institutional and governmental support. 
Indeed, this has always been an issue for marine management initiatives based in low-
income countries. If the PES mechanism can inspire both local and regional support, 
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and provide additional funds to realise conservation, it could be a step in the right 
direction.  
8.4.4.5  Community contracts and equitable sharing 
Given the results above, perhaps most pertinent is how to identify appropriate 
stakeholders. Marine PES programmes within artisanal fishing villages will 
undoubtedly rely on community contracts. With this there will come greater 
complications in dealing with ‘poor’ stakeholders. Community contracts remove the 
notion of voluntary participation and will require a complex set of incentives 
(Sommerville et al. 2009). This relates back to the previously criticised assumption of 
PES as a voluntary mechanism in which people will simply refuse to participate where 
benefits are insufficient. In reality there will ultimately be winners and losers. As such, 
the problem is to what extent should PES and community contracts attempt to deal 
with local poverty.  
Experts showed mixed opinions in the degree to which marine PES schemes should be 
pro-poor. Concerns related mainly to the loss of environmental efficiency and that in 
fact PES would be unable to deal with the underlying issues of poverty in the first 
instance. Both are valid concerns. However, what is evident is that PES should not 
fortify pre-existing inequalities or further marginalise impoverished groups, something 
which is all together too easy (Milne & Adams 2012) and perhaps more so within 
small-scale fishing communities. Marginalisation, exclusion and discrimination are 
common within these communities (Béné 2003) and, as seen in the previous chapters of 
this thesis, further barriers exist for vulnerable socio-economic groups. For example, if 
contracts devolve tenure, females may be at particular risk of being ejected from 
previous roles, as has been seen in the past (Carney 1993). Moreover, safety nets for 
non-participants should also be acknowledged in design – particularly in those 
circumstances where PES hope to promote and cement local tenure and enforcement, 
possibly changing current social norms.  
Again, as previously discussed in Section 8.2.3, the case can be made for non-monetary 
incentive schemes which can allow widespread of benefits, as well as proportional 
benefits (e.g. storage and voucher facilities).  
Again low-hanging fruit exist within the marine portfolio, for example as previously 
mentioned: mangrove forests and carbon sequestration. With relatively simple 
environmental service pathways and a static nature, lessons can be learnt about 
contract implementation, as well as the underlying distributional implications within 
coastal communities. 
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8.4.4.6  Covering initial opportunity costs 
Committing to the long-term financing of marine PES may prove to be expensive for 
conservation organisations and some question whether marine PES can work at the 
scale required. Indeed, more generally debate still surrounds adequate protection size 
for marine areas within the wider conservation literature (Claudet et al. 2008; Halpern 
2003; Walters 2000).  
However, the fishery benefits of MPAs are well documented (e.g. Agardy 2000; Day 
2002; Gell & Roberts 2003; McCook et al. 2010 and Roberts et al. 2001). McClanahan 
(2010) further show how small to moderate fishery closures and gear restrictions can 
increase fisheries profitability in adjacent areas. However, initial costs exist for fishers 
and when incomes are directly affected by restrictions, local support for conservation 
initiatives has been shown to be lower (McClanahan et al. 2009). As such, marine PES 
may be able to assist with these initial opportunity costs experienced by fishers and 
thereby mediate conflict.  
8.2.2 Determinants of fishers’ willingness to adopt a marine Payments for 
Environmental Service scheme  
The success of PES in promoting concurrent objectives of environmental stewardship 
and poverty alleviation is questionable, and empirical research lags well behind policy 
design and implementation (Pattanayak et al. 2010). What is clear is that without 
participation of poor stakeholders, PES holds little promise in meeting these goals.  
Results as to the accessibility of PES schemes in the terrestrial setting are mixed. While 
some found good enrolment by ‘poorer’ households (Pagiola et al. 2008), other report 
difficulties for smaller and less educated households (Grieg-Gran et al. 2005; Southgate 
et al. 2010; Wunder 2008). Issues relating to the lack of necessary skills, labour or 
capital as well as compromised food security have been cited as concerns (Grieg-Gran 
et al. 2005; Pagiola et al. 2008; Southgate et al. 2010;Wunder 2008). 
The lion-share of PES literature as it relates to participation discusses how one can 
improve eligibility through project design (Pagiola et al. 2005, 2008; Wunder 2008; 
Zilberman et al. 2008). Implicit in this research is the notion that if eligible ‘poor’ 
service providers will participate, and simply refuse to participate or withdraw where 
benefits are not realised (Pagiola et al. 2005). This is based on two distinct assumptions: 
that all potential actors are willing to participate and that PES programmes are indeed 
voluntary. Both are, however, open to criticism.  
 218 
First we look more closely at the first of these two assumptions. As demonstrated 
within Chapters 6 of this thesis, although eligible and able, willingness to participate 
may be influenced by a number of other factors. Indeed, factors that have been proven 
to be important in lower-income households (Dercon 2002) can influence an 
individual’s willingness to participate. Beyond household income, ability to spread 
risk can factor into future decision choices (Alderman & Paxson 1992).  
Social capital has been shown as important in fisher livelihoods; Visser (2004) 
identified fishers endowed with stronger social networks and better financial resources 
as better able to defend their interests against other fishers. Within Chapter 6 of this 
thesis we demonstrate that social capital and income-diversification strategies can be 
significant determinants in the decision to adopt marine PES schemes. Not only this, 
but various facets of social capital have different implications in participation choice. 
Indeed, within this thesis we show that levels of overall trust and membership within a 
non-fishing group significantly increased willingness to participate within a proposed 
marine PES scheme. Interestingly, quite the opposite was seen for presence within a 
reciprocal fishing dependency network. More specifically, being dependent on another 
and/or being depended on for fishing activities, and the number of these networks, 
reduced the likelihood of adopting the proposed marine PES programme. Yet to date 
there is little mention of social capital and insurance mechanisms within the PES 
poverty literature. That social capital can influence decisions to try novel development 
initiatives is previously undocumented and has interesting implications for PES 
schemes hoping to target poor households; in particular if poorer households rely on 
informal insurance networks and are fearful to upset these.  
In addition, these determinants may vary by gender. Women have long been 
recognised as some of the more vulnerable societal members (Harrison 2000), and 
perhaps to an even greater extent within low-income fishing communities (Porter & 
Mbezi 2010). However, women continue to be overlooked in development assistance 
policy design within the fishery sector (Sze Choo et al. 2008), mainly due to the 
‘invisibility’ of their role (Sze Choo et al. 2008; Weeratunge et al. 2010). However, 
women can also be some of the most environmentally detrimental. Within our study 
site, tandilo fishing is the sole practice of women.  Conducted within the intertidal 
zone, large mosquito nets are dragged along the substrate by three to six women 
catching small fry and, in addition, many juvenile fish. However destructive, such 
fishing represents one of the only sources of income, and indeed independence, for 
these women.  
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What is apparent is that in order not to further exacerbate fisher women’s 
vulnerability, marine PES must take note of their role in both environmental impacts 
and instrument design. As seen in Chapter 6, women demonstrated different 
motivators for participation. Men were more readily influenced by factors such as 
previous investment into the fishing sector. Owning boats and working on the larger 
boats (dhows) increased male resistance to adopt; on the other hand men, with larger 
farming plots were more willing to sign up to the PES scheme. However, those women 
more ready to participate showed higher levels of experience overall, for example: 
education, experience with alternative income activities and working in groups. This is 
perhaps in part related to the importance of prior experience and education in building 
confidence.  
Social capital was again seen to be an important determinant, although various facets 
affected the genders differently. The only social capital variable which was seen to 
significantly influence men was trust; men with more pronounced trust overall were 
more likely to participate in the proposed marine PES. However, women showed a 
more profound reluctance to upset pre-existing networks. The variable ‘presence 
within a reciprocal fishing dependency network’ was again seen to be significantly 
deter participation. 
These differences are important to note; PES schemes which determine fishers’ 
participation but focus mostly on male determinants – who usually comprise the larger 
share of the fisher numbers – can as a result exclude female stakeholders. In doing so 
PES schemes can have two important consequences: the further marginalisation of 
women within fishing communities and an inadequate environmental targeting.  
8.2.3 Fishers’ preferences for the design of marine Payments for Environmental 
Service schemes 
In addition to understanding those fisher characteristics which can cause reluctance to 
sign up to marine PES schemes, these schemes must inspire participation in the first 
instance. Previous marine conservation interventions, principally designed with little 
collaboration or consensus from local fishers, have largely failed because they were 
unable to inspire compliance (Ferse et al. 2010; Pomeroy et al. 2001).  
PES programme design can be an important factor in a participation decision choice. 
Previous work by Qin et al. (2011), Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010) and Ruto and Garrod 
(2009) show programme design can affect adoption rate of conservation schemes. In 
addition, McClanahan and Mangi (2004) demonstrated heterogeneous preferences for 
marine management restrictions. It follows then, that PES programme design, in 
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particular those restrictions implemented, will have implications for PES participation 
rates.  
In the first instance, Chapter 7 demonstrates CE to be a useful aid in PES design. In the 
second, the attributes of PES management design were indeed shown to have 
implications for PES adoption by fishers; as anticipated increasing restrictions reduced 
the desire to participate. Although hard to compare interventions with differing units 
of change, fishers approximately equated the loss of half of current fishing areas with a 
restriction on nets with mesh size below 6” (an increase from the current 3” status 
quo). Indeed, one might think this a large utility loss to associate with a net mesh 
increase; 50% of fishing grounds is unlikely to be considered punitive in anyone’s eyes. 
However, fishing by many is limited to those in-shore areas accessible via small, non-
motorised one or two man canoes. As it is local fishers complain about the inability to 
catch fish using the legal 3” meshed nets, and illegal nets with smaller meshing are not 
uncommon in the area. Increasing to large mesh sizing will only serve to further 
reduce catch in the in-shore areas.  
PES implementation showed high utility loss to fishers overall. However perhaps more 
interesting, fishers associated the majority of this cost with the initial move away from 
the status quo vs. the additional marginal restrictions themselves. For whatever 
reasons, fishers were reluctant to engage with any additional restrictions in the first 
place and as such showed a strong reluctance to participate in a marine PES scheme. 
Therefore, while programme design is significant, perhaps more important in the first 
instance is building trust. Creating a facilitating environment in fact can be more 
important, and indeed reduce PES compliance costs overall.  
Given potentially high compensation values, increased transactions costs in dealing 
with multiple heterogeneous groups (Jack et al. 2008) and recent evidence that resource 
management decisions in artisanal fishing communities are not always market-driven 
(Daw 2008; Pet-Soede et al. 2001), payments need not necessarily be cash. Positive in-
kind incentives may lower programme costs overall and decrease conflicts if seen as 
more legitimate. Incentives which allow fishers to improve negotiating power, for 
example when selling fish on, will increase all fishers’ income proportionally. 
Incentives could include improved access to storage facilities, a common problem 
within rural artisanal fishing communities. However conditionality, which is 
fundamental to PES, must be retained. Incentives could also be linked to improved 
savings and loans, as has recently been trailed by Net-Works45. Net-works is a recent 
                                                      
45 For more information on Net-Works please visit:  
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innovation by global carpet tile manufacturer Interface, partnered with Zoological 
Society of London, to establish a community-based supply chain for discarded fishing 
nets found along the shore. Payments for nets are made through a voucher scheme 
which participants can then use to ‘buy’ savings shares within a local Village Savings 
and Loans Association. While ‘payments’ are not specifically made for an ecosystem 
service – nets are used as a recycled source of nylon for carpets – environmental and 
development benefits are clear concurrent objectives. Much can be learnt from the 
initiative about implementation in an artisanal setting for both businesses and PES 
schemes alike. 
8.3 Limitations and further research 
This thesis provides insight into some of the challenges and opportunities for PES 
schemes in small-scale fishing communities. At the same time it raises further 
questions which could not be addressed within the context of this thesis. 
A lack of academic literature pertaining to marine PES meant the Chapter 3 in this 
thesis relied solely on expert elicitation. While this technique has the advantage of 
making new knowledge available and highlighting consensus as well as diversity in 
opinion (González et al. 2007), it suffers a number of limitations (Richards 1996). 
Without many real world examples for experts to base their knowledge, expertise is 
drawn from related areas. In addition, where experts refuse to interview, it may not 
always be possible to obtain a representative sample (Richards 1996). This said, a good 
spread of expertise was obtained in the final data chapter, thus we hope a reasonably 
full picture of the state of knowledge in the field. Furthermore, the use of open-ended 
questions was used in order not to lead the experts’ thought process. However, the 
coding of open-ended questions can be subjective. In order to minimise these issues, 
coding was iterative and carried out by the author only. Moreover, within the on-line 
questionnaire, respondents were not motivated to put down all those issues which 
came to them, and perhaps only cited the most pertinent. As such, it is important to 
remember that the elements coded within this final data chapter are perhaps only the 
most relevant in a longer list.  
In spite of these issues, much can be learnt regarding marine PES from expert 
elicitation as has been discovered in this thesis. Given that experts draw on their own 
knowledge base, it would be interesting to dissect results further and identify if certain 
issues are more cited by specific fields. Unfortunately this was not possible given the 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.interfaceflor.co.uk/web/about_us/media_centre_landing_page/press_releases/press-On-
World-Oceans-Day-Interface-and-ZSL-announce-partnership-to-tackle-environmental-problem-blighting-
developing-world-shores 
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wide range of elements coded within the open-ended questions relative to the final 
sample size, and would rely on more targeted close-ended questions.   
Unfortunately, though unavoidable, the hypothetical nature of the marine PES scheme 
raises a number of limitations which should be noted. The hypothetical and cross-
sectional nature of the data does not allow analysis of those actors who may initially 
take up a scheme but drop out later, or more interestingly if members may enrol at a 
later date when the scheme is more well-established and perhaps less ‘risky’; nor does 
it allow examination of other more dynamic aspects of participation, such as 
implications of changing income for example. Further research, over a time-series as 
well as focusing on real marine PES schemes can deal with these issues. Furthermore, it 
is possible that results suffer from hypothetical bias, where respondents have 
strategically answered in order to frame outcomes. This is not unheard of within those 
techniques which rely on hypothetical scenarios such as within a stated preference 
methodology (Chapter 5) (Mitchell & Carson 1993). However, issues can be limited by 
using accurate, meaningful and understandable scenarios (Hanley et al. 1998).  
Primary data from the case study described relied on non-probabilistic sampling 
methods. Non-probabilistic sampling runs the risk of being biased and failing to be 
representative of the target population (Dixon & Leach 1982; Kitchenham & Pfleeger 
2002). Probabilistic sampling methods are the preferred method. Initially fishers were 
randomly selected from village lists. However, the unpredictable nature of fishers and 
the low likelihood of appointments being kept made data collection time-consuming, 
costly and difficult. In any case, non-probabilistic sampling can be justified for pilot 
and exploratory work and where a certain amount of knowledge is known about the 
target population (Dixon & Leach 1982). Efforts were made to target various fishing 
types and wealth groups. The sample from the case site shows similar characteristics to 
previous data on fisher communities collected within the area (Malleret 2004; Malleret 
& Simbua 2004). Furthermore, non-probabilistic sampling methods can suffer from 
issues of self-selection. One might expect that those fishers opposed to the proposed 
PES scheme would refuse to partake in the questionnaire and analysis; however, 
overall the collected sample indicated a large proportion of respondents sampled 
refusing to participate in the PES scheme.  
Despite these limitations, this thesis sheds light on possible barriers to participation 
and calls for a greater understanding of the effect of risk mitigating strategies and 
informal insurance on the adoption of marine PES schemes, as well as PES schemes 
more generally. With the growth of marine PES initiatives, there needs to be an 
increased understanding of those factors (beyond income) which are important for the 
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participation of more vulnerable households. Future research should aim to identify 
further important networks in participating communities, not only with respect to how 
these might influence participation but how a PES scheme might affect these over the 
longer term. Indeed, while such networks may prevent participation, PES with its 
accompanying incentive package may lead to the breakdown of said informal 
insurance systems. In addition, where marine PES schemes hope to target the poorer 
members of society, it will be important to determine those elements of scheme design 
which are preferred and indeed less costly. Within this thesis a limited CE attribute 
design was utilised to determine if CE was a suitable aid in PES programme design. 
PES design attributes were limited to two characteristics and payment size in order to 
reduce cognitive burden. Fishers showed a good comprehension of the CE approach. 
Future studies should concentrate on including all relevant attributes possible. 
Although not delved into in this thesis, it would be interesting to break up perceived 
costs of alternative restrictions by wealth group, and identify proportional costs to 
various groups.  
This thesis is based on one-case study site. It would be useful to see how the results 
herein transfer across to other marine areas, seeing what similarities and differences 
are found. Further analysis to determine the extent to which similarities can be found 
in the terrestrial setting and lessons transferred is advised, and given the more 
established nature of these PES schemes this may indeed be the place to start.   
8.4 Policy Implications 
What appears evident is that marine PES schemes have great potential within the 
coastal and marine environment, and indeed it seems unlikely that the interest in them 
will wain. Marine PES programmes are perhaps used best to compliment some of the 
failings of current instruments, for example to cover initial losses in opportunity costs 
where communities are unable to bear these costs. That PES can inject positive 
incentives alongside conditionality into current tools is perhaps its greatest selling 
point; conditionality will likely improve compliance. However, this novel advantage of 
PES also comes with a caveat: consequences can arise from the addition of this 
incentive-based component. The implications of which should not be overlooked 
within fishing communities. This thesis demonstrates that while marine PES can bring 
opportunities for these communities to secure and sustainably manage their resources, 
inequalities between households can prevent participation of some of the more 
vulnerable.   
PES schemes which aim to be ‘pro-poor’ may utilise quota schemes which include a 
certain quota of low income households; however, care is needed when utilising quota 
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schemes which only look at income. Poverty is multifaceted and extends beyond a lack 
of income. Access to new livelihoods can be determined by gender, class, ethnicity as 
well as social norms and customs to name a few (Allison & Ellis 2001). PES schemes 
which hope to target more vulnerable members of society will need to move away 
from the assumption that communities can be treated as homogeneous units. This 
over-simplification ignores that people can be embedded in dependencies and 
hierarchies, hold different values and therefore respond to incentives and policies 
differently (Coulthard 2012).  
Surprisingly, whilst the type and level of restrictions had a significant impact on the 
likelihood of marine PES adoption, these costs were negligible when compared to the 
initial utility loss associated with a move away from current management practice. 
Fishers showed inertia to move away from current management. As such, marine PES 
should not assume that just because it offers a ‘greater’ incentive package over 
previous conservation models it will simply establish itself and be immediately 
accepted. Factors other than financial needs have been shown to influence fisher 
behaviour (Cinner et al. 2009; Daw 2008). In fact, relics of previous imposed and likely 
failed instruments have left behind legacies of distrust and conflict. As such, it is likely 
that many marine PES will need to be accompanied by conflict resolution instruments 
which can reduce this initial cost. Despite this, CE showed itself to be a useful tool in 
designing and determining possible attributes of a marine PES scheme.  
Demand outside of conservation and development NGOs continues to prove to be an 
issue. However, many of the limitations deterring demand can in fact be opportunities 
for marine PES schemes. Issues such as tenure and enforcement can be opportunities 
for local empowerment. However, with this comes a warning of caution. In promoting 
these benefits, one must not loose sight of the pre-existing exclusions and 
marginalisation which already occur within artisanal communities. In devolving 
rights, recognition of local conditions will be needed in order to prevent 
monopolisation by the more elite. Community contracts should take care not to further 
marginalise the more vulnerable.  
8.5 Conclusions 
PES continue to receive a great deal of attention within development and conservation 
fields alike, and have much to live up to. In the marine environment PES are even more 
nascent; at present most are in the proposal stage. As previously discussed, there has 
been little other critical analysis of PES within a coastal and marine context. More 
worrying is the lack of research associated with possible negative effects within an 
environment known to house some of the world’s most vulnerable.  
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In light of this, we have identified a number of issues that marine PES will need to 
address if they are to be successful.  
In the first instance, work is needed to secure demand. However, many of the issues 
relating to the nature of marine environmental services and tenure can be overcome, 
and indeed should perhaps be looked at as opportunities within the marine and coastal 
environment to secure rights and improve understanding.  
However, in devolving tenure and enforcement rights to communities, marine PES 
must deal with small-scale communities which have underlying inequities. On top of 
this, the nature of PES schemes is one that limits the participation of some. Without 
careful consideration of the most vulnerable, marine PES can exacerbate inequity by 
preventing participation of some vulnerable actors. Care should be taken in the design 
of marine PES schemes. In addition to design factors such as eligibility criteria and 
programme restrictions, the influence that the various types of incentive offered and 
the inherent community structures should be acknowledged. 
One anticipates that PES will continue to flourish within the marine management 
portfolio, in part because it directly addresses some of the key shortcomings of many of 
its predecessors. While we present a rosy picture as to how marine PES can overcome 
some of the more obvious challenges, the final message should be one of caution. Like 
so many failed instruments before it, the long-term successful of marine PES will be 
based on a perception of legitimacy. In turn legitimacy will depend on both the 
effectiveness of management outcomes and the fair and just sharing of benefits. As 
such, getting it ‘socially right’ should be of interest not only to those with development 
agendas but to environmental conservationists as well.  
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A1 Web survey presented to marine and PES experts 
The following screenshots display all pages of web survey except where links are 
hidden (in blue). 
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A2 List of participating experts and organisations 
Id. Name Organisation 
1 Andrew Bovarnick United Nations Development Program 
2 Angelica Klaussén Stockholm University, Sweden 
3 Beatriz Lucas Comunidad y Biodiversidad, Mexico 
4 Thomas Binet CEMARE, University of Portsmouth 
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11 James Spurgeon Sustain Value 
12 Jason Krumholz University of Rhode Island 
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14 Jeff Kinch National Fisheries Authority 
15 Jos Hill Environmental Defense Fund 
16 Josh Donlan Advanced Conservation Strategies 
17 Joshua Cinner James Cook University, Australia 
18 Justin Bousquin EPA ORD Contractor 
19 Katherine Short ICL/WWF 
20 Keith Lawrence Conservation International 
21 Kristina Raab Wageningen University, Netherlands 
22 Lad Atkins REEF Environmental Education Foundation  
23 Linwood Pendleton Duke University 
24 Mark Ellis-Jones Ecosystem Equity 
25 Matt Sommerville Tetra Tech ARD 
26 Matthew Cranford London School of Economics 
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31 Paul Collins Coral Reef Research Foundation 
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33 Peter May University of Washington 
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36 Rashid Sumaila University of British Columbia 
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B1 Data sheets for the questionnaires presented to fishers 
Section A. Tracking Information 
 
 A1. Date form filled (dd/ mm/ yyyy) 
 
 
          
 
 A2. Name of the enumerator      
 
A3. Form filled at (Village/Location)                                                                 
A4. How long have you lived in this village?  years 
 
Section B. Socio-demographic Information 
 
 B1. Name of respondent: 
 B3. Married?:  
 B4. Member of fishing group?  
       If Yes name:  
B2. Age: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
B5. Respondent’s gender   1 Male   2 Female 
B6. Respondent’s highest level of education 
 
 
  1 None 
  2 Primary 
  3 Secondary 
  4 High school 
  5 College / Univ. 
  6 Technical 
  7 Other (specify) 
_________________ 
B7. Are you the head of the household?    1 Yes   2 No 
B8. If responded no to question B7. Is the head of your 
household  
  1 Male 
  2 Married female 
  3 Female spinster 
  4 Widow female 
B9. Head of household’s highest level of education 
 
 
  1 none 
  2 primary 
  3 secondary 
  4 high school 
  5 college / univ. 
  6 technical 
  99 other (specify) 
_________________ 
B10. How many in your household? (share food and 
income) 
Fill in number in corresponding boxes 
  1 Adult males 
  2 Adult females 
  3 Male children 
  4 Female children 
 
B11. Is your main occupation fishing?   1 Yes                            2 No 
B12. How long have you been a fisherman? 
 
Tick one. 
 
  1 Less than 1 year 
  2 1-2 years 
  3 3-5 years 
  4 6-10 years 
  5 11-15 years 
  6 16+ years 
B13. Given that your income from fishing changes on a daily basis but thinking about good and bad days how 
much would you say you earn from fishing on: 
a) on a good day? ___________ 
b) on a average day? ___________ 
c) on a bad day? ___________ 
 
d) this income is split between how many? __________ and is for what kind of fishing? __________ 
What other types of fishing do you do?  
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B14. On average how many days a week do you fish? Time in hours? 
 
 b. Would you say you experience more good or bad days or the same? 
 
 
Section C. Aspirations for the future and attitudes  
C1. Why did you become a fisher? 
 
C2. Do you enjoy being a fisher? 
 
  1 Not at all   2 I don't like it 
very much 
  3 I neither like 
nor dislike it 
  4 I like it   5 I like it very 
much 
 
Please explain why: 
 
C3a. Are there other activities available to you that you would consider 
doing?  
 
b. If yes please list the professions: 
 
  1 Yes    2 No 
 
 
 
C4. If you had the chance, would you prefer to do one of these activities 
as your main activity?  
 
b. Please explain why: 
 
  1 Yes   2 No 
 
 
 
C5. Do you think you will still be fishing in 5 years time? 
 
b. Please explain why: 
 
  1 Yes    2 No 
 
 
 
C6. Overall, do you think the number of fish you catch on the reef has changed over the last five years? N.B. 
Enumerators: Please clarify this is yearly trends not seasonal  
  1 Decreased a 
lot 
  2 Decreased a 
little 
  3 It is about the 
same 
  4 Increased a 
little 
  5 Increased a 
lot 
 
b. Please explain why: 
 
C7. Overall, how do you think your income from fishing has changed in the last five years? 
  1 Decreased a 
lot 
  2 Decreased a 
little 
  3 It is about the 
same 
  4 Increased a 
little 
  5 Increased a 
lot 
 
b. Please explain why: 
 
C8. Overall, do you think the number of days you are required to fish to catch the same amount has increased 
or decreased since you started working as a fisherman? 
  1 These days I spend  
fewer days 
          
  3 The same   5 The days I spend 
 more days 
b. Please explain why: 
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C9. Overall, do you think there are more fishermen now than there were five years ago? 
  1 There are 
many more  
  2 There are a 
few more 
  3 It is about the 
same 
  4 There are a 
few less 
  5 There are far 
fewer 
 
b. Please explain why: 
 
C10. Overall, do you think you are better off, worse off or about the same than before?  
  1 A lot worse off   2 A little worse 
off 
  3 The same   4 A little better 
off 
  5 A lot better off  
 
b. Please explain why: 
 
C11. Overall, do you think the marine park can be beneficial to you in the future? 
  1 Not at all   2 Not very 
much 
  3 I don't know   4 A little   5 A lot  
 
b. Please explain why: 
 
C12. Would you be happy if your son(daughter) became a fisherman(tandilo fisher)?  
  1 Very unhappy   2 Unhappy   3 I don't know   4 Happy   5 Very happy 
 
b. Please explain why: 
 
C13. Do you agree with the statement: There will always be enough fish in the sea available for people to fish? 
  1 Totally 
disagree 
  2 Disagree a 
little 
  3 Neither 
disagree or agree 
  4 Agree a little   5 Totally agree 
 
b. Please explain why: 
 
C14. Do you agree with the statement: If the reef disappears if will make no change to my life? 
  1 Totally 
disagree 
  2 Disagree a 
little 
  3 Neither 
disagree or agree 
  4 Agree a little   5 Totally agree 
 
b. Please explain why: 
 
C15. In your opinion, what kind of improvements could be made to the park regulations? 
 
 
 
 
D. VALUATION  
 
D1. [Enumerator please read this passage to the interviewee] 
 
Due to growing numbers of people both locally and globally, there is an increasing dependence 
on fish. Increased populations and demand has led to an increase in the number of people 
fishing. This has resulted in a decline of fish in the area. Fishing also continues in areas of high 
importance for fish breeding. Fishing of these nursery sites will lead to fish stocks further 
declining.   
 
There are a number of breeding grounds within the marine park. These areas are important for 
the restocking of fish populations and maintaining fish numbers within the park. Furthermore, by 
protecting these areas which are important to juvenile and breeding fish, fish stocks may 
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recover and increase from their current levels, for this reason WWF and CARE International are 
interested in protecting these areas while at the same time improving the livelihoods of local 
fishermen 
 
Enumerator show fisherman map with marked off areas and explain that these areas would be 
areas in which fishing would not be permitted Also make sure without doubt that the respondent 
understands where these areas are. Ask him some land marks to confirm 
 
Please consider how much you fish within these marked areas and the proportion of fish you 
catch there.  
 
 D1a. How much of your total fishing time do you spend fishing within these zoned areas? 
  1 None   2 Less than half   3 About half   4 More than half   5 All  
 
b. How many days would you say you fish in these areas each week/month? 
 
D1b. How much of your catch comes from these areas? 
  1 None   2 Less than half   3 About half   4 More than half   5 All  
 
 
 D1c.  If the regulations changed and the law prevented you from fishing in 
these areas would you change your fishing behaviour? 
 b. Please explain why: 
 
   1 Yes 
  2 No 
  3 Don't know 
 
 D1e.  If the regulations changed and the law prevented you from fishing in 
these areas would this have implications for you welfare? 
 b. Please explain why: 
 
   1 Yes 
  2 No 
  3 Don't know 
 
D1f.  How would your welfare change exactly? 
  1 Welfare would decrease 
  2 Welfare would stay the same 
  3 Welfare would increase 
 
b. Please explain why: 
 
 
 
E2. Enumnerators please read the following to the respondent explaining the map again: 
 
CARE International, alongside WWF, as previously mentioned are interested in improving the 
marine environment in the area, as well as supporting the local livelihoods, particularly of the 
fishers who rely on these resources. In order to do so CARE International are considering a 
conditional cash transfer programme. A conditional cash transfer programme would mean that 
community fishers would be asked to not fish in those specific zoned areas as shown in the 
map as well as stop the use of all illegal fishing gear in all areas, but also compensated for their 
loss of earnings from these changes. 
 
Enumerators: Again show the respondent the map, identifying all the areas where fishing would 
not be permitted, also explain the scenario as described below.  
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The scheme would originally run for 4 to 5 years. The payments would be conditional upon all 
fishers within this community, NOT fishing in these designated areas or using illegal gear. The 
payments would be made on a monthly basis, and all payments would be cancelled if fishing 
continued within the designated areas and illegal gears continued to be used. During this time 
additional investment will be made into the development of alternative occupations which will 
increase the availabilities of alternative activities in the area. Monitoring would be a combined 
effort between local communities, who would all lose out if the rules were broken and the 
Marine Park authority inside park/BMUs officials outside park. In this time it is expected that fish 
stocks will have suitable recovered and fishing profits increased, as well as management 
practices improved allowing the long-term sustainability and profitability of the fishing.   
 
For example far away in the Pacific Ocean, closing areas to fishing has increased local fishers 
catch, both in size and amount. The improvements took a few years to be seen, as fish within 
these areas require time to mature and grow, however after this they often leave the protected 
area. This is why CARE International is looking to support the programme with conditional 
payments over the time it is required for the stocks to recover. However, now these small fishing 
communities in the Pacific which have seen larger catches, more fish and higher income than 
neighbouring communities without such protected areas.  
 
E1a.  Do you think a conditional cash transfer programme – where 
you  are paid a certain amount of money each month for a number of 
years, but at the same time must stop fishing within the zoned areas 
and all illegal fishing during this time period – is something you would 
consider enrolling in?  
 
 b. Can you tell me the reason for your response: 
 
   1 Yes 
  2 No 
  3 Don't know 
  4 Depends on the amount 
 5 Depends on what others 
would do 
 
 
If E2. answered No – go to Section F, If YES – continue with Section E. 
E3. Now I would like you to consider how much is your income as well as the costs associated with fishing in 
these areas. You mentioned that you earned _________(insert answer from B12) from fishing. You also 
mentioned that you caught __________ (insert answer from E1b) of the fish in these areas.  
 
Considering that these areas only provide a certain amount of your fish catch and that this time can be spend 
fishing elsewhere would you accept the following weekly payment to stop fishing in these areas? I am asking for 
the minimum amount you would be prepared to accept, that is, the amount that would leave you as well off as 
you are today, not better, not worse? 
 
NB: READ FIRST. 
It's important to realize that these are early studies. To help us determine if this plan will help and is possible, it 
is important that you give us truthful facts, i.e. the true minimum level of compensation that you would need to 
cover your opportunity costs only for the loss of fishing in these areas.  
Please consider how much you catch in these areas and the time you spend there compared to catch and time 
in other areas. Please note you can continue to fish in other areas using legal gear and generate income from 
these areas. The feasibility of this programme going ahead will depend on if it is affordable, it is possible that 
overinflated responses can lead to the failure of this initiative. 
 
NOW ASK 
Considering all of the above and your fishing patterns what is the minimum weekly compensation value you 
would accept to stop fishing in these areas.  
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Enumerators go down list asking if they would accept each value in sequence. Stop when the responded says 
yes, and writing yes in appropriate box 
 
 Sh T Yes/No   
 500    
 700    
 1000    
 1500    
 2000    
 3000    
 5000    
 7500    
 10,000    
 12,500    
 15,000    
 20,000    
 30,000    
 Other    
E4a. Again, you said that you fish ______ days per week/month in these areas (D1a). By using your averge 
income (B12) I calculated that gives you _________ TSh per week / month. This value appears to be more/less 
than what you asked for in compensation.  
 
b. Why is this? 
 
E5a.  Suppose other fishermen asked for roughly the same level of 
compensation as you, but the scheme was unable to cover all these 
costs, would you be willing to lower the level of compensation 
required? 
 
  b. What new level of compensation would you require? _________ 
 
  c. Please explain why: 
 
   1 Yes 
  2 No 
  3 Don't know 
  4 Depends on the amount 
 
TSh 
E5a.  From our research and talking to other fishers we see that the 
income needed to compensate fishers for loss of fishing in these 
areas is 1000TSh a day, or 5000TSh a week. Understanding this 
would you now be willing to lower the level of compensation 
required? 
 
  b. What new level of compensation would you require? _________ 
 
  c. Please explain why: 
 
   1 Yes 
  2 No 
  3 Don't know 
 
 
 
TSh 
 
 
F. CHOICE EXPERIMENT – FISHERMEN ONLY 
 
F1. Now we would like to ask you a little more about the types of restrictions you would prefer to 
see within the your fishing area. 
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I want you to think about the current law and about further prohibitions in your fishing area, 
more specifically the introduction of additional no-take zones and the prohibition of certain 
gears. These changes come with compensation for these additional restrictions. 
 
I am going to show you three choice cards. Two cards will show you new fishing regulations and 
the third card shows you the current regulation in your fishing area. 
 
Each card has two attributes relating to the possible changes in law which can change:  
• The percentage of your current fishing area to be closed to fishing 
• The allowable net mesh size (in inches) 
 
The final attribute on these cards is a monetary value. This is the level of compensation per 
week you would receive if these restrictions were put in place. Please remember, the values 
shown in BLUE are payments you would receive. Values shown in RED are payments you 
would make each week to have the new restrictions put in place.  
 
Monitoring and enforcement would be a collaboration between the community and the Marine 
Park Authority/BMU. Payments would be made monthly and all payments would be withdrawn if 
the restrictions were not followed. 
 
Please consider carefully which of the scenarios on the cards you prefer, thinking about how 
each restriction would effect your fishing catch, the compensation you would receive and the 
trade-offs between the three.  
 
Enumerators: Please show an example of the cards and choice set and take them through the 
trade offs required: see below.  
 
For example, would you prefer restrictions shown on card 1 which allowed you to fish in all 
areas but you were only allowed to you 6” meshed nets in these areas and were paid 10,000 
TSh compensation a week or would you prefer card 2 which closes 25% of your current fishing 
grounds but allows the use 3” nets and rewards 5,000 TSh a week? Or do you prefer to stick 
with the current management restrictions as shown in card 3?  
 
Enumerators: If interviewee understands the concept continue with game. 
 
Enumerators: Please write card no. of cards picked from bag in table and circle choice 
interviewee make 
 
Round First card Second card No change 
1.   No change 
2.   No change 
3.   No change 
4.   No change 
5.   No change 
6.   No change 
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G. SOCIAL CAPITAL 
G1. If there is a decision to be made in your community, are you involved in 
that decision?  
 
b. If Yes, how so? Actively/passively 
  1 Yes   2 No 
G2. Are you involved in the decision about marine resource use (fishing, shell 
collection, etc) or management?  
 
b. If Yes, how so? Actively/passively? 
  1 Yes   2 No 
G3. Are you involved in community decisions about marine resource use (e.g. 
fishing, shell collection, etc) or management? 
 
b. If Yes, how so? Actively/passively? 
 
  1 Yes   2 No 
G4. How important would you say the following were in your decision to use the fishing gear you use? 
 Not at all 
important 
Not very 
important 
Indifferent    Important Very 
important 
I don't know 
a. skills required       
b. ease of use       
c. boat required       
d. cost of gear       
e. tradition       
f. potential returns       
g. social acceptability       
h. environmental 
impact 
      
i. management 
restrictions  
      
j. other 
List:  
      
 
Please list the three most important factors in choosing your fishing type: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
G5. To what extent do you trust the following groups of people? 
 Not at all Distrust 
more 
people 
than trust 
Trust 
about 
half the 
people 
Trust more 
people 
than 
distrust 
Trust 
all 
Don’t 
know/ 
NA 
a. people you work with       
b. people in your village       
c. community leaders       
d. local government officials       
e. Village Liasion Committee         
f.  NGO staff       
g.fisheries/marine park 
enforcement/BMU officers 
      
h. fishers from other villages       
i. people using different gear        
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G6. Do you belong to any groups or societies? 
 
If Yes, please enter into table below: 
  1 Yes   2 No 
Name of group Group type No. of 
meetings in 
last 6 months 
No. of 
meetings you 
attended 
    
    
    
    
G7. Do you have close family outside of this village?    1 Yes   2 No 
 
If Yes, please fill in the table below for all close family members outside of this village 
Relation Live where now? Lived in village 
before? 
If yes, when did the 
person move away? 
If yes, why did the 
person move 
away? 
     
     
     
     
G8. With whom can you discuss important matters? (anything important to you) 
  
Write the details in the table below.  
Name Occupation Lives in 
village? 
(Y/N) 
Type of information exchanged? 
    
    
    
    
G9. If you noticed changes in the natural environment (e.g. the number of fish caught, the condition of the 
mangrove forest or reef, etc), who would you discuss this with?  
 
Write the details in the table below. 
Name Occupation Lives in 
village? 
(Y/N) 
Type of information exchanged? 
    
    
    
    
G10. Do you exchange information with anyone which is useful for you to carry out 
your common occupation? (E.g. you tell or are told about good fishing spots, 
practices, equipment, timing and season, etc?) 
Write the details in the table below. 
  1 Yes   2 No 
Name  Occupation In 
village? 
(Y/N) 
Relation Known 
how 
long? 
Meet 
how 
often? 
Type of 
information 
exchanged 
I give I 
receive 
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G11. Is there any person(s) on whom you depend, or depend on you, to carry out 
your (their) occupation? (e.g. do you need someone else’s boat gear, nets etc to 
carry out your occupation?) 
Write the details in the table below. 
  1 Yes   2 No 
Name  Occupation In 
village? 
(Y/N) 
Relation Known 
how 
long? 
Meet 
how 
often? 
What is the 
exchange/ 
common link?  
I give I 
receive 
         
         
         
         
 
G12. During bad fishing times, when catch is low, is there any person(s) on whom 
you can rely to help you through these weeks/months, or depend on you, to help 
them through difficult times?  
Write the details in the table below. 
 
  1 Yes 
 
  2 No 
Name  Occupation In 
village? 
(Y/N) 
Relation Known 
how 
long? 
Meet 
how 
often? 
What is the 
exchange/ 
common link? 
I give I 
receive 
         
         
         
         
G13. In your occupation do you sell your catch to anyone in particular?   
 
Write the details in the table below. 
  1 Yes   2 No 
Name  Occupation In 
village? 
(Y/N) 
Relation Known 
how 
long? 
Meet 
how 
often? 
What is the 
exchange/ 
common link? 
I give I 
receive 
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H. FISHING DEMOGRAPHICS 
H1. What gears do you and your household use?  
Fill in all that apply 
Gear Tick all Tick if 
respondent 
uses 
No. of others 
in HH using 
gear 
No. of gear 
rented 
No. of gear 
owned with 
others 
No. of gear 
owned 
alone 
Gleaning 1      
Spear/stick 2      
Speargun 3      
Line 4      
Basket trap 5      
Tidal weir 6      
Net>=3” 7      
Net 2”-2.5” 8      
Net1.5” 9      
Net 1” 10      
Ring net (Juya) 11      
Beach seine Kokoro) 12      
Tandillo 13      
Longline 14      
H2. Do you use a boat to fish? 
b. If Yes, what type and what level of ownership do you have? 
  1 Yes   2 No 
 Tick Boat type How many? Has engine? 
Work on ‘Tajifi’ 1    
Borrow boat 2    
Rent boat 3    
Own boat with others 4    
Own boat  5    
H3. Please describe your catch and income from catch 
Gear:________________________ 
 On a good day On an average 
day 
On a bad day Split between how 
many? 
Fish species generally caught     
Approx no/weight     
Approx income (TSh)     
H4. Did you previously use gear/nets which are now illegal?   1 Yes   2 No 
  
b. If Yes, please list the gear and fill out table: 
Gear:________________________ 
 On a good day On an average 
day 
On a bad day Split between how 
many? 
Fish species generally caught     
Approx no/weight     
Approx income (TSh)     
H5. What other work do YOU personally have or have done in the last 5 years? 
Occupation Main 
job 
(Y/N) 
If stopped, why stop? Could get 
similar work 
now? (Y/N) 
Money brings to 
household/week 
(Sh T) 
Prefer to 
fishing? (Y/N) 
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H6. What activities do you and other people in your household do that bring in food or money to your house?  
Activity Tick if 
respondent 
No. of people 
(include 
respondent) 
Rank of 
importance  
Done for 
income or 
subsistence 
Weekly income to 
household  
(Sh T) 
Fishing      
Gleaning      
Mariculture      
Marketing marine 
products 
     
Farming      
Cash crops      
Livestock      
Small business      
Informal wage       
 
I. ASSETS/CAPITAL  
 
I1. House material: Observe the houses/ or ask the respondent about the houses which belong to his/her 
households-confirm which is the households’ main house, observe and note 
 
I1a. House walls    I1b. Household roof 
 Score Number of 
houses 
  Score Number of 
houses 
Thatch bad condition(b) 1   No roof  0  
Thatch good condition (g) 2   Grass (b) 1  
Mud (b) 3   Grass (g) 2  
Mud (g) 4   Thatch (b) 3  
Stone/Mud bricks – part of house 5   Thatch (g) 4  
Stone/Mud brick – all of house 6   Tin (b) 5  
Cement blocks- part 7   Tin (g) 6  
Cement blocks – whole 8   Tile (b) 7  
Plaster/Paint – part 9   Tile (g) 8  
Plaster/Paint - whole 10      
 
I2. In this household do people:  
 
I2a. own private transport?  I2b. own household items? 
 Score Number    Score Number  
None 0   Mobile phone 1  
Bicycle 1   Electric fan 2  
Motorbike 2   TV 3  
Car 3   Refrigerator 4  
    Satellite dish 6  
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I3. In this household: 
 
I3a. how do you access 
power? 
 I3b. how do you access water?  I3c. do you own house(s)? 
 Score   Score   Score Number 
None 0  River/Well/Pump free 
access 
1  Borrow 
house 
1  
Battery 1  Buy water 2  Rent house 2  
Generator/ 
Solar 
2  Own private water 3  Own house 3  
   Have own tap outside 4  Have title 
deed 
4  
   Have own tap in house 5     
   Have water tank 6     
 
I4. Does the household own:  
  
I4a. livestock?  I4b. farmland? 
 Score Number   Score Acres 
None 0   Don’t farm 0  
Chicken/Duck 1   Borrow land 1  
Goat/Sheep 2   Rent land 2  
Cows 3   Own land 3  
    Have title deed 4  
 
J. QUESTIONS FOR FISHER WIVES 
 
J1. Who owns the land on which you live?   1 Husband 
  2 Both 
  3 Another HH male 
  4 Me 
  5 Rented  
  6 Other 
J2. Respondent’s highest level of education? 
 
 
  1 None 
  2 Primary 
  3 Secondary 
  4 High school 
  5 College/University 
  6 Technical 
  7 Other (specify) 
________________ 
J3. Does your husband give you any money?   1 Yes   2 No 
J4. If Yes, how much money does you husband give you in a: 
a. good week 
b. average week 
c. bad week  
d. How often do you this receive money from your husband? 
 
  1 Daily 
  2 Few times a week  
  3 Once a week 
  4 Less than once a week 
e. What do you spend this income on? 
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J5. Who in your household is responsible for the buying of food? 
 
  1 Me 
  2 Husband  
  3 Someone else 
J6. Do you earn your own money? 
 
  1 Yes  
  2 No  [Go to J8] 
J7. From what activities do you earn money?   
 
b. What you do with this money?  
for example you give anyone / you reserve for your own / buy the needs of others? 
 
J8. Do you account for any products brought into household? (E.g. food from gleaning/farming activities) 
 
 
 
 
  
J9. Do you farm?   1 Yes   2 No 
b. Do you farm for food or money? 
  1 Money 
  2 Food     [Go to J9d] 
  3 Both 
 
c. Where do you spend the money? (tick all that apply) 
  1 Husband 
  2 Home 
  3 Self 
d. What products do you farm? 
 
e. Who owns your house and garden? 
 
f. Who owns your farmland? 
 
J10. What activities do you and other people in your household do that bring in food or money to your house?  
Activities: Importance 
  
  
  
J11. What level of control would you say you have over household income? 
 
  1 No control   2 A little control   3 Control equally 
with husband 
  4 A lot of 
control 
  5 Total control  
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B2 Facilitating legal framework in Tanzania 
Policy/legislation Description 
National Land Policy, 1995. Dual land tenure system.  
All land owned by State.  
Stipulates that all beaches are public. 
Land Act, 1998. Statutory right of occupancy stipulates the right to use and 
occupy land through Title Deed. 
Enables transfer of ownership of land  
Village Land Act, 1998. 
 
Customary right of occupancy gives the right to use and occupy 
land through Certificate of Customary Land issued by village 
councils and registered at District Land Registry. 
National Fisheries Sector Policy, 1997. 
 
Allocation and utilisation of fisheries resources in favour of 
rural communities.  
Involvement of fisher communities in planning, developing and 
managing fisheries resources. 
The Fisheries Act No.6, 1970 Provides for protection, conservation, development, regulation 
and control of fish, fish products, aquatic flora and fauna  
Regulations surrounding spawning protection and pollution of 
waters 
The Fisheries Act, 2003. Enables community-based management 
Establishment of Beach Management Units (and strengthening 
of Village Liaison Committees within marine Parks).  
Joint management agreement between central #government and 
local communities and equitable benefit sharing.  
Exclusion rights afforded to community-based management 
units 
National Forest Policy, 1998. Community-based.  
Village creation and ownership of forests.  
Joint management agreement between central #government and 
local communities and equitable benefit sharing.  
National Environmental Policy, 1997. Local authorities responsible for overseeing planning process 
and establishing local environmental policies and regulations. 
Source: Francis & Bryceson (2000) & Harrison et al. (2010) 
  
 291 
B3 Village effects Model 
 MALE  FEMALE 
Variables Model 4        Model 5 
Village fixed 
effects 
 Model 4 Model 5 
Village fixed 
effects 
Alt_inc 0.239*** 
(0.037) 
0.191***  
(0.040) 
 0.245*** 
(0.045) 
0.327*** 
(0.086) 
Grp_memb 0.034    
(0.213) 
-0.115      
(0.294) 
 0.672*** 
(0.253) 
0.786**    
(0.377) 
Dep_work 0.030    
(0.057) 
0.020       
(0.066) 
 -0.203*** 
(0.045) 
-0.252*** 
(0.052) 
Rely_hardtime -0.074   
(0.047) 
-0.069      
(0.063) 
 0.044 
(0.099) 
0.029      
(0.094) 
Avetrust 0.247*** 
(0.056) 
0.321*       
(0.173) 
 0.241 
(0.180) 
-1.801 (1.354) 
InTrust -0.126   
(0.172) 
-  -0.299 
(0.317) 
- 
Inpark 1.056    
(0.660)  
-  1.136 
(1.182) 
- 
Age -0.008   
(0.007) 
-0.010      
(0.008) 
 -2.0e-04 
(0.003) 
-0.004    
(0.003) 
Education -0.168   
(0.160) 
-0.090      
(0.182) 
 0.328* 
(0.177) 
0.359*    
(0.202) 
HHsize 0.069    
(0.054) 
0.092*     
(0.055) 
 -0.016 
(0.019) 
-0.002    
(0.024) 
MSL 0.071    
(0.046) 
0.076*     
(0.045) 
 -0.087 
(0.066) 
-0.114    
(0.088) 
Land_area -0.029* 
(0.016) 
-0.016      
(0.023) 
 -0.033 
(0.044) 
-0.022    
(0.039) 
Fish_income 0.086*  
(0.047) 
0.084       
(0.059) 
 -0.192 
(0.320) 
-0.451    
(0.392) 
Own_boat -0.416** 
(0.472) 
-0.481*** 
(0.173) 
 - - 
Dhow  -0.321*** 
(0.121) 
-0.402*** 
(0.144) 
 - - 
Legal -0.193   
(0.203) 
-0.152      
(0.238) 
 - - 
Perceived_change -0.285** 
(0.131) 
-0.288**    
(0.141) 
 -0.081 
(0.156) 
-0.038    
(0.161) 
Better_off -0.119  
(0.117) 
0.146       
(0.117) 
 -0.234*** 
(0.054) 
-0.232*** 
(0.056) 
Cons_benefit 0.187*** 
(0.052) 
0.209***   
(0.052) 
 0.184** 
(0.074) 
0.294*** 
(0.084) 
Happy_child -0.153** 
(0.077) 
-0.167*    
(0.087) 
 -0.209*** 
(0.054) 
-0.249*** 
(0.063) 
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 MALE  FEMALE 
Variables Model 4        Model 5 
Village fixed 
effects 
 Model 4 Model 5 
Village fixed 
effects 
Village      
Mkubiru  2.196    
(0.976)** 
  -8.532*    
(5.014) 
Mngoji  1.171*     
(0.979) 
  -9.500*    
(5.037) 
Msimbati  -1.585**    
(0.731) 
  -4.382    
(5.051) 
Naumbu  -0.133      
(0.869) 
  -9.934*   
(5.426) 
Pemba  0.480       
(1.218) 
  -7.660    
(5.496) 
Vill#avetrust      
Mkubiru  -0.422**   
(0.212) 
  1.976      
(1.214) 
Mngoji  -0.512    
(0.228)** 
  1.982*    
(1.200) 
Msimbati  0.554***   
(0.160) 
  0.959      
(1.212) 
Naumbu  -0.059      
(0.189) 
  2.330*    
(1.311) 
Pemba  -0.196      
(0.296) 
  1.623      
(1.339) 
      
_cons -0.736  
(1.001) 
-0.829      
(1.495) 
 -0.890 
(1.271) 
9.884* (5.237) 
      
N 223 223  286  286 
LogLikelihood -116.439 -112.103   -147.787 -138.964 
PseudoR2 0.2454 0.2735  0.1589 0.2091 
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B4 Chow test: Male vs. female fishers 
Variables Pooled 
model 
Interaction 
model:  
Main 
effect 
Interaction 
w.male 
MALE -0.444***      
(0.138) 
 -1.641 46 
(1.142) 
 
Alt_inc 0.251***      
(0.041) 
 0.245*** 
(0.059) 
-0.006  
(0.068) 
Grp_memb 0.425***       
(0.143) 
 0.672*** 
(0.253) 
0.628* 
(0.337) 
Dep_work -0.141***       
(0.032) 
 -0.203*** 
(0.045) 
0.233*** 
(0.064) 
Rely_hardtime -0.019          
(0.047) 
 0.044 
(0.099) 
-0.117 
(0.124) 
Avetrust 0.285***        
(0.096) 
 0.241!47 
(0.180) 
0.006 
(0.167) 
InTrust -0.315**       
(0.139) 
 -0.299 
(0.317) 
0.173 
(0.390) 
Inpark 1.451***      
(0.560) 
 1.056!48 
(0.660) 
0.080 
(1.329) 
Age -0.003         
(0.004) 
 -2.02e-04 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
Education 0.075 
(0.101) 
 -0.328* 
(0.177) 
-0.496*** 
(0.191) 
HHsize 0.023 
(0.025) 
 -0.016 
(0.019) 
0.085 
(0.063) 
MSL -0.004     
(0.041) 
 -0.087 
(0.066) 
0.158** 
(0.077) 
Land_area -0.051***  
(0.016) 
 -0.033 
(0.044) 
0.004 
(0.054) 
Fish_income 0.478  
(0.519) 
 -0.133 
(0.221) 
0.218 
(0.223) 
Own_boat -0.401** 
(0.188) 
 -0.416** 
(0.177) 
 
Dhow  -0.255**   
(0.108) 
 -0.321*** 
(0.121) 
 
Legal -0.218   
(0.190) 
 -0.193 
(0.203) 
 
Perceived_change -0.159      
(0.104) 
 -0.081 
(0.156) 
-0.204 
(0.218) 
Better_off -0.165**      
(0.067) 
 -0.234*** 
(0.054) 
0.116 
(0.102) 
Cons_benefit 0.216***      
(0.012) 
 0.185** 
(0.074) 
0.002 
(0.120) 
Happy_child -0.198***      
(0.051) 
 -0.209*** 
(0.059) 
0.056 
(0.093) 
_cons -0.125          
(0.735) 
 0.890 
(1.271) 
 
N 509  509  
LogLikelihood -274.027  -264.226  
PseudoR2 0.2004  0.2290  
chi2 (5)   39.43  
Prob>chi2   0.0000  
                                                      
46 In line with pooled results (men & women) (p=0.151) given high correlation between male and 
interactions within Chow test. 47Again, in line with pooled results (p=0.181). 48 Just above 10% at p=0.109. 
Significance levels in interaction model give results of t-tests across individual variables for main and 
interaction effect.  
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B5 Full model specifications: Varying Trust variables 
Variables Model 4 
Average 
Trust 
Model 6     
Trust in 
Authority 
Model 7      
Trust in 
fishers 
from 
village 
Model 8          
Trust in 
fishers 
from other 
villages 
Model 6b  
Trust in 
Authority 
marginal 
effects 
Alt_inc 0.239*** 
(0.037) 
0.243*** 
(0.047) 
0.288*** 
(0.034) 
0.359***        
(0.094) 
0.097         
(0.019) 
Grp_memb 0.034    
(0.213) 
0.048      
(0.213) 
0.092       
(0.231) 
0.123              
(0.231) 
0.019         
(0.085) 
Dep_work 0.030    
(0.057) 
0.048      
(0.060) 
-0.007      
(0.068) 
-0.021            
(0.084) 
0.019         
(0.024) 
Rely_hardtime -0.074   
(0.047) 
-0.080*    
(0.045) 
-0.082*   
(0.047) 
-0.083*           
(0.048) 
-0.032        
(0.018) 
Avetrust 0.247*** 
(0.056) 
0.103*    
(0.058) 
0.376*** 
(0.143) 
0.110             
(0.166) 
0.041         
(0.023) 
Trust*Inpark -0.126   
(0.172) 
-0.104     
(0.116) 
-0.251     
(0.219) 
-0.155            
(0.184) 
-0.041        
(0.046) 
Inpark 1.056    
(0.660)  
0.955**    
(0.439) 
1.706      
(1.039) 
1.131**          
(0.574) 
0.337         
(0.156) 
Age -0.008   
(0.007) 
-0.008  
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.014 
(0.011) 
-0.003      
(0.003) 
Education -0.168   
(0.160) 
-0.177 
(0.165) 
-0.162 
(0.172) 
-0.087  
(0.235) 
-0.070   
(0.066) 
HHsize 0.069    
(0.054) 
0.071 
(0.054) 
0.058 
(0.048) 
0.071 
(0.059) 
0.028    
(0.022) 
MSL 0.071    
(0.046) 
0.064 
(0.049) 
0.091** 
(0.044) 
0.085** 
(0.042) 
0.025    
(0.020) 
Land_area -0.029* 
(0.016) 
-0.028* 
(0.016) 
-0.031 
(0.020) 
0.002 
(0.031) 
-0.011    
(0.051) 
Fish_income 0.086*  
(0.047) 
0.087* 
(0.049) 
0.070* 
(0.040) 
0.093 
(0.062) 
-0.035   
(0.019) 
Own_boat -0.416** 
(0.472) 
-0.432** 
(0.181) 
-0.413** 
(0.188) 
-0.430** 
(0.193) 
-0.172   
(0.071) 
Dhow -0.321*** 
(0.121) 
-0.316*** 
(0.114) 
-0.377*** 
(0.146) 
-0.327* 
(0.186) 
-0.125   
(0.006) 
Legal -0.193   
(0.203) 
-0.194 
(0.199) 
-0.207 
(0.192) 
-0.193 
(0.222) 
-0.077   
(0.079) 
Perceived_change -0.285** 
(0.131) 
-0.293** 
(0.129) 
-0.288** 
(0.132) 
-0.274* 
(0.161) 
-0.117   
(0.051) 
Better_off -0.119  
(0.117) 
-0.110 
(0.129) 
-0.140 
(0.121) 
-0.184 
(0.120) 
-0.044   
(0.046) 
Cons_benefit 0.187*** 
(0.052) 
0.193*** 
(0.057) 
0.196*** 
(0.085) 
0.210 
(0.059) 
0.077    
(0.023) 
Happy_child -0.153** 
(0.077) 
-0.150* 
(0.080) 
-0.180** 
(0.034) 
-0.192** 
(0.076) 
-0.060    
(0.032) 
_cons -0.736  
(1.001) 
-0.182 
(0.940) 
-1.436 
(0.938)  
-0.085 
(1.271) 
 
N 223 223 221 199   
LogLikelihood -116.439 -116.754 -113.812  -99.938  
PseudoR2 0.2454 0.2433 0.2561 0.2748  
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B6 Full model specifications: CE Trust 
 Base model: nested  Base model: conditional 
 Coeff  SD  Coeff  SD 
Closure -0.017 ** 0.009  -0.022 ** 0.010 
Net_small 0.268  0.394  0.315  0.358 
Net_large -0.852 * 0.455  -0.989 ** 0.490 
Payment_US 0.041 * 0.024  0.040  0.032 
ASC 0.549  0.444  0.643 * 0.353 
Avetrust_closure 0.002  0.002  0.003  0.003 
Avetrust_netsm -0.053  0.104  -0.055  0.095 
Avetrust_netlg 0.075  0.118  0.071  0.129 
Avetrust_payment 0.005  0.007  0.009  0.009 
Avetrust_ASC 0.060  0.116  0.088  0.093 
        
Log-L -1597.0477  -1600.8923 
Adj-Pseudo R2   0.1350 
Waldchi  64.73   
Prob >chi 0.0000  0.0000 
    
N (choices) 5052  5054 
N(cases) 1684   
LR test for IIA P>chi2 -   
 
